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The Two-Dimensional Content of Consciousness

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Abstract

In this paper I put forward a representationalist theory of conscious experience based on Robert Stalnaker’s version of two-dimensional modal semantics. According to this theory the phenomenal character of an experience correlates with a content equivalent to what Stalnaker calls the diagonal proposition. I show that the theory is closely related both to functionalist theories of consciousness and to higher-order representational theories. It is also more compatible with an anti-Cartesian view of the mind than standard representationalist theories.

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  1. Department of Logic & Metaphysics and Moral Philosophy, University of St. Andrews, St. Andrews, Fife, KY16 9AL, United Kingdom

    Simon Prosser

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Prosser, S. The Two-Dimensional Content of Consciousness. Philos Stud 136, 319–349 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-005-4281-2

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