Abstract
In a number of passages of the Timaeus Plato states that the world is generated in such a way as to effectively reproduce the intelligible paradigm. The aim of this chapter is to understand in which sense the world is indeed a likeness of the paradigm, especially with regard to three aspects: its unicity, its completeness/perfection (i.e., its being τέλειον), its (a)temporality. My overall claim is that the key feature of the paradigm that the world is meant to reproduce is not its simplicity or stability, but its dynamic and holistic structure. More specifically, I shall argue that: the world is unique because the intelligible structure of the paradigm is holistic in a qualified way; the world is complete/perfect not in the sense that it encompasses the reproduction of all forms, but since it reproduces at the best possible level the rational motion and life of the intelligible world, and this is what Plato actually means by his definition of “time”. This will effectively explain why it is really good for the demiurge to take the intelligible realm as a paradigm, and why Plato can effectively state that the generated world is not a shadowy half-being, but a venerable god.
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Notes
- 1.
A strong version of this view implies the ascription to Plato a sort of bundle-theory, as proposed, e.g., by Johansen (2004, 118–122), Zeyl (2010), Ademollo (2018). Against this view a more hylomorphic interpretation of Plato’s ontology of sensible particulars has been provided, among others, by Algra (1995, pp. 92–99)—following in the tracks of, e.g., Cherniss (1954). I would side with the former reading, although this is not crucial for my argument.
- 2.
This is, for instance, the way in which Plato presents his theory of forms in the Phaedo.
- 3.
On Plato’s theory of parts-whole relation see the seminal study by Harte (2002).
- 4.
See Petrucci (2021a).
- 5.
- 6.
This must refer to the intelligible world. It cannot refer to the world itself (Brisson, 1995 translates ambiguously, while the pronoun seems to be missing in Cornford’s translation—modified here) either grammatically (it should in this case be reflexive) or argumentatively: the point here is that the world, arranged by the demiurge to resemble the intelligible (d2–3), contains within itself the instantiations of all intelligible living things—for each sensible particular participates not only in the form that determines its species, but also in all the forms that from time to time determine its properties.
- 7.
Petrucci (2021b).
- 8.
The relation between this Timaean passage and the Sophist has been effectively demonstrated by Ferrari (2011).
- 9.
Ferrari (2003, pp. 88–91).
- 10.
One could object that this model apparently leaves no room for any quantitative difference between the number of forms in the intelligible living being and the sets of related properties in the sensible world, and in turn this might imply an obvious puzzle: what if, say, a catastrophe caused the extinction of a species? I would take Plato to reply that it is not necessary that all forms are always instantiated de re, but it is crucial that the demiurge ensures in principle the completeness of the world, especially in terms of holistic structure.
- 11.
The importance of the goodness of the demurge in this argument has been well emphasised by El Murr (2021, pp. 50–54).
- 12.
See esp. Parry (1979), Patterson (1981), Mohr (2005, pp. 21–26). These interpretations grant, however, that the intelligible living being is here a specific form; see also Sedley (2007, p. 108 n. 36), who argued that Timaeus would be referring here to the ideal genus “animal”, and Thein (2006), who rather focused on the four forms of the living species mentioned at 39e3–40a2. Accoding to Cherniss (1944, pp. 295–7), Plato would thus resolve the regress of the Third Man as sketched in Resp. X.597c7–9 and formulated in the Parmenides: Plato would suggest that, with respect to both completeness and the “living being”, the form and the corresponding sensible particulars are not such in the same respect. In fact, it has been well shown that, even considering here the intelligible living being as a form, Plato seems to proceed along a different path of reasoning: the form of the living being would share with the sensible world completeness (and not the property “living being”), as shown by the fact that this argument does not imply any regress (since the most inclusive living being would not need to be included in anything; cf. Parry (1979, pp. 7–9) and (1991, pp. 25–32), and Patterson (1981, pp. 105–9).
- 13.
- 14.
See also Rashed (2018, pp. 115–17).
- 15.
As in fact already noted by Parry (1979, pp. 9–11).
- 16.
The argument proposed by Parry (1991, pp. 25–7), that it must be a form because, being a living being in itself, it must be more than the totality of its parts, is weak, because a ὅλον is both a totality of parts and, as such, more than the totality of its parts.
- 17.
To some extent, this section may be regarded as a complement to Daniel Vasquez’ chapter in this volume, namely of his section 3, in which the issue of the meaning of this definition with respect to the paradigm’s eternity is raised. It also seems to me that my own understanding of the notion of time may be compatible with Daniel Vasquez’s, who argues that time is the unified ‘observable astronomical event that consists of the coordinated movements of the sun, the moon, the five observable planets and earth’: I would argue that this event has to coincide, at least referentially, with the life embedded in the heavenly motions—though I would also insist on the fact that the notion of life has an explanatory and causal priority.
- 18.
Of course I do not mean that the cosmogonic account really consists in a temporal process: however, it is important to consider the order in which, within its logical development, the tale presents its major actors and products.
- 19.
- 20.
See esp. Tarán (1979) and Sorabji (1988, pp. 108–12); on the problem see also Mohr (2005, pp. 51–80). Consequently, one can suppose that describing the eternity of the intelligible and that of the sensible with the same adjective in the space of a few lines (d3, d7) serves Plato precisely to bring attention to the necessary dissimilarity between the two dimensions (Tarán, 1979, p. 45).
- 21.
See Petrucci (2022, pp. 306–308).
- 22.
See esp. Centrone (2004).
- 23.
Although it is probably excessive to assert, with Mohr (1986, pp. 41–3), that the eternity of the cosmos is contingent.
- 24.
- 25.
See Karfik (2004, pp. 177–8).
- 26.
This point is key also inasmuch as it helps understand possible divergences with respect to other passages, e.g. Laws X.897a, where different psychic motions (whishing, opining, etc.) are treated as paradigms of various kinds of derivative physical changes. I take this passage to mean that specific psychic motions are mirrored by specific physical motions—and this is consistent with the overall Timaean idea that the soul’s reasoning is intrinsically related to its motion (see esp. 36e, expressing the theoretical framework for this). Still, this does not imply that the soul’s motions as whole are the ontological paradigm for the world’s motions as a whole—which is, on the contrary, what the paradigm is. I thank the press’ anonymous reader for stimulating me to consider this point.
- 27.
νὺξ μὲν οὖν ἡμέρα τε γέγονεν οὕτως καὶ διὰ ταῦτα, ἡ τῆς μιᾶς καὶ φρονιμωτάτης κυκλήσεως περίοδος, μεὶς δὲ ἐπειδὰν σελήνη περιελθοῦσα τὸν ἑαυτῆς κύκλον ἥλιον ἐπικαταλάβῃ, ἐνιαυτὸς δὲ ὁπόταν ἥλιος τὸν ἑαυτοῦ περιέλθῃ κύκλον.
- 28.
On Plato’s “great year” see de Callatay (1996).
- 29.
Contra Bowen (2002, p. 158), who instead takes an extremely reductive attitude toward the astronomical complexity of the Platonic model.
- 30.
Cf. also Resp. X.617b2 and Knorr (1990, p. 315).
- 31.
For a general discussion of the astronomical structure of the section and the previous critical debate see Petrucci (2022, pp. 466–473).
- 32.
Thein (2020) seems to go in the same direction; however, he assumes a reduced complexity for planetary motion (partic. at p. 103, n. 14) and thus ends up reducing again the cosmological function of planets.
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Petrucci, F.M. (2023). The Perfect World. On the Relation Between the World and the Paradigm in Plato’s Timaeus. In: Ilievski, V., Vázquez, D., De Bianchi, S. (eds) Plato on Time and the World. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-28198-3_6
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