Abstract
Strawson has recently developed a style of semantic subject-predicate analysis which, applied to certain sentences, rivals a standard account that turns on the notion of scope. His account depends on three notions: (i) complex, derivative properties, (ii) predicate-negation, and (iii) substantiation—an alleged semantic function having particular-specification as a special case. As I further develop it, the suspicion energes that his account simply is the scope account in disguise. I show that it is rather an untenable rival, placing the blame on his notion (iii), vindicating his notion (i) and finding his notion (ii) theoretically needless.
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Patton, T.E. Replies and discussion on Strawson' substitute for scope. Linguistics and Philosophy 2, 291–304 (1978). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00350260
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00350260