In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:

Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 9.1 (2002) 19-21



[Access article in PDF]

Moral Principles Don't Signify

Paul E. Mullen


Abstract thinking is to see nothing in a murderer except the abstract fact that he is a murderer, and to annul all other human aspects in him with this simple quality."

(Hegel 1817)

DAVID WARD, in his interesting essay, advances a number of propositions:

  1. That moral (including evil) behavior must be governed by a principle.
  2. That the principles involved in evil actions are unconscious.
  3. That these unconscious evil principles may be the product of malignant narcissism.
  4. And somewhat tentatively, that evil is driven "independent of any conscious desires" and by implication the evil person may be stripped of moral responsibility for their behavior.

To begin with common ground: Those who act in an evil manner, in my experience, do not usually acknowledge that they acted on an evil principle (nor do those who commit good acts, excepting the terminally self-righteous, usually explain their behavior in terms of adherence to principles). Among serious offenders, self-justification in terms of having no choice is more common or the hapless claim that "I don't know why I did that" or even "I can't believe I did that" (which all too often becomes "I can't remember doing that" for as Nietzche (1886) wrote "I have done that—says my memory. I could not have done that—says my pride and remains inexorable. Eventually memory gives in"). Those who do appeal to principle to justify their evil actions almost inevitably cite value systems that have considerable, if not universal, acceptance. I have encountered men who proudly declared their killings to be part of the pursuit of righteous aims, such as protecting children from pedophiles, stopping the killing of the unborn child, reducing AIDS, and cleansing their city of vice. Interestingly the combination of dreadful, and in many cases repeated, violence with self-righteous superiority often attracts from fellow prisoners and prison staff a label of evil.

Doctor Ward bases his argument in the Kantian notion that individuals direct their conduct through the reasoned application of a prior knowledge of moral rules. There are alternative views. For example, Aristotle held that virtue is a habit, or skill, learned by practice, just as harp players acquire the skill of musicianship by repeated playing. Spending my time with offenders has made me an Aristotelian. Both morality and criminality seem in practice to arise more from habit realized in the oft-repeated banalities of our acts than from any consideration of the moral implications of those acts (Mullen 1992). We usually act in response to most situations in a manner that reflects our habitual ways of understanding and behaving. Polite people respond politely, honest people honestly, self-seeking people selfishly, and chronically angry people with [End Page 19] confrontation. Sometimes the enormous impact of an extreme circumstance, such as being threatened with a weapon or confronted with infidelity, may produce explosive and violent responses that the actor, and those who know them, would never have expected. Such atypical responses are rarely, if ever, chosen on the basis of principle but reflect rapidly formulated commitments to action made in the heat of the moment. Habitual ways of responding can and do change with changing attitudes. We are capable of shifting our world view, almost always to remain consonant with the attitudes of those among whom we live, but just occasionally in response to independent thought or personal experiences (e.g., an unexpected disaster that undermines our views of order and justice). Principled action may well be the exclusive domain of socially awkward, obsessive recluses living in eighteenth century Germany. In our world, moral principles do not seem to signify; only the moral subject with their specific structuring of the world and themselves (Clark and Holquist 1984). That impression could of course be because, as David Ward suggests, the principles are unconscious.

The unconscious is a curious concept. That we selectively forget, that we deceive ourselves as well as others, and that we restructure the past in accord with the needs of the...

pdf

Share