Abstract
The impact of globalization on human rights has generated substantial debate. On the one hand, those making liberal, free-market arguments assert that globalization has a positive impact on developing countries through the increased generation of wealth (e.g., Garrett 1998; Richards et al. in International Studies Quarterly 45:219–239, 2001; Rodrik in Challenge 41:81–94, 1997). On the other hand, the critical perspective claims that globalization negatively impacts respect for human rights because trading arrangements, while open, are detrimentally uneven (e.g., Carleton 1989; Haggard and Maxfield 1996; Stiglitz and Charlton 2005). However, few have looked at the relationship between globalization and respect for economic and social rights. In order to test this relationship, I examine non-OECD countries utilizing two-stage regression analysis to control for investment-selection factors. I find mixed results for the hypothesis that globalization negatively affects respect for economic and social rights. Consistent with Richards et al. (International Studies Quarterly 45:219–239, 2001), I conclude by arguing for the need to disaggregate globalization in order to determine its true effects.
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Notes
I use the general term “globalization” to refer to economic globalization.
Additional economic rights include equal opportunity for promotion, a decent living, safe and healthy working conditions, rest, leisure, and periodic public holidays with pay and the right to form and to participate in domestic and international labor organizations.
This is consistent with Richards et al. (2001).
A lasting management interest is defined as ownership of 10% or more of voting stock in an enterprise located in an economy other than that of the investor. FDI is expressed as the sum of equity capital, reinvestment of earnings, and other long- and short-term capital as shown in the balance of payments of the reporting economy.
Investment selection factors appearing in both models include respect for economic and social rights, economic growth, regime type, civil conflict, and interstate conflict.
The CIRI dataset is based on an additive scale which ranges from zero to eight (no respect for physical integrity rights to complete respect). The physical integrity rights considered are the right to live a life free from torture, political imprisonment, extra-judicial killing, and disappearance.
More specifically, democratic leaders are held more accountable due to larger constituencies and the regular threat of losing power through routine elections.
This measure consists of net ODA (comprising disbursements of loans made on concessional terms and grants by official agencies of Development Assistance Committee or DAC members and non-member countries alike as well as multilateral institutions) to promote economic development and welfare in countries and territories in part I of the DAC list of recipients. It includes loans with a grant element of at least 25% (calculated at a rate of discount of 10%). Net official aid is also included in this measure and refers to aid flows (net of repayments) from official donors to countries and territories in part II of the DAC list of recipients. Official aid is provided under terms and conditions similar to those for ODA.
This measure is the sum of principal repayments and interest paid in foreign currency, goods or services on long-term debt, and interest paid on short-term debt and repayments, including both repurchases and charges made to the International Monetary Fund. The data are collected from the World Bank.
This measure consists of the purchases of stocks and bonds by foreign investors, which total less than 10% of the total enterprise being invested in. Corporate securities, money market instruments, bonds, notes, and financial derivatives are included.
Of course, this depends on the government’s willingness to redistribute wealth and is controlled for by the inclusion of other variables such as regime type. As discussed later, democracies are more willing to redistribute wealth due to higher accountability to populations via elections.
An armed conflict is defined as “a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths” (Gleditsch et al. 2002, 1).
By adding ten to each score, I transform this variable into a zero to 20 measure.
I expected these to have a large impact due to the sheer amount of FDI and the stated goals of ODA.
For the sake of space, I only include two-stage results. No variables change in their direction or significance in the one-stage model (however, the magnitude of the effects do change).
For a more extensive discussion of the consequences of portfolio investment, see Grabel (1998).
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Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Rod Abouharb and Jeremy Wells for reading earlier versions of this paper and David Sobek for his continuous advice. I am also very appreciative of the feedback that I received at the 2008 American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, and I have attempted to incorporate those suggestions into the finished product. Finally, I am extremely grateful to Steven Roper and Lilian Barria for their many helpful suggestions during the final revision process. I, of course, take full credit for any omissions or errors.
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Payne, C.L. Bringing Home the Bacon or Not? Globalization and Government Respect for Economic and Social Rights. Hum Rights Rev 10, 413–429 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12142-009-0128-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12142-009-0128-0