Abstract
Causal Dispositionalism provides an account of causation based on an ontology of causal powers, properties with causal essence. According to the account, causation can be analysed in terms of the interaction of powers and its subsequent production of their effect. Recently, Baltimore, J. A. (2022. “Dispositionalism, Causation, and the Interaction Gap.” Erkenntnis 87: 677–92) has raised a challenge against two competing approaches, the compositional view (CV) and the mutual manifestation view (MMV), to explain what makes powers interactive – the interaction gap. In this paper, we raise the challenge of explaining what makes powers productive – the production gap. While Baltimore’s verdict is tentatively favouring (MMV), we find both approaches wanting. Our conclusion is that Causal Dispositionalists should take Baltimore’s and our critique seriously. Powers cannot cause their effects just by bearing the name “causal”. To deserve their names, more metaphysical details are needed.
Acknowledgments
The author is grateful to Toby Friend, Giacomo Giannini, Vassilis Livanios, Neil Williams, and Shinya Aoyama, for helpful comments on early versions of this paper. She is also grateful to the audience and the organisers of the “Causation in Sciences: Powers, mechanism and Singularism” conference (CauSci Project, NMBU) for their valuable feedback.
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