Dialectic Journal Autumn 2020 Edition by Dialectic Journal

The Undergraduate Journal of Philosophy at The University of York

Editor

Interviewee

Mihaela Sotirova

Dr Annette Zimmermann

Contributors

Graphics and Design

Micah Phillips-Gary

Hannah Curtis

Dylan Ridgway Siobhan Marie Doyle

Reviewers and Copy Editors Chau Tonnu Hannah Curtis Eleanor Jane Paisley Ethan Dayan Maria Valenstain Mihaela Sotirova

Contents 6 Editorâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s preface 1. The Phenomenology of Frustration and Orthodox Transcendental Idealism Micah Phillips-Gary

2. The advantages and disadvantages of the UK parliamentary system Dylan Ridgway

3. Kierkegaard: The Temporal and Eternal Structure of the Process of Forgiveness Dr Siobhan Doyle

4. Editorial interview with Dr Annette Zimmermann on the philosophy of AI and machine learning

"The unexamined life is not worth living." -Socrates1

For this edition of Dialectic, we compiled papers from all fields of philosophy, giving the authors an unlimited scope of topics to choose from for their essays. The subjects discussed in this publication range from transcendental idealism to Kierkegaardâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s understanding of the process of forgiveness.

In the first paper, Micah Philips-Gary claims that objects have both matter and conceptual structure independent of human cognition. The author argues in favour of a position they call maximal realism, which stands in opposition to an orthodox transcendental idealism. In the second essay, Dylan Ridgway outlines the United Kingdomâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s parliamentary system. From this, the author considers and reflects on its advantages and disadvantages, finally considering potential reform. In her discussion of Kierkegaardâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s ideas on forgiveness, Siobhan Doyle argues for a necessity to fully grasp his understanding of the nature of human beings if we wish to comprehend his structure of the concept of forgiveness. To do this, the author claims that we must move beyond his pseudonymous works to his directly communicated ethical work: Works of Love.

Mihaela Sotirova Editor

Plato. and Stokes, M., 1997. Apology Of Socrates. Warminster: Aris & Phillips.

The Phenomenology of Frustration and Orthodox Transcendental Idealism Micah Phillips-Gary is an BA maths and philosophy student at the College of Wooster In this paper I draw on Husserl's early analysis of the frustration of an intentional act to argue against orthodox transcendental idealism, the claim that our acts of cognition can be mistaken with regard to a "matter" and are therefore objective, but this matter only has conceptual structure by virtue of human activity. For example, the proposition “My coffee cup is red” can be true or false depending on the sensations I receive (the matter of the act of cognition), which are independent of my will, but it is only by virtue of my own conceptualizing activity (the form or “structure” of the act of cognition) that there exists an object which is my coffee cup and is red, as opposed to this bare sensation of redness. I will argue against this view. Objects have both matter and conceptual structure independent of human cognition. Our acts of cognition can be mistaken with regard to matter insofar as subsequent intentional acts give the same object as having a different, contradictory matter, in which case our earlier act is "frustrated". This contradictory matter, in order to contradict the earlier, which was itself a property predicated to the object insofar as it has a certain conceptual structure, must itself belong to the object insofar as it has the same conceptual structure.

The aim of this paper is to argue for a position I call maximal realism. Maximal realism is defined primarily in opposition to an orthodox transcendental idealism, which I distinguish from transcendental idealism only because Emil Lask and (in places) C. S. Peirce both read Kant's transcendental idealism in such a way that is fully in accord with maximal realism (Lask 2015: 399; Peirce 1931: 8.15). Orthodox transcendental idealism, as I interpret it, consists of two claims. The first claim is that objects have a matter that does not depend on human activity and in relation to which we can make mistakes. This 7

claim I call minimal realism and is not denied by maximal realism. The second claim is that this matter lacks conceptual structure and thus it is only as a result of human conceptual activity that there are "objects" with "properties" entering into "relations" at all. By the conceptual structure of an object, I understand both the formal and material structures which constitute it and by virtue of which certain properties are predicable of it, for example a relation's being a relation, a number's being a number, a sensuous object's being a sensuous object. This "matter" typically is conceived as being given passively to us as a stream of sensations. On an orthodox reading of Kant, this stream of sensations is the result of incognisable "things-in-themselves" acting upon us, while on James' view the question of things-in-themselves is left unanswered and on an orthodox reading of Husserlâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s later analysis answered negatively (James 1904: 463; Tieszen 2011: 105). Still, all three views fall under the general concept of an orthodox transcendental idealism insofar as they claim that what constrains our acts of judgment, and thereby prevents us from being able to say anything we want, is a matter lacking conceptual structure. Insofar as they deny the totally implausible solipsistic position that our acts of judgment are totally unconstrained, and therefore incapable of being mistaken, all three positions are committed to minimal realism. In contrast to the minimal realism of this orthodox transcendental idealism, maximal realism asserts that not only do objects have a matter that is not simply a product of human activity, but they also have a conceptual structure. This position will be argued for in the following two sections, drawing from Husserl's early account of the frustration of an intentional act in his Logical Investigations. For now, though, time must be taken, to avoid a possible misinterpretation. That is, it should be made clear that maximal realism does not imply the claim that there is only one true set of conceptual structures, with all others being mere human illusion. As will be argued below, the possibility for our predication of a property to an object to be frustrated implies that that object has, independently of us, a conceptual structure allowing for that property to belong to it. If it can be shown that acts intending the same object have different conceptual structures and can be frustrated, then, such a view

would imply pluralism. Such a pluralist maximal realism1 is seemingly rejected by James (1904: 469). Yet, his critique of this position applies only to the epistemological position that we are to proceed in our cognitive activity by "copying" a conceptual structure we find readymade and not the metaphysical position defended here, that whatever conceptual structure we intend an object to have must already belong to it if we are able to be frustrated in our predication of material properties to the objects so structured (ibid.).

The conceptual framework in which I will be arguing for maximal realism is primarily that of the Logical Investigations. Thus, I presuppose here an intentional philosophy of mind, according to which (most, if not all) mental states are said to be "about" some object. Now, this way of characterizing intentionality as "aboutness" is not incorrect, but it is essentially incomplete without a discussion of evidence. Evidence, for Husserl, is that state of affairs in which the object of an act is not merely intended but is actually "given in our act and as we mean it" (Husserl 1970: 195). Evidence is not primarily a causal relation between a particular act of consciousness which is uniquely temporally located and a state of affairs, but rather the experience of an ideal relation of agreement between a state of affairs and the propositional "meaning" of an act (ibid.). In such a case, an act is said to be "full," as opposed to when the object of an act is not present, in which case the act is said to be "empty" (Husserl 2001: 233). This allows us to clarify the sense of intentionality by saying that an act which intends an object is one that has its fulfilment in an act in which this object is actually present. Such a distinction between empty acts and full ones is a distinction of degree, not of kind (ibid.: 234). The best example of this is given in Husserl's account of the intuition of a sensuous object in Ideas I as essentially taking

Pluralist maximal realism, the kind I am primarily interested in here, must be distinguished from maximal realism full stop in order to account for the fact that Peirce's position may be considered a kind of maximal realism, despite seeming to imply a monism, where "monism" is understood here as the claim that there is a unique, true conceptual structure to the universe (in the case of Peirce, the true set of conceptual structures being those belonging to that universal "catholic consent" which all inquiry tends towards) (Peirce 1931, CP 8.13).

place in a potentially infinite series of "adumbrations" (Husserl 2014: 75). For instance, as I look at my water bottle, my act of intending it is not entirely empty, but not entirely full either, insofar as what I intend is the object as a whole, whereas what is actually present to me is simply the water bottle as seen from one angle, the rest of the object merely intended. This brings us to the distinction between the fulfilment and the frustration of an intentional act (Husserl 2001: 212). Insofar as an intentional act is not completely full (which is the case, at the very least, for all acts intending the sensuous), there is always the possibility of frustrating or fulfilling my intentional act. Suppose I intend my water bottle as clean. As I continue to inspect it, this intentional act is "filled up" by further acts which each give one abstract "side" of the object. In this, I perform a continual act of "synthesis", which can be characterized either as the "identification" of the object as originally intended and as subsequently given or as the "consciousness of a certain agreement" between the meaning of the original intentional act, which may either be empty or partially fulfilled, and the subsequent partially fulfilled ones (ibid.). However, I then look inside the bottle and see some strange brown residue. In doing so, another "side" of the object, as it were, is given to me, one that shows that it was dirty after all. My earlier intentional act has been frustrated. Again, there is an act of synthesis involved here, but instead of being characterisable as an act of identification or consciousness of agreement, it is characterisable as an act of "distinction" between the object as originally intended and the object as now given or as a consciousness of a "conflict" between the meaning of the original intentional act and the subsequent partially fulfilled one (ibid.). While fulfilment and frustration are both important in our lives, for our purposes here it is frustration that is the far more interesting phenomenon. If our intentional acts were only ever fulfilled, we should have to be idealists after a fashion, insofar as nothing would ever constrain or contradict my personal consciousness. The key evidence for minimal realism is provided by the fact that our intentional acts are sometimes frustrated. It is in frustration that my acts of intending are contradicted by some external matter in relation to which I can be mistaken. In the above example, my water bottle was present to me as dirty even though I originally intended it as clean. The possibility of frustration thus

requires the minimal realism shared by both the maximal realist and orthodox transcendental idealist. The sense in which the phenomenon of frustration provides evidence for a specifically maximal realism requires a deeper understanding of the conceptual structure of frustration. Now, as was indicated above, a frustration is itself founded upon a partially fulfilled act. In particular, it is founded upon a partially fulfilled intentional act having as its meaning the negation of the meaning of the original intentional act. I originally intended my water bottle as clean, an act having as its meaning the proposition "my water bottle is clean," while the frustration of this act is a partially fulfilled intentional act having as its meaning the proposition "my water bottle is dirty" which conflicts with the earlier one. Nevertheless, notice that the meaning of this second act is not the ordinary negation of the meaning of the original act, namely "It is false that my water bottle is clean." That the two meanings conflict is, then, not something that can be ascertained from a formal logical standpoint. Rather, it is because the specific predicates "clean" and "dirty" contradict one another that the two meanings as a whole conflict. Or, to be more precise, it is because of the contradicting nature of the predicates combined with the identical nature of the subjects of these two meanings that they conflict. "The total intention points to an A which is red, and intuition reveals an A which is green. It is in the coincidence of meaning and intuition in their direction to an identical A, that the moments intended in union with A in the two cases, come into conflict" (Husserl 2001: 212). The claim that the frustration of an intentional act which predicates p of A is founded on this act and a subsequent partially fulfilled one, which predicates a contradicting predicate q of A, is the key to maximal realism. In the above, that an object has a matter independently of us was seen to follow from the fact of our intentional acts being contradicted by future partially fulfilled acts. However, in the above we have seen that what contradicts our acts of intending is not a formless matter but an object which is not only identified with but also has the same conceptual structure as the object as originally intended. While perhaps orthodox transcendental idealism could contend with the idea that there

is a numerical identity between objects of experience and things-in-themselves2 or sensory data, it cannot accept that what contradicts our acts of intending has a conceptual structure. Yet, this is what is required by Husserl's earlier analysis of frustration, insofar as frustration necessarily involves the attempted predication of contradictory properties to the same object and therefore that which contradicts my earlier intentional act is precisely the same object as I originally intended but simply having a different, contradicting property than the one I predicated of it and yet also having the same conceptual structure I attributed to it, such that the property earlier predicated to it is still predicable to it now. Else, there would be no way for the contradictory properties to come into conflict with one another. Further, we can be mistaken in attributing a certain conceptual structure to an object, albeit not in the same way as we can be mistaken in predicating a certain material property to an object. In the latter case, our intentional act will be frustrated. In the former, meanwhile, it will neither be frustrated nor fulfilled, not even partially, insofar as in either case this would amount to confirming that the object has the conceptual structure to which we attribute it. To use a mathematical example, if I intend the number 7 as even, I am attributing to it the conceptual structure of a number and this intentional act can and will be frustrated in the course of calculations, while if I intend the number 7 as green, thereby attributing to it the conceptual structure of a sensuous object, there is no such act that would count as a fulfilment or a frustration. Such errors regarding conceptual structure are thus destined to remain mere intentions. In conclusion, the phenomenology of frustration requires us to take on a maximal realist position in our metaphysics, according to which objects have both a material and a conceptual structure that is not simply the product of human activity (though this is not to say that we are merely passive in our cognitive activities, simply that, so to speak, the conceptual structures we form must already be realised in the universe for our intentional acts which attribute these structures to objects to be able to be frustrated or fulfilled). The simple

Or at least, it could contend with this idea about as well as it can contend with the idea that things-in-themselves are both without conceptual structure and yet are able to enter into relations with us so as to give rise the stream of sensations.

possibility of being mistaken with regard to particular acts of predication requires a minimal realism, while the fact that these acts of predication can only be contradicted by further, partially-fulfilled acts of predication, which intend the same object as being ideally capable of having the property to which we earlier predicated it in a more or less empty way, implies that objects only have an independent matter insofar as they have an independent conceptual structure and, thus, minimal realism implies maximal realism.

Bibliography

Husserl, E. (2014). Ideas I. Trans. D. Dahlstrom, Hackett, Indianapolis, IN, original work published in 1913.

Husserl, E. (2001). Logical investigations: volume two. Trans. J. Findlay, Routledge, Oxon, original work published in 1901.

Husserl, E. (1970). Logical investigations: volume one. Trans. J. Findlay, Routledge & Kegan Paul, Oxon, original work published in 1900.

James, W. (1904) 'Humanism and truth' in Mind, 13, no. 52: 457-475. Available at: www.jstor.org/stable/2248582 [accessed 27 April 2020]

Lask, E. (2015). 'Announcement of the logic of philosophy and the doctrine of categories'. In The neo-kantian reader. Trans. A. Iyer, ed. S. Luft., Routledge, Oxon, original work published 1910.

Peirce, C. S. (1931). Collected papers of Charles Sanders Peirce. Eds. C. Hartshorne & P. Weiss, Harvard University Press, Cambridge.

Tieszen, R. L. (2011). After Gรถdel: Platonism and rationalism in mathematics and logic. Oxford University Press, Oxford.

The advantages and disadvantages of the UK parliamentary system Dylan Ridgway is a third year BA philosophy and religious studies student at the University of Kent – ridgway.dylan@yahoo.co.uk

Introduction Today the relation between Queen-in-Parliament and the citizens of the United Kingdom is an intimate one, in which the legislature accompanies people “from the cradle to the grave.” (Brown 1946: 1) Former MP, W.J. Brown, describes in an excruciatingly comedic length the myriad of departments and ministries that people become the concern of; even the museums and parks one enjoys on a Sunday afternoon is likely under the purview of the Ministry of Works (ibid.: 89)! All of this contact and concern is the direct result of “some Act-some deed-of Parliament” (ibid.: 9). This essay will first outline the constitutional make-up of the United Kingdom’s parliamentary system, defining the role and powers of its constituents. Therein, this essay will deliberate on the advantages, which are those aspects which promote both the greatest utility of governance whilst aiming at the maximal exercise of more direct modes of democracy; including: the flexibility and proficiency of the UK’s parliamentary system. Whilst also illustrating the disadvantages of the UK’s parliamentary system. Disadvantages being those elements which promote arbitrary rule, and stymie both effective government and democracy. Amongst these disadvantages are an inappropriate distribution of powers, and positions of authority filled by inappropriate members. The aim of this essay will be to discuss potential reform to the UK’s parliamentary system to make it more advantageous and bring to light those disadvantageous elements.

Queen-in-Parliament; composition, role and powers of the ‘Mother of Parliaments’

Queen-in-Parliament (the technical term for Parliament) is composed of three constituents: The Monarch (Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II), the House of Peers and the House of Commons (Adonis 1993: 3). Walter Bagehot famously drew a distinction between the efficient elements of this system, which “in fact, works and rules”, and the dignified who “preserve the reverence of the population”(Bagehot 1964: 61). Her Majesty acts as the dignified, MP’s the efficient, with Peers in a peculiar medium between the two. The Monarch possesses two types of power; prerogative, i.e. “the residue of discretionary or arbitrary authority left in the hands of the crown” (ibid.: 5), and those afforded her by statute, for example, the appointment/investiture of supreme court judges (Constitutional Reform Act 2005). It is the prerogative that essentially relates to Parliament. Her Majesty in a strict constitutional quasi-legal sense possesses the prerogative to appoint the Prime Minister, appoint and dismiss ministers (government), assent to legislation passed by Parliament, to prorogue or discontinue a session of Parliament, and in a constitutional crisis, to act contrary to the advice of her ministers (UK Parliament 2004). Thereon, the monarch, following the passage of the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011 (Repeal) Bill, possesses the prerogative to dissolve Parliament ending the current parliamentary session and calling for a new general election (Draft fixed-term act repeal 2020). Furthermore, the monarch, on the advice of the Prime Minister, creates and appoints Peers to the upper chamber (ibid.:6). Finally, the monarch is not bound by statute law (the highest form of law), except by “express words or necessary implication” (ibid.: 6). However, these powers are not plenary; Vernon Bogdanor estimates “over 95 percent” of prerogatives are not exercised by the monarch personally, but on the advice of ministers or by ministers themselves (Bogdanor 1995: 66). The House of Peers is the upper chamber of Parliament. There is no upper limit to membership in the House of Peers (‘House of Lords: does size matter?’ 2015). Presently1 the House is composed of 800 peers, 774 of these being the Lords Temporal, 26 being the Lords Spiritual (Lords membership – by peerage

As of November 16th 2020.

2020). The Lords Spiritual are the most senior bishops of the Church of England who have an automatic right to sit in the House, ex officio of their episcopal office (Norton 2013: 40). The remaining Lords Temporal fall into two categories, appointed life-time Peers and hereditary Peers. 86 hereditary Peers currently sit in the House by virtue of noble birth (Lords membership â&#x20AC;&#x201C; by peerage 2020). The role of the House of Peers is to scrutinise legislation, establishing that the wording of bills is not ambiguous, and its intended exegesis is clear. Additionally, it is to suggest changes to legislation based on moral, economic and constitution considerations. These considerations may or may not be adopted by the Commons. Peers possess a suspensory veto over proposed legislation, lasting a single year for regular bills and a month for money bills2. After this period has elapsed bills may be sent for the Royal Assent and carry the force of the law without the consent of the Peers (Parliament act 1949). It is often said that Parliament is a synonym for the House of Commons, emphasizing the lower chamberâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s status as the politically preeminent body (Norton 2013: 17). The Commons is composed of 650 seats occupied by Members of Parliament (MPs), who represent a single constituency following a general election (Types of election, referendums, and who can vote n.d.). All UK, Irish and qualifying Commonwealth citizens over the age of 18 can become candidates for election; they cannot hold office in any other legislature or at present be a seated Peer (The Electoral Commission 2018). All UK, Irish, and qualifying Commonwealth citizens may vote in general elections (Types of election, referendums, and who can vote n.d.). MPs are elected by a first-pastthe-post system; the candidate with the highest number of votes within a constituency becomes the local MP (ibid.). There are several primary functions to the Commons. Firstly, there is the elective function, where the party or coalition which commands either a majority (326) or largest number of seats choses those people who will form a government (Bagehot 1964). From this party or coalition a Prime Minister is chosen as the

Money bills are any proposed legislation pertaining to finance, the authority to determine between regular and money bill falls under the purview of the Speaker of the House of Commons, as per the Parliament Acts 1911 & 1949.

executive, and a cabinet of around 20 individuals is formed to act as government ministers. There is no legal obligation for these ministers to be members of either House of Parliament3, though this is the convention (Rush 2005). Secondly, the Commons possess the function of expression to “express the mind of the English people on all matters”, essentially to act as representatives (Bagehot 1964). Finally, the Commons possess the function of legislation, the making of laws (ibid.: 153). Parliament is sovereign as the highest legal authority in the UK, comparable to the position of the US Constitution, with “uncontrollable authority in making, confirming, enlarging, restraining, abrogating, repealing, reviving, and expounding of laws” (Gordon 1964: 34). Sir William Blackstone commented that Parliament “can, in short, do everything that is not naturally impossible” (ibid.)

The monarch who reigns but does not rule: the problem of parliamentary sovereignty In a robust democracy there must exist a separation and appropriate distribution of powers, allowing each organ of state to check the other, preventing the emergence of a tyranny. Montesquieu states in The Spirit of Laws, there can be “no liberty” if the three powers of government (executive, legislative, judicial) are not separated; declaring that if the legislative and judicial were joined the life and liberties of citizens would be subjected to arbitrary control, if executive power is likewise amalgamated this overarching entity would act “with all the violence of an oppressor” (Montesquieu 1736-43: 202). A disadvantage of the UK’s parliamentary system is that is does not possess appropriate distribution of powers. The sovereignty of Parliament means there are no limits to what legislation may be passed, unlike in the USA where there are matters that Congress is constitutionally forbidden on legislating (Thomas 1994: 12-13). The Peers may only delay legislation by means of the suspensory veto, lasting at most 12 months

Only Prime Minister and Chancellor of the Exchequer (head of finance), must by convention be members of the House of Commons.

(Parliament Act 1949). Likewise, the Supreme Court has no authority to declare unlawful an Act of parliament. Lady Hale, President of the Supreme Court declared this a “gaping hole” in the powers of the judiciary (Lady Hale 2016). Moreover, Supreme Court Judges may be removed from office if the approval of Parliament is forthcoming, a provision built into the Act of Parliament establishing the Supreme Court throwing into doubt the supposedly inviolable independence of the judiciary (Parliament Act 1949). Thus, the only legal failsafe to prevent Parliament potentially using its plenary legislative powers to pass tyrannical legislation, is the possible refusal of the Monarchs prerogative of assent, what Montesquieu called “the power of refusal” (Montesquieu 1736-43). Bogdanor in The Monarchy and the Constitution, outlines that the monarch could act in exceptional circumstances “as a constitutional guardian”, exercising discretion in use of the prerogative and refusing assent to bills (Bogdanor 1995: 65). From a strictly legal perspective the monarch does possess the prerogative to refuse assent, a fact attested to by contemporary government papers (The Public Administration Select Committee 2004). Conversely, conventionally the power of prerogative is either firmly under the control of government, or only exercised on the advice of government (Gordon 1964: 26). These conventions are disadvantageous, as they only carry the force of tradition not of law which creates ambiguity as to what actions are constitutionally acceptable. This conventional element prevents the Monarch acting on her prerogatives, as acting against convention may “endanger the status or even the existence of the Monarchy” (Marshal 1967: 40). Bagehot, speaking on the Royal Assent in 1867 asserted: “the Queen has no such veto. She must sign her own death-warrant if the two Houses unanimously send it up to her. It is a fiction of the past to ascribe to her legislative power” (Bagehot 1964: 98). In 2008 another constitutional monarch, Henri Grand Duke of Luxembourg, tested the efficacy of refusing assent. Refusing his assent to a progressive euthanasia bill on the grounds it ran ethically contrary to his faith (Frieden 2009: 539). Consequently, the Luxembourger Parliament unanimously decided to amend the constitution, stripping the Duke of the power to refuse assent (ibid. 539). This clearly demonstrates the exercise of powers by monarchs, 19

regardless of their utility, is too intolerable to modern parliamentary democracy. This example and the preceding discussion of the relation between monarch and Commons, demonstrates the lack of substantial legal checks on the power of Parliament. Therefore, it is improbable that the judiciary or head of state could prevent potentially pernicious laws being enacted. This lack of appropriate distribution of power, and therefore checks and balances, underscores a disadvantage of the UK parliamentary system stressing a potential for arbitrary rule.

The uncodified constitution; ease of constitutional change One advantage of the UK’s parliamentary system is the ease of constitutional reform due to the uncodified nature of the UK’s constitution. The House of Lords Act 1999 exemplifies this; prior to its provisions, 750 Peers sat by virtue of noble birth (Silk & Waters 1998: 14) this was reduced to a maximum of 92 (intended to only be a temporary measure) the Act succinctly proclaims; “No-one shall be a member of the House of Lords by virtue of a hereditary peerage” (House of Lords Act 1999). This change is constitutionally profound. Attained simply by a majority vote in the Commons and Peers (Hansard 1999: 46). The uncodified nature of the constitution allows for “flexibility and pragmatism”, allowing the legislature to make amendments and changes, in response to social change (Turpin & Topkins 2012: 46). It also leaves change and conflict resolution more firmly in the political realm, and therefore, our elected officials (ibid.). By contrast, written constitutions often place high thresholds on amendments. Amendment to the United States Constitution, for example, requires a two-thirds majority vote in Congress (Constitution of the United States 1992). As a result, it is estimated by Pew Research, of an estimated 12,000 proposed amendments since the Constitutional Convention, only 27 have made it into the American Constitution (Desilver 2018). What results is a disadvantageous political status quo with arguments about the constitutions effect being conducted in legal terms as an exercise of interpretation, with these discussions often displaced from the political realm into the hands of judges (ibid.: 46). 20

Hans Kelsen, in the Essence and Value of Democracy states that the very existence of modern democracy “depends on whether Parliament proves to be a suitable tool for solving the social problems of our time” (Kelsen 2013: 48). Hence, the flexibility of the UK’s parliamentary system is a great advantage, allowing the law to actively move with the flux of morality, with greater discussion and action premised on the need for social change. Parliament, unlike other legislatures, can respond more rapidly to social changes. This is essential, as democracy not only means that the people ought to be represented in government but that their views at large be able to change the nature of the state, within reasonable limits.

The House of Peers; reform and technical parliaments According to Hans Kelsen there exists a demand for the creation of Fachparlamente or technical parliaments, comprised of experts in various fields who are unelected and apply their expertise to “the decisive legislative work,” granting legislatures an element of professionalism (ibid.: 61). This desire emerges because there exists few requirements that elected representatives have specific technical qualification (ibid.). For example, in the UK there exists no legal requirement for candidates who wish to be elected MP’s to even be registered voters, formal education is likewise not a requirement to ascend to the highest body of authority (The Electoral Commission 2018). An advantage of the UK parliamentary system is the potential for reform of the House of Peers to act as a technical parliament. Indeed currently, the powers and function of the Peers are an advantageous, acting in line with what could be called a technical parliament. Peers provide greater time in scrutinising complex bills, suggesting amendments to these bills to create more erudite legislation, which “save time for the Commons” (Crick 1964: 144). Between 1979-83 the Peers suggested 2,283 revisions to legislation, all bar six were accepted by the Commons (Thomas 1994: 78). Between 2010-11 over 400 hours were spent by Peers “tidying up” legislation (The House of Lords, playing a vital role in making laws, investigating public policy, checking government action n.d.). The advantage the Peers present

in increasing the efficiency of the legislature is twofold. Firstly, they decrease the workload presented by the legislative process. Secondly, they are able to apply their understanding of statecraft to the review and suggested adjustments of legislation, adding to the credentials of the Peers as a technical entity. Furthermore, the Peers provide a check on the absolute legislative authority of the Commons through their suspensory veto on legislation lasting 12 months for regular bills and a single month for money bills (Parliament Act 1949). This act of â&#x20AC;&#x153;Asking government to think againâ&#x20AC;? lets Peers demonstrate an urgent need for either amending a bill or preventing it, allowing for a greater length of debate of bill in the Commons (The House of Lords, playing a vital role in making laws, investigating public policy, checking government action n.d.). Peers are appointed for life, nor do they depend on popular election for their position, as a result debate is far freer than in the Commons, where an MP could lose their seat for making a controversial but necessary statement or suggested change in the agenda (Brown 1946: 114). This has the advantage of increasing the opportunity for thorough discussion and debate. The scope of powers afforded the Peers also mean they cannot usurp the authority conferred on MPs by democratic mandate. The role and powers of Peers represent the advantage of providing greater practical efficiency to Parliament, whilst not preventing but better informing the function of elected representatives. Presently these advantages are atrophied by both the present makeup and potential future members of the Peers. Peers are created in a largely arbitrary fashion, which is a disadvantage of the UKâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s parliamentary system. Foremost are the hereditary and spiritual Peers; neither group was chosen for their ability but rather due to the arbitrary characteristics of noble birth and ecclesiastic office respectively. Thereon, under the present system of patronage creating new lifetime Peers, there exists no oversight to the creation of new Peers (Silk & Walters 1998: 256). The House of Lords Appointment Commission, established in 2000, does exist to suggest non-political nominees to the Prime Minister often suggested for their ability, in line with the desire for technical ability being represented in Parliament (House of Lords Appointment Commission n.d.). In 2018, three Peerages were made in line with their recommendations (ibid.). By contrast, in May of the same year Prime Minister Theresa May appointed nine

conservative Peers without consulting the Commission (Hughes & Blitz 2018). What is underscored is the arbitrary nature of how Peers are both created and maintained. This represents a disadvantage of the UK’s parliamentary system, as Peers are not created purely due to consideration of their ability but rather as a reward; or to fill the chamber with Peers sympathetic to one particular political party and therefore any bills presented to them by this party. This does not aim at the betterment of Parliament but particular interest. The role and powers of Peers present the advantage of heightening the ability of Parliament, but any advantage is held back by the arbitrary and peculiar existence of these Peers. If this issue was confronted, the House of Peers would act far more efficiently.

Binding elections and party elites One disadvantage of the UK’s parliamentary system and that of most modern democracy’s is the emergence of what Carl Schmitt called “a new aristocracy” or party elites, limiting the choice citizens have in elections (Schmitt 1988: 29). MPs are elected often simply due to their party affiliation, due to the dominance of party politics. In this way the general will becomes particular. The Commons becomes an “antechamber for special interests” (Schmitt 1986). The general will is watered down by the narrow choice of representatives given to the people. When voting, the only choice is that of a local representative, and the people have no say in which of these representatives will form a government; they only elect a Parliament. Convention holds that the leader of the political party with an absolute majority in the Commons will be invited to form a government (Rush 2005: 16). However, there is nothing preventing a political party changing its leader without consulting the electorate. Of the 24 Prime Ministers of the last half century, 12 assumed office without a general election (‘PM-in-waiting Theresa May promises “a better Britain”’ 2016). Present Prime Minister Boris Johnson became premier after internal election of the Conservative Party, hence his personal mandate to act as the executive of the United Kingdom does not stem from the people but from party members (Stewart 2019). The dominance of two-party politics means it becomes near impossible to be elected as an independent MP. In the 2017 general election only two seats were

won by non-traditional entities (General Election 2017: full results and analysis 2019). Plainly, the will of the people is not only limited to the election of MPs but also to a fixed list of political parties. This acts as a disadvantage of the UK’s parliamentary system, as democracy is effectively reduced to a binary of the two most dominant parties and those oligarchs chosen by those parties.4

The House of Commons; the push for greater democratisation One clear emerging advantage of the UK’s parliamentary system is the increasing role of citizens in the legislature. Rousseau in On the Social Contract remarks; “The English people thinks it is a free people, it is greatly mistaken; it is free only during the election of the members of parliament; as soon as they are elected it is enslaved, it is nothing” (Rousseau, 1988: 144) Indeed, one of the largest criticisms of parliamentary democracy is that the will of parliament is not necessarily the will of the people. For, outside of general elections (as Rousseau suggests) the wishes of the people have no part in the legislative process (Kelsen 2013: 58). To mend this gap between the people and their representatives the UK parliamentary system has a simple solution: the introduction of active petitions. If a proposal, which presents a general wish to direct policy or introduce legislation, receives 100,000 signatures from UK citizens then it will be debated in Parliament (Petitions: UK Government and Parliament n.d.). This system allows for the current will of citizens to be represented directly in Parliament. Due to the relatively low threshold of signatures required, smaller interest groups which may feel their views are not represented in Parliament have a clear way to have their opinions expressed within the legislature. This remedy doesn’t sufficiently harmonise the will of both people and state, it does however bridge much of the divide. This is clearly

It could be argued, there are other political parties with the ability to gain a large number of seats (i.e. the Liberal Democrats & SNP), however, it is unlikely that these parties will garner enough support to gain a majority of seats and form a government in Westminster, for this practical consideration they are excluded in the discussion.

advantageous, as it allows for a more active and direct form of democracy, whilst maintaining the benefit of the parliamentary system, that is to say the benefit of a collegian organ of experts.

Conclusion; a hope of reform It is clear that presently the UK’s parliamentary system has a large amount of reform and change to go through before the gap between people and their elected officials is more appropriately bridged. A clear corollary question following from a presentation and discussion of the nature of the UK’s parliamentary system, is whether its advantages outnumber its disadvantages. The advantages of the UK’s parliamentary system, its flexibility, growing element of direct democracy, and potential for greater professionalism in the Peers, are somewhat outnumbered by the disadvantages. These disadvantages are rectifiable. The lacking checks on the power of the Commons may be resolved by transferring the prerogative of assent from the Monarch to the Supreme court, creating a strong legal mechanism to prevent potentially pernicious legislation. Removal of all hereditary Peers and empowering the House of Lords Appointment Commission for the future creation of Peers, would remedy the presently arbitrary patronage system. Finally, potential electoral reform would strengthen the democratic principle, allowing for a full advantageous realisation of democracy under the UK’s parliamentary system.

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Kierkegaard: The Temporal and Eternal Structure of the Process of Forgiveness Dr Siobhan Doyle is a faculty member at St Nicholas Montessori College of Ireland and a teaching fellow at University College Dublin – siobhan.doyle@smsi.ie The Danish philosopher Søren Kierkegaard (1813-1855) argues that the temporal and eternal structure of the process of forgiveness relates directly to the temporal and eternal structure of the human person. That is, the human being as body and soul; finite and infinite; temporal and eternal; and determined and free. Patrick Stokes writes that for Kierkegaard, the human person is ‘not so much a network of integrated components; as a conglomeration of opposites—the active, self-aware holding-together of which, taken as a totality, answers to the name of ‘self’ (Stokes 2009: 64).1 The minor thesis of this paper will endeavour to show the necessity of grasping Kierkegaard’s understanding of the true nature of the human being, in both ontological and ethical terms, in order to be able to fully comprehend the structure of his concept of forgiveness as a process. The holistic nature of the human person as a conglomeration of opposites in tension, which is experienced as anxiety, is outlined and argued for throughout the course of Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous authorship. The major thesis of this paper will argue, however, that based on the Socratic or ironic nature of Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous authorship, the only way of grasping his definitive understanding of the true structure of the process of forgiveness as both temporal and eternal, is by moving beyond his pseudonymous works. Kierkegaard’s definitive explanation of forgiveness as a process is presented in his major, directly communicated ethical work: Works

See also, Kierkegaard. (1980). The Concept of Anxiety: 85-90; Elrod. (1973). ‘The Self in Kierkegaard’s Pseudonyms’. In International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 4.: 223-240. 1

of Love (Kierkegaard 1995: 421-42). In short, my argument is, that because Works of Love is the only work—apart from his religious authorship—that Kierkegaard puts his own name to, it must be accepted as his definitive view on the true structure of the process of forgiveness. The minor thesis Kierkegaard’s discussion of the temporal structure of forgiveness is presented in his pseudonymous work, Stages on Life’s Way (1845). In the third section of this work, entitled ‘Letter to the Reader’, Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous author, Frater Taciturnus, explores the issues of sin and forgiveness (Kierkegaard 1988: 48184; 474-77). Here, from an ontological perspective, he describes the original state of the human being as one of living in an immediate harmony with his true nature in pre-conscious existence. Pre-conscious existence is, by its very nature, a sinfree form of existence. The rationale for pre-conscious existence had already been explained by Kierkegaard’s author, Haufniensis, in the Concept of Anxiety (1844) in terms of his description of the ‘dreaming spirit.’ (Kierkegaard 1980: 48-49). According to Haufniensis, the disruption of the dreaming spirit as pre-conscious existence is heralded by the individual’s conscious awakening. What this means is that the sinful break away from true immediacy relates directly to, or is the cause of, the awakening of self-consciousness. In Stages on Life’s Way, Taciturnus describes the first stage of awakened existence as the aesthetic level of existence. From an ethical perspective, the aesthetic form of existence is a limited (or restricted) form of conscious immediacy where the finite world is seen as what is given or necessary. Here, the individual is grounded in a temporal and finite form of existence: the individual’s response to existence on the aesthetic level is one where he, in a self-absorbed fashion, acts in accordance with his own immediate psycho-physical desires. It is the experience of boredom and the general sense dissatisfaction with the fickle nature and shallowness of his life that drives the aesthetic individual to search out a more grounded or meaningful life. So, it is the experience and acknowledgement of this heightened state of anxiety and despair that reveals the aesthete’s inner longing and deep desire to change the direction of his life. The recognition of this inner desire along with the personal decision to elevate his thinking to a higher psychological level is, for

Kierkegaard, the movement from the aesthetic level of existence to ethical existence. This psychological elevation can be understood as the transformation of selfish self-will to a universal good-will toward all others (the general will). Kierkegaard’s argument for the religious level, as an even higher existential level, is based on the idea that as the ethical individual’s dissatisfaction with the instability or contingency of the outer world intensifies, so too does his desire to turn inwards in search of his authentic self or the truth within himself. This internal search for the infinite or universal principles could ultimately lead the individual to the discovery of, and reunion with, the absolute truth. According to Kierkegaard, this final movement from religiousness A to religiousness B entails a leap beyond finite understanding, and therefore a leap beyond God as immanence. For Kierkegaard, the individual, as a human being and as a dynamic agent, has the choice to exist on one of these three existential or psychological levels of existence: aesthetic, ethical, or religious consciousness. In the Sickness unto Death, his author Anti-Climacus discusses what he calls ‘the gradation of the consciousness of the self’ (Kierkegaard 1980: 79). Once again, he equates the first or lowest level—the aesthetic level—of consciousness with a form of ‘ignorance’, and this form of ignorance relates to a lack of knowledge with regard to the idea of having either an infinite self or an eternal spirit. The argument here is that the aesthete always has the potential to progress to the level of the ethical, or infinite consciousness; the actual movement being dependent upon his own decision as a free agent. However, AntiClimacus points out that the problem with the aesthetic and ethical levels of consciousness is that being external categories, they are confined within the temporal structure of the human self. In other words, the aesthetic and the ethical level of existence are both confined within the limits of reason or finite consciousness. The problem for Kierkegaard is that the act of forgiveness, on either of these temporal existential levels, will also be limited or restricted. There are two specific problems which arise within the limits of temporality, or finite understanding, in terms of moral failure and forgiveness:

A) In terms of moral failure: Within the confines of rational understanding or secular ethics, the individual who steps outside of the universal due to moral weakness has no higher court of appeal for his ethical failure beyond the ethical itself (Kierkegaard 1985: 96). Within the secular ethical framework, the individual can only be either right or wrong; either good or bad; either guilty or not guilty. B) In terms of Forgiveness: Within the restricted framework of the rational understanding, the terms of forgiveness are either formulated on the basis of i) the dictates of popular opinion (aesthetic individual), or ii) in terms of the dictates of the moral law (ethical individual). This means that even the individuals who have moved beyond the dictates of popular opinion, from the aesthetic level to the ethical level, are still living within the rational confines of secular ethics. Within the restrictions of a rational framework, both the sinner and the forgiver must accept that they, as particulars, can never be higher than the universal. Within the Kierkegaardian framework, the decision to move inward to the ethico-religious levels of existence heralds the recognition of a higher court of appeal, a telos that is even higher than the ethical. This brave move from the safety of the ethical marks the individual’s desire to reclaim the infinite aspect of his true self as spirit (infinite resignation); and ultimately marks the individual’s desire for a reunion with the absolute (true Faith) (Kierkegaard 1985: 139). The exploration and recognition of the deeper levels of anxiety and despair experienced by the ethical man is a tactic used by several of Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous authors to nudge the reader towards, what they argue is, an awareness of the highest existential level which is God’s love. The highest existential level, religiousness B, offers the forgiver the love of God (pure love) as the ultimate telos; and thereby offers the sinner liberation from moral failure through absolute forgiveness. This is where Kierkegaard needs his reader to be able to fully grasp the true nature of love, which entails the true structure of forgiveness, as both a temporal and an eternal process. Kierkegaard’s authors argue (from varying perspectives) that it is only by means of a certain kind of progression through the varying levels of consciousness that the individual eventually gains the knowledge of having a self in which there is something eternal (Kierkegaard 1980: 79-82).

For Kierkegaard, spirit is something that on the one hand, I already am; but on the other hand, is something that I must strive to be (Kierkegaard 1980: 29-30; Plotinus 1991: 37).2 The real value of the multi-layered structures of love and forgiveness, as they are formulated, developed, and presented in Kierkegaard’s vast authorship, is that these structures act as stepping-stones which lead to Kierkegaard’s definitive view of the eternal structure of the process of love and forgiveness, as it is presented in Works of Love (1847). The major thesis This paper will now focus on the relation between the eternal structure of forgiveness and the eternal structure of the human person. That is, Kierkegaard’s account of the inward turn from a secular form of ethics to a Christian form of ethics: the inward movement to the ethico-religious levels of existence. Kierkegaard’s Christian Ethics is grounded in love, as divinely commanded love. This is an ethical theory which reflects the Gospels of Matthew, Mark, and Luke (Gospel of Matthew, 22:37-40; Mark, 12:29-31; Luke, 10:27-8). The duty to love and to forgive one’s neighbour is at the core of Kierkegaard’s Works of Love. In the Christian tradition, it is taken for granted that divine commands impose obligations. Obligatory love, however, can be represented as either commanded by a divine lawgiver: God; or lovingly demonstrated by a divine exemplar: Jesus Christ as the son of God. With regard to the latter, what Kierkegaard wants to remind his reader is that Christ’s love was not an intense feeling of love in terms of romantic love. Rather, it was works of love, or actions of love, which was the very fabric and meaning of his life (Ferreira 2001: 23). This is the form of love, neighbourly love, that Kierkegaard presents us with in his major, directly communicated work, Works of Love (1847). Curiously, the subtitle of Works of Love is: ‘Some Christian Deliberations in the form of discourses.’ It is important to point out that in contrast to the language of commands and obligations,

See also: Evans. (1990). Søren Kierkegaard’s Christian Psychology.: 45. See also, Evans. (2010). Kierkegaard: An Introduction.: 113. 2

Kierkegaard is presenting his understanding of ‘works of love’, or love of the neighbour, as a series of deliberations. Deliberation is a style of writing that does not contain arguments or authoritative teaching. Kierkegaard writes that these deliberations ‘are Christian deliberations, therefore not about love, but about works of love’. Throughout the course of series one and two of WL, Kierkegaard argues that love for the neighbour is much more than something that God requires; ‘it is something that presupposes love for God’ (Evans 2004). What he means is that to love the neighbour is the finite or temporal way to enact our love of God in the world. It is the way to make our infinite love for God tangible in the finite and temporal world. ‘The Christian love commandment commands loving God above all else, and then loving the neighbour’ (WL: 57). It could be argued that the reason that love is commanded, is that language or the written word is the only medium that we have to encapsulate and explain the message of eternal love in a temporal world. M. J. Ferreira suggests that another reason that love is commanded is that should we ever lose the courage to love, the love commandment may offer us the strength we need to love in challenging situations (Ferreira 2001: 38). In WL Kierkegaard recognises the fact that life is enriched by different experiences of love. He argues, however, that this multiplicity must not mislead us into thinking that there are many kinds of love. He argues that there is in essence only one kind of love: the one true love, the spirit’s love as infinite love. In WL Kierkegaard is making a clear distinction between love as ‘Neighbourly Love’ (the spirit’s love) and love as ‘Preferential Love’ (romantic love and friendship). That is, neighbourly love as an infinite form of love and preferential love as a finite form of love. The Finite and Infinite form of Love For Kierkegaard, preferential love, which is a finite form of love, is emotional love. It is the feeling of love associated with one’s natural inclinations, desires, or preferences. This form of love, love on the aesthetic level of existence, is seen as a selfish form of self-love: the poets or the popular form of love. The problems that Kierkegaard associates with this form of love relate directly to the modern debate on the inequality (and nepotism) associated with partiality (Wolf 1992:

243-59). On the other hand, neighbourly love—as the spirit’s love—is an infinite form of love. This form of love is based on equality (everyone is our neighbour) which means that it is all-inclusive. As human beings, loving preferentially—selfish self-love—seems natural to us, whereas loving in a neighbourly fashion presents us with the challenge of selflessness. That is, the challenge of transforming selfish self-love into proper selflove. Kierkegaard argues that the transformation of preferential love, as a form of partiality, into a proper form of self-love is the individual’s reconnection to his infinite spirit. Kierkegaard names this transformation of preferential or aesthetic love into neighbourly or ethical love the transformation of the eternal (Kierkegaard 1995: 3132). At this point the individual’s finite self-will is replaced by, or transformed back into, the infinite will as the love of God. In this relationship, God (as infinite love), is the middle term between our relationships with others. In other words, pure or infinite love, as the spirits love, is now the middle term between us and all others. Kierkegaard states in the conclusion of Works of Love that ‘the commandment is that you Shall love, but if you will understand yourself and life, then it seems that it should not need to be commanded, because to love people is the only thing worth living for, and without this love you are not really living’ (Kierkegaard 1995: 375 & 146). For Kierkegaard, the finite and infinite nature of love and forgiveness relate directly to the temporal and eternal structure of the human person. Forgiveness, therefore, can be an expression of either finite love (with conditions) or infinite love (without conditions). With regard to the former, the aesthete’s terms of forgiveness are, for the most part, motivated either by the dictates of popular opinion or by his own selfabsorbed pride. With regard to the latter (infinite or neighbourly love), the religious person sees forgiveness as an expression of infinite love; on the basis that this form of forgiveness, between the individual and the other, has God as the middle term.

In Works of Love, Kierkegaard’s aim is to free our works of love, which includes forgiveness, from the constraints of the moral law, or first ethics. First ethics, for Kierkegaard, is secular ethics. What makes Kierkegaard’s second ethics, as Christian ethics, a higher form of ethics is that it can deal with the manifestation of sin or moral failure by allowing the sinner to have recourse to the closest form of absolute forgiveness that can be offered in the temporal world. The message that is embedded in Kierkegaard’s larger Christian perspective is that the object of true faith is a loving God who, in his supreme greatness, can be in a relation with the single individual in two ways: either i) Immanently—within the realm of understanding and human reason— through the expression of loving duty and conscience. This is the transformation from finite loving to infinite loving, where God’s infinite love is the middle term between me and all others. or ii) Transcendently: through the movement to true faith. Here, the single individual as the particular stands in an absolute relation to the absolute—FT, 85 (Religiousness B). This is the reunion of God and spirit at the highest level of existence. This is the joyful reclamation of, and return to, the first immediate. According to Kierkegaard, this is the reunion of the infinite spirit with absolute, or divine, love.

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Interview with Dr Annette Zimmermann Dr Annette Zimmermann is a Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of York, and a Technology & Human Rights Fellow at Harvard University. Dr Zimmermann’s current research focuses on the political and moral philosophy of AI and machine learning. Before that, Dr Zimmermann was a postdoctoral fellow at Princeton University (2018-2020), with a joint appointment at the Center for Human Values and the Center for Information Technology Policy. Prior to that, they were awarded a DPhil from Nuffield College at the University of Oxford, for work focusing on contemporary analytic political and moral philosophy—in particular, democratic decision-making, justice, and risk. Dr Zimmermann's recent research visitor positions include Yale University (2016), the Australian National University (2019) and Stanford University (2020). They have advised policy-makers on AI ethics issues at UNESCO, the Australian Human Rights Commission, the UK Centre for Data Ethics and Innovation, and the OECD. In recognition of their research, Dr Zimmermann has received the 2020 David Roscoe Early Career Award in Science, Ethics, and Society by the Hastings Center, and they have been named on the 2021 “100 Brilliant Women in AI Ethics List”. 1. Artificial intelligence and machine learning are relatively recent subjects of philosophical discussion. What captured your interest in this particular sphere of ethics and philosophy? As part of my doctoral research at Oxford, I was working on developing arguments about how societies should distribute rights (including participatory rights in complex collective decision scenarios) in light of the fact that different people and groups are exposed to unequal levels of risk. My core intuition was— and still is—that it is often unjust to distribute the same rights and benefits to people who are vulnerable to drastically different levels of risk exposure—and I also think that we have to think seriously about the question of who ought to have the power to make democratically legitimate decisions about how risks are distributed in society. Halfway throughout my DPhil, I began reading empirical

work and research from computer scientists which showed that algorithmic decision-making and machine learning often impose significantly unequal risks on different socio-demographic groups, thus exacerbating social structures of racial, gender, and class injustice—in domains as different as criminal justice, healthcare, and education. I thought that these kinds of risk distributions raise very similar political and ethical problems to the ones that I had been thinking about in the context of my doctoral dissertation on democratic theory and justice. So, as I was writing my doctoral dissertation, I decided that my next research project would be about the philosophical implications of risk and uncertainty in the specific context of algorithmic decision-making. Understanding the technological specificities at stake, of course, required learning a lot of new material from computer science and applied statistics—from auditing undergraduate CS classes during my DPhil, to collaborating directly with computer scientists on research papers by the time I went to Princeton University for my postdoc—which has been incredibly exciting and intellectually rewarding. 2. Could you briefly outline your chief philosophical ideas through any current or past theories and arguments that you have put forward? Right now, I am working on several academic papers on the concept of algorithmic injustice. I am interested in the scope of that concept: I think that it’s important to understand what kind of problem we are dealing with and how big of a problem it is, in comparison to other moral and political problems, because our answer to that question will determine what kind of answers we can give about morally and politically justifiable solutions. In my work, I think about questions like: what type of injustice are we talking about when we talk about algorithmic injustice? Is it a unique form of injustice, or just a reiteration of other, more familiar forms of non-technological injustice that already shape society? I am also interested in the question of how algorithmic bias develops and compounds over time, which in my view is an extremely underexplored area.

I am also working on a short book titled The Algorithmic is Political. The book is about the extent to which technological design and deployment decisions have this political and moral baggage that we talked about before, and what that means for our moral and political rights and duties: who is responsible for when things

go wrong? Who should fix things like algorithmic bias, particularly when it compounds historical patterns of injustice? Are there some decisions that we simply should not automate, even if we have highly accurate and efficient technological tools? Who has a right to have a say: who should be involved in decisions about that, and how should those decisions take place given existing political and social structures? What would it mean to democratize AI, and would democratizing AI solve problems like algorithmic injustice? In the past, I have written about a number of other topics in political philosophy and the philosophy of lawâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;for instance, on the justifiability of criminal disenfranchisement in a democratic state (recently published in Philosophy & Public Affairs). In that paper, I argue that widespread current disenfranchisement policies disenfranchise the wrong set of people. They are over inclusive, because they disenfranchise persons guilty of serious, but non-political, criminal wrongdoing â&#x20AC;&#x201D; and that is particularly objectionable under circumstances in which criminal disenfranchisement has additional large-scale collateral consequences, for instance by perpetuating existing structures of racial inequality and exclusion. At the same time, existing disenfranchisement policies are also under inclusive, because they fail to disenfranchise some persons guilty of serious political wrongdoing such as large-scale corruption, bribery, electioneering, and conspiracy with foreign powers. Holding political wrongdoers accountable may require temporarily depriving them of particular democratic participation rights, such as the right to continue to hold office or the right to run of office in an upcoming election. Ultimately, I think that we have strong, yet under acknowledged reasons to question the underlying intuitions of those accounts of criminal disenfranchisement which currently dominate the philosophical debate and those reasons point us towards approaching the question of whether we ought to disenfranchise anyone with much more nuance and skepticism. 3. How do you go about formulating and developing your philosophical arguments and ideas? Do you have a particular method or methodology that you use when constructing any of your arguments, and how has this evolved throughout your career?

I find it exciting that philosophy challenges us to think about our own thinking in a clear, structured way. I think that some moral and political philosophers (at least implicitly) buy into the view that acts or states of affairs that are obviously morally wrong — say, discrimination, disrespect, corruption are not really worthy of much philosophical scrutiny, precisely because of their obvious wrongness. Instead of doing ‘X is wrong — duh’-style philosophy, they seem to think that one should primarily pursue philosophical questions that are not morally straightforward in this way: doing moral and political philosophy, on this view, means hunting for tricky ethics puzzles and dilemmas, which demand novel, intricate philosophical solutions and elaborately construed thought experiments. But while I very much enjoy the ‘complex puzzle’ aspect of philosophy, I think that it is important not to adopt too narrow of a view about what philosophy is supposed to be like, and which topics count as distinctively philosophical topics. The view that increasingly drives my own philosophical work is that it is often worth stating, emphasizing, that a state of affairs is wrong. It is worth explaining why it is wrong, and how wrong it is. It is worth examining alternative states of affairs, and examining our own inclination to label problems as obvious in the first place to declare the moral case closed. Doing so matters; morally and politically. In the meantime, we might well realize that whatever we consider obviously wrong or right is not philosophically obvious at all. I think that as philosophers, we are often (understandably) consumed by our search for big, ‘sexy’, dazzingly complex problems. But it is important to remember that we are already surrounded by them. The Small, the Clearly Wrongful, the Ostensibly Boring warrants our philosophical curiosity, our moral concern, and our political action. 4. It is undeniably the case that AI has become, and is becoming, an increasingly significant part of our lives. As more young philosophers become interested in engaging with discussions around AI, do you have any advice on how they could start formulating their ideas and exploring this topic? The new subfield ‘political/moral philosophy of AI’ is still in its infancy, but a lot of interesting philosophical work in this area is about to come out or has appeared very recently. But philosophers interested in this topic can and should also draw on longer-standing philosophical debates in various subfields, not all

of which are specific to AI, but offer valuable conceptual and normative tools for reasoning about AI—including, but not limited to, the philosophy of technology, philosophy of mind, epistemology, philosophy of language, and ethics/political philosophy as well as the philosophy of law. While some aspects of AI raise new and unique philosophical questions, other aspects of it can be usefully analysed by drawing on existing philosophical resources: we shouldn’t approach the philosophy of AI with the unduly narrow mindset that all existing philosophical work is entirely inapplicable to this domain. In addition, I would advise young philosophers interested in AI to engage seriously and deeply with computer science, applied statistics, and applied mathematics—for instance, by auditing online courses, or reading work by scholars from those disciplines. While the philosophical questions and problems AI poses cannot be resolved exclusively via technological and mathematical solutions, rigorous philosophical work in this area requires (amongst other things) understanding, on a technological level, why AI systems lead to particular outcomes: how these systems work, how they interact with the world, and how non-philosophers have so far tried to improve these systems. Conferences like the Association for Computing Machinery’s conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency (https://facctconference.org/) are a great place to start to get a sense of the state of the art in this field of research—talks are geared towards an interdisciplinary audience (and thus accessible for philosophers), and this year’s conference will be fully online. I would also recommend directly following the work for leading researchers in this field—just to name a few notable and influential examples, I have learned a lot from reading the works of scholars like Timnit Gebru, Ruha Benjamin, Joy Buolamwini, Safiya Noble, and Rediet Abebe.