Abstract
This paper reconsiders a much-discussed passage in de Anima 3.2. In that passage, Aristotle discusses the dilemma whether we perceive that we see by sight or by some other sense. The paper focuses on a problem that arises from the received understanding of the second horn of the dilemma. The problem is why Aristotle takes the hypothetical other sense to perceive not only seeing but also colour even if he claims elsewhere that sight is the only sense that can perceive colour. This problem is particularly severe for those interpreters who understand the dilemma in the way just given, that is, in terms of sensory capacities rather than sense activities. By proposing an alternative understanding of the structure of the dilemma, the aim of the paper is to resolve the problem and hence place the capacity reading on a firmer footing.
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