Abstract
Two justifications of backward induction (BI) in generic perfect information games are formulated using Bonanno's (1992; Theory and Decision 33, 153) belief systems. The first justification concerns the BI strategy profile and is based on selecting a set of rational belief systems from which players have to choose their belief functions. The second justification concerns the BI path of play and is based on a sequential deletion of nodes that are inconsistent with the choice of rational belief functions.
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Quesada, A. Belief system foundations of backward induction. Theory and Decision 53, 393–403 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1024102216631
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1024102216631