Abstract
The traditional definition per genus et differentiam is argued to be cognitively grounded in perception and in order to avoid needless argument, definitions are stipulated to assert boundaries. An analysis of the notion of perspective shows that a boundary is a composite of two distinctions: similarity that includes and difference that excludes. The concept is applied to the type-token distinction and percepts are shown to be the result of a comparison between a token as representing some phenomenon and a type as representing the kind of object the phenomenon might be. The Principle of Connection is proposed as the mental architecture that gives rise to percepts. The value of a percept is shown to be one of Identical, Similar, Different or Contrary and its perceptual aspects represent the cognitive schema of Essence, Quality, Quantity and Relation. The two notions of similarity and difference are claimed to constitute the necessary and sufficient conditions for definitions. Accordingly, the qualitative elements of a definition signify the genus as representing the similarity of the defined entity in terms of others of its kind and the quantitative elements signify the differentia as representing the difference it has from everything else. Paying proper attention to both qualitative and quantitative aspects will enable formulation of definitions that are ‘good’.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Aristotle (1995a) On generation and corruption. In: Barnes J (eds) The complete works of Aristotle: the revised Oxford translation. Princeton University Press, Princeton, pp 512–554
Aristotle (1995b) On the soul. In: Barnes J (ed) The complete works of Aristotle: the revised Oxford translation. Princeton University Press, Princeton, pp 641–692
Barsalou LW (1983) Ad hoc categories. Mem Cognition 11:211–227
Bateson G (1968) Redundancy and coding. In: Sebeok TA (ed) Animal communication: techniques of study and results of research. Indiana University Press, Bloomington, pp 614–626
Black M. (1937) Vagueness: an exercise in logical analysis. Philos Sci 4:427–455
Bochenski IM (1961) A history of formal logic. University of Notre dame Press, Notre dame, Indiana
Clark HH (1996) Using language. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
D’Andrade R (1995) The development of cognitive anthropology. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Davidson D (1986) A coherence theory of truth and knowledge. In: LePore E (eds) Truth and interpretation: perspectives on the philosophy of Donald Davidson. Blackwell, Oxford, pp␣307–319
de Morgan A, Taylor AE (1847) Formal logic. The Open Court Company, London (1926)
Foote P (1961) Goodness and choice. Proc Aristotelian Soc 35:45–60
Gelman SA (2003) The essential child: origins of essentialism in everyday thought. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Greeno JG (1974) Processes of learning and comprehension. In: Gregg LW (ed) Knowledge and cognition. John Wiley & Sons, New York, pp 17–28
Grice HP, Strawson PF (1956) In defense of a dogma. Philos Rev 65:141–158
Hallett G (1977) A companion to Wittgenstein’s “Philosophical investigations”. Cornell University Press, Ithaca
Hollingworth HL (1913) Judgements of similarity and difference. Psycho Rev 20:271–289
Jacobson AL (1963) Learning in flatworms and annelids. Psycho Bull 60:74–94
Kernighan BW, Ritchie DM (1988) The C programming language, 2nd edn. Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ
Lesniewski S (1931) Ueber Definitionen in der sogenannten Theorie der Deduktion. In: Surma SJ, Srzednicki JT, Barnett DI (eds) Collected works, Boston, Reidel
Morris C (1938) Foundations of the theory of signs. In: Morris C (ed) Writings on the general theory of signs. Mouton, The Hague, pp 17–74 (1971)
Morris C (1946) Signs, language and behavior. Prentice Hall, New York
Newell A (1990) Unified theories of cognition. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA
Pears DF (1953) Universals. In: Flew AGN (ed) Logic and language, 2nd series. Basil Blackwell, Oxford, pp 51–81
Peirce CS (1868) On a new list of categories. Proc Am Acad Arts Sci 7:287–298
Plato (1997) Protagoras. In: Cooper JM (ed) Plato complete works. Hackett Publishing, Indianapolis, pp 746–790
Priest G (1979) The logic of paradox. J Philos Logic 8:219–241
Quine WVO (1960) Word and object. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA
Quine WVO (1961) Two dogmas of empiricism. In: Quine WVO (ed) From a logical point of view. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, pp 20–46
Randall R (1976) How tall is a taxonomic tree? Some evidence for dwarfism. Am Ethnol 3:543–553
Robinson R (1954) Definition. Clarendon Press, Oxford
Rosch E (1975) Cognitive representations of semantic categories. J Exp Psychol: General 104:193–233
Simon HA (1962) The architecture of complexity. Proc Am Philos Soc 106:467–482
Ungerer F, Schmid H-J (1996) An introduction to cognitive linguistics. Longman, London
Wells HG (1908) First and last things: a confession of faith and rule of life. Watts & Co, London (1929)
Wertheimer M (1912) Experimentelle Studien über das Sehen von Bewegungen. Zeitschrift für Psychologie 61:161–265
Whitehead AN, Russell B (1960) Principia mathematica, 2nd edn. University Press, Cambridge
Wittgenstein L (1922) Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Routledge, London (1999)
Wittgenstein L (1997) Philosophical investigations, 2nd edn. Blacwell Publishers, Oxford
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Additional information
This paper is based on my master’s thesis at Monash University (2003). I thank Keith Allan for commenting on an earlier draft—any remaining infelicities are mine only.
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
van Polanen Petel, H. A perceptual account of definitions. Axiomathes 17, 53–73 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10516-006-9001-9
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10516-006-9001-9