Abstract
This paper outlines several of the challenges that are inherent in any attempt to communicate subjective experience to others, particularly in the context of a clinical interview. It presents the phenomenological interview as a way of effectively responding to these challenges, which may be especially important when attempting to understand the profound experiential transformations that take place in schizophrenia. Features of language experience in schizophrenia—including changes in interpersonal orientation, a sense of the arbitrariness of language, and a desire for faithful communication of experience (including of ineffable transformations of experience)—are described, together with discussion of their relevance for the interview context. Furthermore, the interview presents a unique context in which both intersubjective and interpersonal aspects of experience will be described as well as evoked. It is proposed that phenomenological interviewers should not only be familiar with these and other experiences that can occur in schizophrenia, but also capable of applying the techniques of phenomenological and hermeneutic methods in order to understand the descriptions of interviewees with sensitivity and accuracy.
Notes
A number of alterations in cognition and stream of consciousness also manifest as disturbances of speech or language, including many that are considered emblematic of the schizophrenia spectrum, such as thought interference or thought pressure and first rank symptoms including thought insertion and thought withdrawal. We will not discuss these alterations here, however, but will focus solely on those that primarily involve the experience of language itself.
The ability to talk about one’s experience in some degree of detail is often a pre-requisite for phenomenological interviews. Those who are unable or unwilling to do so, e.g. interviewees who are acutely psychotic or suffering from significant cognitive disorganization, may not be appropriate for such interviews until their symptoms have improved.
Here we follow Sass’s (2019) distinction between the intersubjective and the interpersonal: in which “interpersonal [refers] to experience that is oriented toward another person or other people as a more or less direct target or object of one’s attention or awareness, and “intersubjective” [refers] to the presence of the human other as a kind of implicit participant in at least some of one’s own acts of awareness, especially perception” (p. 130).
References
Alcántara, C., & Gone, J. (2014). Multicultural issues in the clinical interview and diagnostic process. In F.T.L. Leong, L. Comas-Díaz, N. hall, V.C. McLoyd, & J.E. Trimble (Eds.), APA handbook of multicultural psychology: Vol. 2, Application and training (pp. 153-163).
American Psychiatric Association. (2013). Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders (5th ed.). Arlington: American Psychiatric Association.
Andreasen, N. C. (2007). DSM and the death of phenomenology in America: An example of unintended consequences. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 33, 108–112.
Artaud, A. (1976). Antonin Artaud: Selected writings. S. Sontag (Ed.). New York: Farrar, Straus, & Giroux.
Bergson, H. (1913/2001). Time and free will. (F.L. Pogson, Trans.). Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, Inc.
Berrios, G. E., & Markova, I. S. (2012). The construction of hallucinations. In J. D. Blom & I. E. C. Sommer (Eds.), Hallucinations: Research and practice (pp. 55–71). New Yorker: Springer.
Binswanger, L. (1957). Schizophrenie. Pfullingen: Neske.
Bitbol, M., & Petitmengin, C. (2016). On the possibility and reality of introspection. Mind and Matter, 1, 51–75.
Blankenburg, W. (1969/2001). First steps toward a psychopathology of common sense (Orig. Ansaetze zu einer Psychopathologie des 'common sense'). (A. Mishara, trans.). Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology, 8, 303–315.
Blankenburg, W. (1971/1991). La perte de l’evidence naturelle: Une contribution a la psychopathologie des schizophrenies pauci-symptomatiques. (Orig. Der Verlust der Naturlichen Selbstverstandlichkeit: Ein Beitrag zur Psychopathologie Symptomarmer Schizophrenien.) (J.-M. Azorin & Y. Totyan, Trans.). Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
Cermolacce, M., Sass, L., & Parnas, J. (2010). What is bizarre in bizarre delusions? A critical review. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 36, 667–679.
Conerty, J., Škodlar, B., Pienkos, E., Zadravek, T., Byrom, G., & Sass, L. (2017). Examination of anomalous world experience: A report on reliability. Psychopathology, 50, 55–59.
Conrad, K. (1958). Die beginnende Schizophrenie: Versuch einer Gestatlanalyse des Wahns. Stuttgart: Georg Thieme Verlag.
De Decker, B., & Van de Craen, P. (1987). Towards an interpersonal theory of schizophrenia. In R. Wodak & P. Van de Craen (Eds.), Neurotic and psychotic language behaviour (pp. 249–265). Clevedon: Multilingual Matters.
Descent into Madness. (2011). 60 Minutes: CBS News.
Dilthey, W. (1924). Die geistige Welt: Einleitung in die Philosophie des Lebers. Erste Hälfte: Abhandlungen zur Grundlegung der Geisteswissenschaften. In G. Misch (Ed.), Gesammelte Schriften (Vol. 5). Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.
Englebert, J., Monville, F., Valentiny, C., Mossay, F., Pienkos, E., & Sass, L. (2019). Anomalous experience of self and world: Administration of EASE and EAWE scales to four subjects with schizophrenia. Psychopathology, 52, 294–303.
Fink, E. (1988/1995). Sixth Cartesian meditation. (R. Bruzina, Trans.). Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.
Fuchs, T. (2013). Temporality and psychopathology. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 12, 75–104.
Gadamer, H.-G. (1984). Truth and method. New York: Crossroad.
Heidegger, M. (1962). Being and time. (J. Macquarrie & E. Robinson, trans.) New York: Harper and row.
Heidegger, M. (2008). Letter on humanism. In M. Heidegger (Ed.), Basic writings (pp. 213–266). New York: Harper Perennial Modern Thought.
Henriksen, M. G., Škodlar, B., Sass, L. A., & Parnas, J. (2010). Autism and perplexity. A qualitative and theoretical study of basic subjective experiences in schizophrenia. Psychopathology, 43, 357–368.
Humpston, C. S., Adams, R. A., Benrimoh, D., Broome, M. R., Corlett, P. R., Gerrans, P., Horga, G., Parr, T., Pienkos, E., Powers, A. R., Raballo, A., Rosen, C., & Linden, D. E. J. (2019). From computation to the first-person: Auditory-verbal hallucinations and delusions of thought interference in schizophrenia-spectrum psychoses. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 45, S56–S66.
Hurlburt, R. T. (1990). Sampling normal and schizophrenic inner experience. New York: Plenum.
Hurlburt, R. T., & Akhter, S. A. (2006). The descriptive experience sampling method. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 5, 271–301.
Jansson, L., & Nordgaard, J. (2016). The psychiatric interview for differential diagnosis. Switzerland: Springer.
Jaspers, K. (1959/1963). General psychopathology. (J. Hoenig & M. Hamilton, Trans.). London: John Hopkins University Press.
Kirmayer, L. J. (1992). The body’s insistence on meaning: Metaphor as presentation and representation in illness experience. Medical Anthropology Quarterly, 6, 323–346.
Kirmayer, L. J. (2000). Broken narratives: Clinical encounters and the poetics of illness experience. In C. Mattingly & L. Garro (Eds.), Narrative and the cultural construction of illness and healing (pp. 153–180). Berkeley: University of California Press.
Kraepelin, E. (1971). Dementia praecox and paraphrenia. (R. M. Barclay, Trans.). Huntington, NY: Robert E. Krieger.
Kraus, A. (2006). Schizophrenic delusion and hallucination as the expression and consequence of an alteration of the existential a prioris. In M. C. Chung, K. W. M. Fulford, & G. Graham (Eds.), Reconceiving schizophrenia (pp. 97–111). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Laing, R. D. (1965). The divided self. New York: Penguin.
Linehan, M. M., Heard, H. L., & Armstrong, H. E. (1993). Naturalistic follow-up of a behavioral treatment for chronically parasuicidal borderline patients. Archives of General Psychiatry, 50, 971–974.
Lorenz, M. (1961). Problems posed by schizophrenic language. Archives of General Psychiatry, 4, 603–610.
Madeira, L., Filipe, T., Cavaco, T., Pienkos, E., & Figueira, M. L. (2018). The loss of nosological validity: Why and how should we consider disturbances of subjective world experience? Psicopatologia Fenomenológica Contemporânea, 7, 29–46.
Marcel, A. (2003). Introspective report: Trust, self-knowledge and science. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 10, 167–186.
Merleau-Ponty, M. (2008). Phenomenology of perception. (C. Smith, Trans.). New York: Routledge Classics.
Minkowski, E. (1927/2012). La schizophrénie (excerpt). In M. R. Broome, R. Harland, G. S. Owen, & A. Stringaris (Eds.), The Maudsley reader in phenomenological psychiatry (pp. 143–155). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Nelson, B., Thompson, A., & Yung, A. R. (2012). Basic self-disturbance predicts psychosis onset in the ultra high risk for psychosis “prodromal” population. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 38, 1277–1287.
Nelson, B., Yung, A. R., Bechdolf, A., & McGorry, P. D. (2007). The phenomenological critique and self-disturbance: Implications for ultra-high risk (“prodrome”) research. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 34, 381–392.
Nisbett, R. E., & Wilson, T. D. (1977). Telling more than we can know: Verbal reports on mental processes. Psychological Review, 84, 231–259.
Nordgaard, J., & Parnas, J. (2014). Self-disorders and the schizophrenia spectrum: A study of 100 first hospital admissions. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 40, 1300–1307.
Nordgaard, J., Sass, L. A., & Parnas, J. (2013). The psychiatric interview: Validity, structure, and subjectivity. European Archives of Psychiatry and Clinical Neuroscience, 263, 353–364.
Pao, P. (1994). Schizophrenic disorders. Theory and treatment from a psychodynamic point of view. Madison: International Universities Press.
Parnas, J. (2011). A disappearing heritage: The clinical core of schizophrenia. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 37, 1121–1130.
Parnas, J., Møller, P., Kircher, T., Thalbitzer, J., Jansson, L., Handest, P., & Zahavi, D. (2005). EASE: Examination of anomalous self experience. Psychopathology, 38, 236–258.
Parnas, J., Sass, L. A., & Zahavi, D. (2013). Rediscovering psychopathology: The epistemology and phenomenology of the psychiatric object. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 39, 270–277.
Petitmengin, C., Remillieux, A., & Valenzuela-Moguillansky, C. (2018). Discovering the structures of lived experience. Towards a micro-phenomonological analysis. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 18, 691–730.
Phillips, J. (1996). Key concepts: Hermeneutics. Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology, 3, 61–69.
Pienkos, E., Giersch, A., Hansen, M., Humpston, C., McCarthy-Jones, S., Mishara, A., Nelson, B., Park, S., Sharma, R., Thomas, N., & Rosen, C. (2019). Hallucinations beyond voices: A conceptual review of the phenomenology of altered perception in psychosis. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 45, S67–S77.
Pienkos, E., & Sass, L. (2017). Language: On the phenomenology of linguistic experience in schizophrenia (ancillary article to EAWE domain 4). Psychopathology, 50, 83–89.
Raballo, A., & Parnas, J. (2012). Examination of anomalous self-experience: Initial study of the structure of self-disorders in schizophrenia. The Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, 200, 577–583.
Rasmussen, A. R., Stephensen, H., & Parnas, J. (2018). EAFI: Examination of anomalous fantasy and imagination. Psychopathology, 51, 216–226.
Ratcliffe, M. (2012). Phenomenology as a form of empathy. Inquiry, 55, 473–495.
Ricoeur, P. (1976). Interpretation theory: Discourse and the surplus of meaning. Fort Worth: Texas Christian University Press.
Rümke, H. C. (1941/1990). The nuclear symptom of schizophrenia and the praecoxfeeling. History of Psychiatry, 1, 331–341.
Sass, L. (1992). Heidegger, schizophrenia, and the ontological difference. Philosophical Psychology, 5, 109–132.
Sass, L. (1998). Ambiguity is of the essence: The relevance of hermeneutics for psychoanalysis. In P. Marcus & A. Rosenthal (Eds.), Psychoanalytic versions of the human condition: Philosophies of life and their impact on practice (pp. 257–305). New York: New York University Press.
Sass, L. (2017). Madness and modernism: Insanity in the light of modern art, literature, and thought (rev. ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Sass, L. (2019). Three dangers: Phenomenological reflections on the psychotherapy of psychosis. Psychopathology, 52, 126–134.
Sass, L., Borda, J., Madeira, L., Pienkos, E., & Nelson, B. (2018). Varieties of self disorder: A bio-pheno-social model of schizophrenia. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 44, 720–727.
Sass, L., & Byrom, G. N. (2015). Phenomenological and neurocognitive perspectives on delusion. World Psychiatry, 14, 164–173.
Sass, L., & Fishman, A. (2019). Introspection, phenomenology, and psychopathology. In G. Stanghellini, M. R. Broome, A. V. Fernandez, P. FUsar-Poli, A. Raballo, & R. Rosfort (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of phenomenological psychopathology (pp. 248–261). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Sass, L., & Parnas, J. (2003). Schizophrenia, consciousness, and the self. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 29, 427–444.
Sass, L., & Pienkos, E. (2015). Beyond words: Linguistic experience in melancholia, mania, and schizophrenia. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 14, 475–495.
Sass, L., Pienkos, E., Škodlar, B., Stanghellini, G., Fuchs, T., Parnas, J., & Jones, N. (2017). EAWE: Examination of anomalous world experience. Psychopathology, 50, 10–54.
Schooler, J. W. (2002). Re-representing consciousness: Dissociations between experience and meta-consciousness. Trends in Cognitive Science, 6, 339–344.
Schooler, J. W., & Schreiber, C. A. (2004). Experience, meta-consciousness, and the paradox of introspection. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 11, 17–39.
Schwartz, M. A., & Wiggins, O. P. (1987). Typifications: The first step for clinical diagnosis in psychiatry. The Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, 175, 65–77.
Simon, A. E., Dvorsky, D. N., Boesch, J., Roth, B., Isler, S., Schueler, P., Petralli, C., & Umbricht, D. (2006). Defining subjects at risk for psychosis: A comparison of two approaches. Schizophrenia Research, 81, 83–90.
Škodlar, B., & Henriksen, M. G. (2019). Toward a phenomenological psychotherapy for schizophrenia. Psychopathology, 52, 117–125.
Stanghellini, G. & Ballerini, M. (2007). Values in persons with schizophrenia. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 33, 131–141.
Stanghellini, G., & Ballerini, M. (2011). What is it like to be a person with schizophrenia in the social world? A first-person perspective study on schizophrenic dissociality - part 2: Methodological issues and empirical findings. Psychopathology, 44, 183–192.
Stanghellini, G., Castellini, G., Brogna, P., Faravelli, C., & Ricca, V. (2012). Identity and eating disorders (IDEA): A questionnaire evaluating identity and embodiment in eating disorder patients. Psychopathology, 45, 147–158.
Willis, P. (2001). The ‘things themselves’ in phenomenology. Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology, 1, 1–12.
Wittgenstein, L. (1953). Philosophical investigations. (G.E. Anscombe, Trans.). Upper Saddle River: Pearson Education, Inc.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Additional information
Publisher’s note
Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Pienkos, E., Škodlar, B. & Sass, L. Expressing experience: the promise and perils of the phenomenological interview. Phenom Cogn Sci 21, 53–71 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-021-09731-4
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-021-09731-4