Abstract
A thought that we all entertain at some time or other is that the course of our lives might have been very different from the way they in fact have been, with the consequence that we might have been rather different sorts of persons than we actually are. A less common, but prima facie intelligible thought is that we might never have existed at all, though someone rather like us did. Arguably, any plausible theory of personal identity should be able to accommodate both possibilities. Certain currently popular Reductionist theories of personal identity, however, seem to be deficient in precisely this respect. This paper explores some Reductionist responses to that challenge.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
REFERENCES
Adams, R. M.: 1979, ‘Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity’, Journal of Philosophy 76, 5-26.
Armstrong, D. M.: 1978, Nominalism and Realism, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Armstrong, D. M.: 1989, Universals: An Opinionated Introduction, Westview Press, Boulder.
Ayer, A. J.: 1954, Philosophical Essays, Macmillan, London.
Black, M.: 1952, ‘The Identity of Indiscernibles’, Mind 61, 153-61.
Brody, B. B.: 1980, Identity and Essence, Princeton University Press, Princeton.
Campbell, K.: 1990, Abstract Particulars, Blackwell, Oxford.
Casanova, J.: 1928, The Memoirs of Jacques Casanova: An Autobiography, trans. A. Machen, The Venetian Society, London.
Chisholm, R. M.: 1976, Person and Object, George Allen and Unwin, London.
Denkel, A.: 1996, Object and Property, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Forbes, G.: 1980, ‘Origin and Identity’, Philosophical Studies 37, 353-62.
Forbes, G.: 1985, The Metaphysics of Modality, Clarendon Press, Oxford.
French, S. & Redhead, M.: 1988, ‘Quantum Physics and the Identity of Indiscernibles’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 39, 233-46.
Hacking, I.: 1975, ‘The Identity of Indiscernibles’, Journal of Philosophy 72, 219-56.
Hintikka, J.: 1975, The Intentions of Intentionality and Other New Models for Modality, D. Reidel, Dordrecht.
Kripke, S. A.: 1980, Naming and Necessity, Blackwell, Oxford.
Mackie, J. L.: 1976, Problems From Locke, Clarendon Press, Oxford.
Mackie, P.: 1987, ‘Essence, Origin and Identity’, Mind 96, 173-201.
Madell, G.: 1981, The Identity of the Self, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh.
Nozick, R.: 1981, Philosophical Explanations, Clarendon Press, Oxford.
Parfit, D.: 1986, Reasons and Persons, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Parfit, D.: 1995, ‘The Unimportance of Identity’, in H. Harris, ed., Identity, Clarendon Press, Oxford.
Perry, J.: 1975, ed., Personal Identity, University of California Press, Berkeley.
Shoemaker, S. and Swinburne, R.: 1984, Personal Identity, Blackwell, Oxford.
Swinburne, R.: 1973–74, ‘Personal Identity’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 74, 231-48.
Tichy, P. and Oddie, G.: 1983, ‘Ability and Freedom’, American Philosophical Quarterly 20, 135-47.
van Fraassen, B. C.: 1991, Quantum Mechanics: An Empiricist View, Clarendon Press, Oxford.
Wiggins, D.: 1980, Sameness and Substance, Blackwell, Oxford.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Perrett, R.W., Barton, C. Personal Identity, Reductionism and the Necessity of Origins. Erkenntnis 51, 277–294 (1999). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005455206904
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005455206904