Abstract
This paper explores the idea of forward induction for extensive games. It interprets this idea as a general behavioral principle the technical details of which have to be worked out in each specific case. Because of its cooperative ingredient, this approach should be contrasted with the usual approaches of non-cooperative game theory which are rooted in individual rationality.
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Ponssard, JP. Self enforceable paths in extensive form games. Theor Decis 29, 69–83 (1990). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00134105
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00134105