Summary
In hisProgress and its Problems, Laudan dismisses the problem of incommensurability in science by endorsing two general assertions. The first claims there are actually no incommensurable pairs of theories or research traditions; the second maintains that his problem-solving model of scientific progress would be able rationally to appraise even incommensurable pairs of theories or traditions (are compare them for their progressiveness). I argue here that Laudan fails to provide a plausible defence of either thesis, and that this creates some problems for his general approach.
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Notably in Laudan's ‘A confutation of convergent realism’,Philosophy of Science 48 (1981), pp. 19–49.
See, e.g., his ‘Why was the logic of discovery abandoned?’, in T. Nickles (ed.),Scientific Discovery, Logic, and Rationality, D. Reidel, Dordrecht, 1980.
For a criticism of one such attempt, see my ‘Stegmüller on Kuhn and incommensurability’,Brit. J. Phil. Sci. 33 (1982), pp. 389–396.
From here on I shall deal exclusively with the views Laudan expresses inProgress and its Problems (University of California Press, 1977), and all quotations below are taken from that volume. I can find no evidence from Laudan's later writings that his opinions on incommensurability have substantially altered.
For some of the difficulties involved in attempting a formal criterion of application, see my ‘Comments on a criterion of theoreticity’,Synthese 48 (1981), pp. 77–86.
For an elaboration of this view, see, e. g., Guttings' review ofProgress and its Problems inErkenntnis 15 (1980), pp. 91–103.
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Pearce, D. Research traditions, incommensurability and scientific progress. Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 15, 261–271 (1984). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01801361
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01801361