Abstract
The paper defends that it is possible to offer a Kantian argument for justifying the introduction of Universal Basic Income (UBI). It first briefly presents Philippe van Parijs’ argument for UBI based on the concept of real freedom for all. In doing so, it will focus on its general structure and central insight, without entering too much into other issues like the economic feasibility of UBI. It second briefly presents Kant’s concept of external freedom and especially focuses on some of its components to assess whether there is some closeness to van Parijs’ concept of real freedom. It further considers whether UBI is not only compatible with a Kantian position, but can be justified from such a position because it represents a tool for concretely realizing external freedom as presented in the Doctrine of Right and for attaining the ethical ideal of virtuosity presented in the Doctrine of Virtue.
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Notes
The introduction of UBI can be defended on the basis of different arguments such as the communitarian argument (Freeden 1992), the compensation argument (first used by Thomas Paine in Agrarian Justice: see Paine 1995), or the basic needs argument. None of them, however, can be defended from a Kantian perspective. I cannot prove this in this context, though.
Children, particularly from poor families, may face many external obstacles to their education, even when there is a public system of education: schools may be too far away in the absence of public transport; parents may take children out of school because they need their help at home or to provide another source of income, etc.
Quotations from Kant are marked by referring to the English translation I used (Kant 1996) and by indicating the volume and the page of the Akademie-Ausgabe of his works.
It shares this formality with Kant’s metaphysical concept of right, which he defines as “the sum of the conditions under which the choice [Willkür] of one can be united with the choice of another in accordance with a universal law of freedom” (Kant 1996, 387; 06: 230).
According to Kant, the criminal loses his “dignity of a citizen” through his crime, and, “though he is kept alive, he is made a mere tool of another’s choice (either of the state or of another citizen).” Now, Kant goes on, “whoever is another’s tool (which he can become only by a verdict and right) is a bondsman (servus in sensu stricto) and is the property (dominium) of another, who is accordingly not merely his master (herus) but also his owner (dominus) and can therefore alienate him as a thing, use him as he pleases (only not for shameful purposes) and dispose of his powers though not of his life and members” (471 f.; 06: 229 f.).
On this see Horn 2014, who convincingly argues for a non-individualistic justification for the existence of the state in Kant.
On Kant on taxation see Penner 2010.
It is noteworthy that the political community has a duty of self-preservation and therefore a duty to assist its poorest members while these have no corresponding subjective right to such assistance. On the contrary, it is evidently expected that they help themselves through work, since laziness is not admitted and since only individuals who, for different reasons, are not able to work are eligible for public assistance.
As Paul infamously put it: “If anyone will not work, then let him not eat” (2 Thessalonians, 3:10). On Luther see Geremek 1994, 180.
An example of this can be observed in the case of the abolishment of the Brazilian social program Bolsa Familia (one of the largest of the world) by the government of President Bolsonaro.
Karen Stohr called my attention to this point.
One could also claim that it represents a violation of human dignity (see Mieth and Williams 2022), but Kant’s view of this concept is not as unequivocal as it is often assumed (for an exhaustive analysis see Sensen 2011), and I would rather leave this issue aside since I think that the argument according to which poverty is a hindrance to the fulfillment of our duties already offers a good reason for eradicating it.
Once again, I thank Karen Stohr for calling my attention to this point.
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Acknowledgements
The research leading to this paper was funded by CNPq with grant nr. 302590/2018-8. I thank for their suggestions and critiques the two anonymous reviewers of a first version of the paper, as well as Claudia Blöser, Violetta Igneski, Corinna Mieth, Reza Mosayebi, Oliver Sensen, Martin Sticker, Karen Stohr, Garrath Williams, and Ariel Zylberman. I would also like to thank Kim Butson for reviewing the text.
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Pinzani, A. Towards a Kantian Argument for a Universal Basic Income. Ethic Theory Moral Prac 26, 225–236 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-022-10339-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-022-10339-z