Abstract
Consider a simple game with n players. Let ψi be the Shapley–Shubik power index for player i. Then 1-ψi measures his powerlessness. We break down this powerlessness into two components – a `quixote index' Q i (which measures how much of a `quixote' i is), and a `follower index' F i (which measures how much of a `follower' he is). Formulae, properties, and axiomatizations for Q and F are given. Examples are also supplied.
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Quint, T. Measures of Powerlessness in Simple Games. Theory and Decision 50, 367–382 (2001). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1010315526150
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1010315526150