Abstract
This short chapter explores Aquinas’s teaching on the vegetative soul. At first glance, Aquinas does not seem too interested in the vegetative soul, and this type of soul certainly takes last rank compared with the sensory and the intellectual souls, which are of more relevance when it comes to human perfection and morality. However, this does not mean that Aquinas’s teaching on the vegetative soul lacks sophistication. The chapter first examines why there is a need to posit a vegetative soul in the first place. It then turns to the three main functions of the vegetative soul – nutrition, growth, and generation – and how they are related. After addressing in what sense, according to Aquinas, human beings possess a vegetative soul, the chapter closes with a reflection on the relative obscurity of the activities of the vegetative soul.
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Notes
- 1.
See also Amalia Cerrito’s contribution to this volume.
- 2.
See, for instance, Summa Theologiae I, q. 82, a. 4; I-II, q. 17, a. 8; and III, q. 19, a. 2.
- 3.
See Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 17, a. 8 ad 3: “Ad tertium dicendum quod virtus et vitium, laus et vituperium, non debentur ipsis actibus nutritivae vel generativae potentiae, qui sunt digestio et formatio corporis humani, sed actibus sensitivae partis ordinatis ad actus generativae vel nutritivae, puta in concupiscendo delectationem cibi et venereorum, et utendo secundum quod oportet vel non secundum quod oportet.”
- 4.
See, for instance, Summa Theologiae I, q. 84, a. 2. It may look as if plants have perception, just like animals, when they turn themselves towards the sun. But for Aquinas this is not a case of perception. What the plant is doing is merely interacting with the heat caused by the sun and on which it relies for growth.
- 5.
See also Quaestiones disputatae de anima, q. 13; Summa contra Gentiles, lib. 1, cap. 97; Scriptum super libros Sententiarum, lib. 3, dist. 35, q. 1, a. 1. For discussion see Carreño 2015. Aquinas’s identification of life with self-motion makes one wonder whether it commits him to saying that simple material objects like the elements are also alive. For elements have the principle of their movement in themselves and they move through themselves (seipsis). However, as Aquinas explains elsewhere, elements or simple material objects such as heavy or light bodies, although they move through themselves (seipsis), do not move themselves (seipsa) (Quaestiones disputatae de veritate, q. 24, a. 1). In Summa Theologiae I, q. 18, a. 1 ad 2, Aquinas returns to the comparison with the motion of simple bodies and he clarifies that they move themselves only when they are not at their natural location. This is very different from living beings that move themselves regardless of their location. In Sententia de anima, lib. 2, lect. 3, ll. 173–176, Aquinas points to yet another difference between plant and elemental motion: whereas the latter only move towards one place, the former move in two opposite directions (namely, upwards – stems, leaves etc.; and downwards – roots). For this see also Pasnau 2002, 212–213.
- 6.
For translation of passages from Summa Theologiae I, qq. 75–89, I follow Pasnau’s translation in Aquinas 2002. All other translations are mine.
- 7.
See, for instance, Summa contra Gentiles, lib. 2, cap. 62, n. 8: “Operatio autem animae nutritivae etiam excedit virtutem qualitatum elementarium: probat enim Aristoteles, in II de anima, quod ignis non est causa augmenti, sed concausa aliquo modo, principalis autem causa est anima, ad quam comparatur calor sicut instrumentum ad artificem. Non igitur potest anima vegetabilis produci ex commixtione elementorum.” See also Quaestiones disputatae de anima, q. 1.
- 8.
See also Quaestiones disputatae de potentia, q. 3, a. 9; Quaestiones disputatae de veritate, q. 10, a. 1 ad 2.
- 9.
Summa Theologiae I, q. 76, a. 8; Quaestiones disputatae de anima, q. 10; Summa contra Gentiles, lib. 2, cap. 72; Sententia de anima, lib. 1, lect. 14 and lib. 2, lect. 4. See Aristotle, De anima I.5 411b19–27 for background.
- 10.
See also Summa Theologiae I, q. 69, a. 2 ad 1.
- 11.
Quaestiones disputatae de anima, q. 13, ll. 205–212: “Nam ad hoc quod indiuiduum producatur in esse ordinatur potentia generatiua, ad hoc autem quod quantitatem debitam consequatur ordinatur uis augmentatiua, ad hoc autem quod conseruetur in esse ordinatur uis nutritiua. Hec autem consequuntur corpora inanimata ab agente naturali extrinseco. Tamen, et propter hoc, predicte uires anime dicuntur naturales.” See also ibid. ad 14: “Dicendum quod potentie anime uegetabilis dicuntur uires naturales quia non operantur nisi quod natura facit in corporibus, set dicuntur uires anime quia altiori modo hoc faciunt”; Sententia de anima, lib. 1, lect. 5.
- 12.
This is the normal way in which plants are generated. Aquinas, however, also allows for the spontaneous generation of plants and lower-level animals. See Scriptum super libros Sententiarum, lib. 2, dist. 18, q. 2, a. 3 ad 5; Sententia de anima, lib. 2, lect. 7.
- 13.
The idea that “a generator generates something that is similar to it in kind (generans generat sibi simile in specie)” is one of basic principles of Aquinas’s natural philosophy. See, for instance, Quaestiones disputatae de potentia, q. 3, a. 9 ad 6.
- 14.
This ‘definition’ is based on Aristotle, De anima II.4416b23–25, but Aristotle most certainly did not intend to present it as a definition. The section in Aquinas’s commentary presents a clear order among the three powers of the vegetative soul. The first, and lowest, is the nutritive power, the second and “more perfect (perfectior)” is the augmentative power, and the generative power is the “most perfect (perfectissima)”.
- 15.
See Quodlibet IV, q. 11, a. 1 for a similar discussion.
- 16.
See also Quaestiones disputatae de anima, q. 16, a. 1 ad 13; ibid., q. 26, a. 3.
- 17.
Of course, there are other reasons too. For those see, for instance, Summa Theologiae I, q. 77, a. 1; Quodlibet X, q. 3, a. 1; Quaestio disputata de spiritualibus creaturis, a. 11; Quaestiones disputatae de anima, q. 12. For Aquinas’s position on this topic as it compares with his predecessors and contemporaries see Künzle 1956).
- 18.
Robert Kilwardby, the archbishop of Canterbury and a Dominican confrere, condemned in March 1277 thirty theses at Oxford. Some of the condemned theses can be traced back to Aquinas’s teaching on the unicity of the substantial form. For background see Callus 1955. The unicity of the substantial form was again condemned by John Peckham, a Franciscan and Kilwardby’s successor as archbishop, in 1286. For a more recent overview of the debate see Boer 2013, cap. 2.4.
- 19.
See Wippel 2000, 327–351, for a detailed overview of the texts in which Aquinas addresses the unicity of the substantial form.
- 20.
See also Quaestiones disputatae de anima, q. 11; Summa contra Gentiles, lib. 2, cap. 58.
- 21.
This is emphasized rightly by B. Carlos Bazán in his excellent introduction to Aquinas 2016, 75.
- 22.
See Quaestiones disputatae de veritate, q. 13, a. 4. In this text Aquinas also highlights the close connection between our intellective and nutritive powers by pointing out that heightened intellective activity such as contemplation can sometimes interfere with the activity of the nutritive power.
- 23.
- 24.
See, for instance, Quaestio disputata de spiritualibus creaturis, a. 3 ad 13: “Relinquitur dicendum quod in generatione hominis aut animalis sunt multe generationes et corruptiones sibi inuicem succedentes: adueniente enim perfectiori forma deficit imperfectior. Et sic, cum in embrione primo sit anima uegetativa tantum, cum peruentum fuerit ad maiorem perfectionem, tollitur forma imperfecta et succedit forma perfectior, que est anima uegetativa et sensitiua simul; et ultimo cedente succedit ultima forma completissima, que est anima rationalis.”
- 25.
Sententia de anima, lib. 1, lect. 14, ll. 149–157: “Item, uegetabilis potest esse sine sensibili et intelligibili, set hec non possunt esse sine uegetabili: nullum enim animal habet sensum seu intellectum sine hac, scilicet uegetabili. Sic ergo uiuere attribuitur isti principio, scilicet uegetabili, sicut sentire tactui, non tamen quod animal per solum uegetabile uiuat, set quia est primum principium in quo manifestatur uita.” The remark might be intended as a criticism of Averroes, who seems to have identified life with the activities of the vegetative soul. For this interpretation of Averroes see Doig 1974.
- 26.
Obviously, this classification of degrees of life is meant to be only about living bodies; otherwise God should exemplify the highest form of life.
- 27.
For a fascinating survey of the later medieval debate about how knowledge of the soul is possible see Boer 2013, cap. 3.3.
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Pickavé, M. (2021). Thomas Aquinas on the Vegetative Soul. In: Baldassarri, F., Blank, A. (eds) Vegetative Powers. International Archives of the History of Ideas Archives internationales d'histoire des idées, vol 234. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-69709-9_9
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