Abstract
In this paper I argue that the political and economic domains are analogous for distributive purposes. The upshot of this conclusion is that because we normally think that an unequal distribution of votes is objectionable even if these inequalities are strictly necessary to improve the lives of less informed voters, so we should conclude that an unequal distribution of resources might be similarly objectionable even if strictly necessary to make the worse off better off. Leveling down economic resources is therefore sometimes morally permissible. I consider and reject three types of objections to this view.
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Notes
Or the virtuous and the corrupt, the wise and the ignorant, and so on.
What I am calling here the “democratic objection” might object to Mill’s proposal for reasons other than equality. If this is true, then one can both affirm the objection and the thesis. I argue against this possibility in Peña-Rangel (2022).
To be sure, one might argue that because it is impermissible to level down, it is therefore impermissible to distribute votes according to an egalitarian principle such as OPOV. Throughout this article I will assume the opposite view and ask what might follow from it.
A slightly different way of putting this same challenge says that the state’s obligation to promote relational equality flows straightforwardly form democracy, and because economic institutions are not constrained by democracy in the same way that political institutions are, the state ought not level down to promote relational equality.
I will use these two terms—relational and social equality—interchangeably throughout the paper.
See, for example, Conly’s (2016, 46–48) discussion of “equal treatment.” Conly does not discuss political equality, however—just inequalities in economic resources.
I am following my discussion in Peña-Rangel (2022).
Rawls attributes this view to Rousseau.
Scanlon is relaying TM Cottom’s (2013) account: https://talkingpointsmemo.com/cafe/why-do-poor-people-waste-money-on-luxury-goods. Last accessed: July 19, 2023.
Or near fully realized: perhaps there is some fifth or sixth complaint I have overlooked.
There is also the idea of standing as equals, that I leave aside for illustrative purposes. Objections (a) through (d) are meant to be tracking all three constitutive features of relating as equals.
A commonly invoked challenge against the view that political equality (in the form perhaps of “one person, one vote” [OPOV]) is not necessary for relational equality depends on this tension. A different kind of objection, however, is discussed by Cox (2022). Cox thinks that political inequality is objectionable only because and only insofar those with more power can extract greater consideration from others. I take it that, if true, this would undermine the constitutive grounding—objection (c)—against voting (and, given the analogy, resource) inequalities. Cox asks us to consider the following example: suppose that we live in a society in which we all think that votes are distributed according to OPOV when in fact they are not: some of the machines used to tally the votes are broken, unbeknownst to all of us, effectively granting some people one vote and zero votes to others. Cox’s question is whether this would count as a society of equals, and concludes that it would since not knowing that some of us have more/less power means that we cannot convert these power inequalities into inequalities of consideration. Yet, suppose you found out about the faulty machines (without actually knowing whether you are on the losing or winning side of the inequality and without knowing which machines work and which are faulty). Would you have an objection of the kind “we should replace all these machines?” And, if so, what grounds such an objection? Not that some voters enjoy greater rewards, benefits, or something of the kind. Nor that political decisions are different from what they might otherwise have been: suppose there is a normal distribution of faulty machines, such that the final vote count is representative of the population. Nor, lastly, that I or others enjoy greater consideration as a result. I cannot help but think that the objection depends on the thought that, in a society of equals, we owe political equality to one another. I try to defend this kind of view in Peña-Rangel (2022).
My emphasis on well-being here is meant to track one specification of the leveling down objection that seems most threatening to egalitarian views. A certain distribution, X, would represent a leveled-down state of affairs with respect to another distribution, Y, only if (i) at least one person in X is made worse off (or prevented from becoming better off), all things considered, without thereby making any other person all-things-considered better off, (ii) resulting primarily in a more egalitarian state of affairs. The emphasis on well-being is important because otherwise we run the risk of losing sight of the fact that leveling down in one currency—money, say—might bring about important advantages in another dimension—opportunities, for instance. Focusing on well-being allows us to make all-things-considered evaluations that track condition (i), a condition I refer to as “the reverse Pareto condition.” I have a more detailed discussion of this point in Peña-Rangel (2022) and Peña-Rangel (2023). However, there might be other currencies for which leveling down would be impermissible, and I do not want to suggest otherwise. If justice, for instance, is the sort of thing that comes in degrees, it might be impermissible to level down the amount of justice that one person experiences just to bring her down to the level of justice another person experiences. With respect to justice as a good we distribute, it seems like equality, sufficiency, or even some versions of the difference principle share similar flaws. I thank an anonymous reviewer for raising this question.
Anderson (1999, 320) says, for example, that “democratic equality… requires that everyone have effective access to enough resources to avoid being oppressed by others and to function as an equal in civil society.”
This thought is complicated by the positional nature of some of these goods, raising questions about what I call The reverse Pareto condition implicit in cases of leveling down—the idea that at least one person must be made worse off, all things considered, and no one else should be made better off, all things considered, as a result. I consider some of the implications of leveling down in the economic domain with respect to this Reverse Pareto condition in Section 3.
I am following a discussion of Wolff’s (2019, 10).
On how effective some of these informal mechanisms are in influencing political decisions, see, for example, Grossman et al. (2022).
This specification is vague. Difficult questions about what it means for a strategy to be “unavailable” remain: must it be impossible to offset inequalities for us to say they are unavailable? Or is it sufficient for these strategies to be extremely difficult to implement in order to deem them unavailable? Also, suppose offsetting or redistribution is impossible today, but we have a reasonable expectation that redistribution will be possible five, ten, twenty years down the road: how long is it unreasonable to wait so as to consider these alternatives unavailable?
How forgiving exactly is a difficult question to answer: it depends on empirical questions which remain to a large extent unresolved. They might also vary contextually. I shall follow the convention and simply claim that “wide disparities” are concerning while “narrow disparities” might not be (Hausman 2015, 235). See also Schemmel (2011), Rawls (1999; 2001), and O’Neill (2010).
Though this thought is compatible with the view that the state might come to the aid of the needy if this is required to stimulate productivity and growth.
For a similar claim, see Lippert-Rasmussen (2011).
See de Freytas-Tamura K (2018) BBC, Criticized Over Pay Gap, Cuts Salaries of Some Male Journalists. The New York Times. Last accessed on June 23, 2019: https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/26/business/media/bbc-pay-gap.html?smprod=nytcore-ipad&smid=nytcore-ipad-share. See also Tsang A (2018) Resignation of Carrie Gracie, BBC China Editor, Resurfaces Pay Row. The New York Times, 2018. Last accessed on June 23, 2019: https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/08/business/media/bbc-carrie-gracie-china-editor.html?action=click&module=RelatedCoverage&pgtype=Article®ion=Footer. Carrie Gracie seems to be expressing a thought here echoed by Cohen (1988, 264) in the context of worker solidarity: that she will not be satisfied with a “personal escape which is not part of a general liberation.”
I am following my discussion in Peña-Rangel (2023).
Chris Evans is in fact an entertainer, famous for hosting a morning show called The Chris Evans Breakfast Show.
As a parenthetical remark here, let me just say that it is unclear to me why we ought to maximize rather than aim for a sufficientarian distribution of dispositions: a sufficient disposition to treat each other’s strong interests just as I would treat mine, that is. This would presumably count as an egalitarian relationship as well. Perhaps it is Scheffler’s view that the threshold coincides with the maximizing requirement.
Satz also thinks that the distribution of some goods in kind will have negative effects on relational equality, as when the distribution of those goods is “disabling” or “comes closely linked with stigma.” Perhaps in these cases money or other forms of economic resources is appropriate.
The unequal treatment of men and women might be manifested in other ways, of course: it would be objectionable for similar reasons if the BBC had only restrooms for men in their facilities, for example. My own view is that money can sometimes work to undermine relational equality, not that money is special for relational equality in the way that maybe votes are special for relational equality. It is also true that money here is not what causes people to relate as equals, but it is a manifestation of unequal treatment. But this is fine. We distribute money equally to fight against the expression of inequality that unequal salaries would otherwise entail.
I am following my discussion in Peña-Rangel (2023) throughout this section.
Parfit (2002) and Holtug (2010) sometimes frame this as a “triviality” objection. Parfit (2002, 112–113. Emphasis added) thinks this is true with respect to what he calls weak egalitarian positions, though not with respect to moderate views: moderates are “true egalitarians,” he says. Holtug (2010, 172–174), on the other hand, seems more inclined to think that the charge touches both forms of weak and moderate egalitarianism. I will specify what they mean shortly. I also think the objection applies to both, as I try to argue in a moment.
And when I say equally well off I mean to say equally well off: suppose that there are no concerns here about sufficiency or adequacy: in all three cases, we are far above the threshold below which life ceases to be worth living. My discussion and examples are from Peña-Rangel (2023).
For a discussion of leaky bucket taxation, see Okun (1975).
See also Holtug (2010).
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Acknowledgements
I am grateful for written comments on earlier versions of this paper from Debra Satz, Josiah Ober, Rob Reich, Glory Liu, Luis de la Calle, and two anonymous reviewers. For several helpful discussions, my thanks to Marc Grinberg, Andreas Schedler, Joshua Cohen, Emilee Chapman, Eamonn Callan, Blake Francis, Chris Lewis, Claudio López-Guerra, and Paula Casal. A version of this paper was presented at CIDE’s Política y Gobierno workshop. I want to thank audience members and my discussant, José Antonio Aguilar, for very helpful feedback.
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Peña-Rangel, D. Economic Inequality and the Permissibility of Leveling Down. Ethic Theory Moral Prac 26, 803–832 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-023-10411-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-023-10411-2