Abstract
In this paper we examine the status of relations in two prominent views in metaphysics of science, i.e. dispositionalism and structuralism, and argue that the current consensus about the metaphysics of relations, according to which relations are to be viewed as internal and as constituting no addition of being over and above their relata, needs to be re-examined. After discussing what we call internalism and externalism about relations, we show that dispositionalism and structuralism lead to opposite but equally controversial accounts of the metaphysics of relations. While we criticise some widespread versions of those views, we identify versions of dispositionalism and structuralism that we deem more promising. A core feature of both of these more promising variants is an externalist view about relations. Against the current internalist consensus, we claim that a version of externalism about relations is the view that best combines metaphysical rigour with a naturalistic stance.
Funding source: ESPA 2014-2020 "Support of researchers with emphasis on young researchers"
Award Identifier / Grant number: 5007197
Acknowledgments
We wish to thank the members of our research group at the University of Athens and the members of the Metascience project at the University of Bristol for much helpful discussion of earlier versions of this paper, as well as an anonymous reviewer for useful comments and suggestions. The research for this paper was supported by the Operational Program “Human Resources Development, Education and Lifelong Learning” (ESPA 2014–2020), which was co-financed by Greece and the European Union (European Social Fund) under the invitation with the title “Support of researchers with emphasis on young researchers” (project no. 5007197).
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