Abstract
In this essay, I propose an analysis of Quine’s example ’Giorgione was so-called because of his size’, grounded on the idea of an obstinate demonstrative. In the first sections, I discuss the advantages and drawbacks of the demonstrative and logophoric treatments of ‘so called’, I highlight certain parallelisms with Davidson’s paratactic view of quotation, and I introduce independent considerations in favor of the idea of an obstinate demonstrative. In the second half of my essay, I apply this notion to Quine’s example, and I discuss its consequences with respect to the principle of substitutivity of coreferential singular terms.
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Predelli, S. Substitutivity, Obstinacy, and the Case of Giorgione. J Philos Logic 39, 5–21 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-009-9102-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-009-9102-1