Abstract
In a series of recent publications, Gigerenzer and his collaborators have attempted to derive new norms of rationality from their psychological research in the Centre for Adaptive Behaviour and Cognition (ABC). Specifically, they have claimed that there are good reasons to replace the norms traditionally used to assess rational behaviour, which rest on the ideal of optimisation. Their proposal has considerable importance, as it has been laid out as a revision of the normative framework accepted in the social, behavioural, and cognitive sciences. Still, whereas the ABC scholars present their approach as diametrically opposed to the framework of optimisation—two incompatible takes on the problem of defining rational behaviour—this paper argues that it is not entirely clear whether this is the case. I introduce a distinction between different kinds of reflection upon norms of rationality that has been neglected by ABC scholars, and provide reasons to think that the departure from the traditional framework might be less radical than ABC scholars suppose.
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Notes
Gigerenzer et al. appeal to the work by Houston et al. (2007a), who argue that violations of the axiom of transitivity could result from an optimal state-dependent strategy that maximizes the animal’s probability of long-term survival. Foraging options differ in terms of mean energetic intake and risk of predation: some are safer but provide only low energy intake; others promise high yield but at considerable risk. Depending on its energy reserve and the necessity to choose a higher intake option as an insurance against starvation, an animal will change its preferences between the foraging options: when the energy reserves are high the animal chooses options that are safe but have lower yield; when reserves are low, the animal should take risks to procure higher intake and to avoid starvation. In the world of animals, the objective of being transitive may thus get into the way of trying to survive. Houston et al. (2007b) make a similar argument on inconsistency in humans that has been mistakenly interpreted as a form of irrationality, and identified environmental structures in which violations of transitivity are fitness-maximizing.
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Acknowledgments
I am grateful to Till Vierkant and Lars Penke for the insightful suggestions they formulated on earlier versions of the paper.
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Polonioli, A. Reflecting on Gigerenzer’s critique of optimisation. Mind Soc 12, 245–256 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11299-013-0132-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11299-013-0132-6