Abstract
In this paper I am going to examine Kelsen’s legal positivism in the light of Nazilegal theory. My claim will be that Kelsen’s thesis that law and morality constitute two distinct normative spheres is highly plausible, but that some of his metaethical assumptions are seriously flawed.
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Pauer-Studer, H. (2014). Kelsen’s Legal Positivism and the Challenge of Nazi Law. In: Galavotti, M.C., Nemeth, E., Stadler, F. (eds) European Philosophy of Science – Philosophy of Science in Europe and the Viennese Heritage. Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook, vol 17. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-01899-7_16
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-01899-7_16
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-01898-0
Online ISBN: 978-3-319-01899-7
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