Meta-epistemological scepticism: criticisms and a defence
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Date
28/06/2016Author
Ranalli, Christopher
Metadata
Abstract
The epistemological problem of the external world asks:
(1) “How is knowledge of the world possible given certain obstacles
which make it look impossible?”
This is a “how-possible?” question: it asks how something is possible given
certain obstacles which make it look impossible (cf. Cassam 2007; Nozick
1981; Stroud 1984). Now consider the following question, which asks:
(2) “How is a philosophically satisfying answer to (1) possible?”
Scepticism is the thesis that knowledge of the world is impossible. It
therefore represents a negative answer to the first question. Meta-epistemological
scepticism is the thesis that a satisfying philosophical
explanation of how our knowledge of the world is possible is itself not
possible. It therefore represents a negative answer to the second question.
In this thesis, I explore the prospects of meta-epistemological
scepticism. In particular, I structure the thesis around two master arguments
from Stroud (1984, 2000, 2004, and 2009) for meta-epistemological
scepticism. The first argument is what I call “Stroud’s puzzle”, and the
second argument is “Stroud’s dilemma” (cf. Cassam 2009). I argue that
Stroud’s puzzle fails to provide adequate support for meta-epistemological
scepticism. However, I also argue that Stroud’s dilemma withstands serious
objections (e.g., from Sosa 1994, Williams 1996, and Cassam 2009). In
short, while Stroud’s puzzle fails to provide adequate support for meta-epistemological
scepticism, Stroud’s dilemma does seem to provide
adequate support for meta-epistemological scepticism. This thesis therefore
represents a partial defence of meta-epistemological scepticism. Meta-epistemological
scepticism is therefore a live option in epistemology.
In Chapter 1, I explain what meta-epistemological is, present
Stroud’s puzzle and Stroud’s dilemma for meta-epistemological scepticism,
and argue that meta-epistemological sceptics are not committed to first-order
scepticism. In Chapter 2, I examine what I call the “anti-revisionist”
premise of Stroud’s puzzle and argue that it lacks adequate support. In
Chapter 3, I examine the “conditional scepticism” premise of Stroud’s
puzzle and argue that it lacks adequate support. In Chapter 4, I look at
Williams’s (1996) master argument against Stroud’s dilemma, and argue
that it fails. In Chapter 5, I look at externalist responses to Stroud’s
dilemma, and in particular, Sosa (1994). I argue that Sosa’s objection fails,
and therefore Stroud’s dilemma survives serious externalist objections. In
Chapter 6, I explain Cassam’s (2009) argument against Stroud’s dilemma,
and I argue that it fails. Chapter 7 concludes the thesis, summarising the
main results.