Skip to main content
Log in

Artificial explanations: the epistemological interpretation of explanation in AI

  • Published:
Synthese Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

In this paper I critically examine the notion of explanation used in artificial intelligence in general, and in the theory of belief revision in particular. I focus on two of the best known accounts in the literature: Pagnucco’s abductive expansion functions and Gärdenfors’ counterfactual analysis. I argue that both accounts are at odds with the way in which this notion has historically been understood in philosophy. They are also at odds with the explanatory strategies used in actual scientific practice. At the end of the paper I outline a set of desiderata for an epistemologically motivated, scientifically informed belief revision model for explanation.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  • Achinstein P.: The nature of explanation. Oxford University Press, New York (1983)

    Google Scholar 

  • Alchourrón C., Gärdenfors P., Mackinson D.: On the logic of theory change: Partial meet contraction functions and their associated revision functions. Journal of Symbolic Logic 50, 510–530 (1985) doi:10.2307/2274239

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Aliseda A.: Abductive reasoning. Springer, Dordrecht (2006)

    Google Scholar 

  • Boutilier C.: Unifying default reasoning and belief revision in a modal framework. Artificial Intelligence 68, 33–85 (1994). doi:10.1016/0004–3702(94)90095-7

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Boutilier C., Becher V.: Abduction as belief revision. Artificial Intelligence 77, 43–94 (1995). doi:10.1016/0004-3702(94)00025-V

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cherniak C.: Minimal rationality. MIT Press, Cambridge (1986)

    Google Scholar 

  • Gärdenfors P.: Knowledge in flux. MIT Press, Modeling the dynamics of epistemic states. Cambridge (1988)

    Google Scholar 

  • Gärdenfors P., Makinson D.: Nonmonotonic inference based on expectations. Artificial Intelligence 65, 197–245 (1994). doi:10.1016/0004-3702(94)90017-5

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hansson S.O., Wassermann R.: Local change. Studia Logica 70, 49–76 (2002). doi:10.1023/A:1014654208944

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Harman G.: The inference to the best explanation. The Philosophical Review 74, 88–95 (1965). doi:10.2307/2183532

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Harman G.: Change in view. MIT Press, Cambridge (1986)

    Google Scholar 

  • Hempel C.G.: Aspects of scientific explanation. The Free Press, New York (1965)

    Google Scholar 

  • Hempel C.G.: Postscript 1976: More recent ideas on the problem of statistical explanation. In: J.H., Fetzer(eds) The philosophy of Carl G. Studies in science, explanation, and rationality, Oxford University Press, New York (2001)

    Google Scholar 

  • Hempel C.G., Oppenheim P.: Studies in the logic of explanation. Philosophy of Science 15, 135–175 (1948)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Jeffrey R.: Statistical explanation vs statistical inference. In: Salmon, W.C.(eds) Statistical explanation and statistical relevance., Pittsburgh University Press, Pittsburgh (1971)

    Google Scholar 

  • Kakas A.C., Kowalski R.A., Toni F.: Abductive logic programming. Journal of Logic and Computation 2, 719–770 (1993). doi:10.1093/logcom/2.6.719

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Levesque, H. J. (1989). A knowledge-level account of abduction. In Proceedings of the Eleventh International Joint Conference in Artificial Intelligence. Los Altos: Morgan Kaufman.

  • Levi I.: Four themes in statistical explanation. In: Harper, W.L., Skyrms, B.(eds) Causation in decision, belief change, and statistics., Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston (1988)

    Google Scholar 

  • Levi I.: Mild contraction. Oxford University Press, Evaluating loss of information due to loss of belief. New York (2004)

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Lewis D.: Logic for equivocators. Nous 16, 431–441 (1982). doi:10.2307/2216219

    Google Scholar 

  • Lewis, D. (1986). Causal explanation. In Philosophical papers (Vol. II). New York: Oxford University Press.

  • Mackinson D., Gärdenfors P.: Relations between the logic of theory change and nonmonotonic Logic. In: Fuhrmann, A., Morreau, M.(eds) The logic of theory change, Springer, Berlin (1991)

    Google Scholar 

  • Ng, H. T., & Mooney, R. J. (1990). On the role of coherence in abductive explanation. In Proceedings of the Eighth National Conference on Artificial Intelligence. Los Altos: Morgan Kaufmann.

  • Páez A.: Explanations in K. An analysis of explanation as a belief revision operation. Oberhausen, Athena Verlag (2006)

    Google Scholar 

  • Pagnucco, M. (1996). The role of abductive reasoning within the process of belief revision. Dissertation, University of Sydney.

  • Parikh, R. (1999). Beliefs, belief revision, and splitting languages. In L. Moss, J. Ginzburg, & M. de Rijke (Eds.), Logic, language, and computation. Amsterdam: CSLI Publications.

  • Paul G.: Approaches to abductive reasoning: An overview. Artificial Intelligence Review 7, 109–152 (1993). doi:10.1007/BF00849080

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Peng Y., Reggia J.A.: Abductive inference models for diagnostic problem-solving. Springer, Berlin (1990)

    Google Scholar 

  • Poole D.: Explanation and prediction: An architecture for default and abductive reasoning. Computational Intelligence 5, 97–110 (1989). doi:10.1111/j.1467-8640.1989.tb00319.x

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Railton P.: A deductive-nomological model of probabilistic explanation. Philosophy of Science 45, 206–226 (1978). doi:10.1086/288797

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ram, A., & Leake, D. (1991). Evaluation of explanatory hypotheses. In Proceedings of the Thirteenth Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Hillsdale: Erlbaum.

  • Rott H.: Change, choice, and inference. Oxford University Press, A study of belief revision and nonmonotonic reasoning. Oxford (2001)

    Google Scholar 

  • Salmon W.C.: Scientific explanation and the causal structure of the world. Princeton University Press, Princeton (1984)

    Google Scholar 

  • Salmon W.C.: Four decades of scientific explanation. University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis (1989)

    Google Scholar 

  • Schurz, G. (2007). Patterns of abduction. Synthese (in press). doi:10.1007/s11229-007-9223-4.

  • Scriven M.: Truisms as the grounds for historical explanation. In: Gardiner, P.(eds) Theories of history., The Free Press, New York (1959)

    Google Scholar 

  • Stickel M.E.: A Prolog-like inference system for computing minimal-cost abductive explanation in natural language interpretation. Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence 4, 89–106 (1991). doi:10.1007/BF01531174

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Thagard P.R.: Explanatory coherence. The Behavioral and Brain Sciences 12, 435–502 (1989)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Wassermann, R. (2000). Resource-bounded belief revision. Amsterdam: Institute for Logic, Language and Computation Dissertation Series.

  • Wassermann, R., & Dias, W. (2001). Abductive expansion of belief bases. In Proceedings of the IJCAI Workshop on Abductive Reasoning, Seattle.

  • Woodward J.: Making things happen. A theory of causal explanation. Oxford University Press, New York (2003)

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Andrés Páez.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Páez, A. Artificial explanations: the epistemological interpretation of explanation in AI. Synthese 170, 131–146 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-008-9361-3

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-008-9361-3

Keywords

Navigation