Abstract
I argue that Harry Frankfurt’s doctrine of sufficiency, properly understood, presents a plausible alternative to egalitarianism. My position may be more general than Frankfurt’s, insofar as he limits himself to economic sufficiency; on my view, insufficiency is a generic reason for the rejection of principles governing permissible behavior. By situating sufficiency within a contractualist framework of moral permissibility, I provide an alternative to common (and, I think, mistaken) characterizations of the doctrine of sufficiency as either subordinate to equality or primarily concerned with maximizing cases of sufficiency.
Acknowledgments
For their comments on early drafts I thank Peter de Marneffe, Kurt Blankschaen, and several anonymous reviewers. I am also grateful to Elizabeth Anderson for patient and instructive feedback on the conference version of this paper. The Florida Philosophical Association, Mississippi Philosophical Association, and American Philosophical Association all hosted conferences from which my work has benefitted; I extend my appreciation to the event organizers and participants who made that possible.
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