Abstract
It is shown in this paper that a very mild form of Pareto principle is compatible with a set of restrictive conditions. Deriving a choice set identical with the set of alternatives in the case of paradox of voting amounts to begging the problem. If we restrict that the choice set should be a proper sub-set of the original set, the paradox will be revived. In the realistic sense liberalism may well be treated as an outcome of the choice rather than as a basic value judgement. Choice of ‘Rules of the Game’ ought to be the first step and then only society can seek the optimal situation under those Rules.
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Bibliography
K. J. Arrow, Individual Values and Social Choice, New York 1951, 2nd Ed. 1963.
R. N. Batra and P. K. Pattanaik, ‘On Some Suggestions for Having Non-Binary Social Choice Functions’, Theory and Decision 3 (1972) 1–11.
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I am very grateful to P. K. Pattanaik for helpful discussions and valuable comments on the first draft. I am also grateful to Prof. Amartya Sen whose lectures at the Delhi School of Economics introduced me to the theory of social choice.
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Ramachandra, V.S. Liberalism, non-binary choice and Pareto principle. Theor Decis 3, 49–54 (1972). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00139353
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00139353