Abstract
Kant asserts that the formula of the schools “nihil appetimus, nisi sub ratione boni” is undoubtedly certain when clearly expressed (KpV 177). Conversely, doubt reflects a failure clearly to express it. Once we comprehend the concepts of the formula, of the good (bonum) and of desire (appetitus), there is no doubting it. In recent times, the formula has fallen into doubt. If Kant is right, then this shows a lack of clarity with respect to the concepts the formula conjoins. I want to suggest that Kant is right: the formula of the schools is undoubtedly certain. I first explain in Kant’s own terms why there is no such thing as doubting the formula. Then I approach it from a different angle, provided by what I take to be the unclarity that affects current thought on the topic.
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Notes
“Sensuous nature therefore contains too little to provide a ground of moral evil in the human being, for, to the extent that it eliminates the incentives originating in freedom it makes of the human a purely animal being; a reason exonerated from the moral law, an evil reason as it were (an absolutely evil will), would on the contrary contain too much, because resistance to the law would itself be thereby elevated to incentive […], and so the subject would be made a diabolical being. – Neither of these two is however applicable to the human being.”
“The ground of this evil can also not be placed (2) in a corruption of the morally legislative reason, as if reason could extirpate within itself the dignity of the law itself, for this is absolutely impossible. To think of oneself as a freely acting being, yet as exempted from the one law commensurate to such a being […], would amount to the thought of a cause operating without any law at all […]: and this is a contradiction.”
“But even though the existence of this propensity to evil in human nature can be established through experiential demonstrations of the actual resistance in time of the human power of choice against the law, these demonstrations still do not teach us the real nature of that propensity [to evil] or the ground of this resistance; that nature rather, […], must be cognized a priori from the concept of evil, so far as the latter is possible according to the laws of freedom […]. What follows is the development of this concept.”
Indeed, Kitcher attributes this concept of knowledge to Kant. Cf. Kitcher 2011, p. 19: “Kant’s view of rational cognition is that in applying concepts, rational animals know the basis or ground or reason for the application—hence they must be aware of their own representations, because those are the grounds of the application. Since reasoning as well as judging requires that human cognizers recognize their grounds as such, […] I belabor this point, because the cognition that is the prime subject matter of the Critique is the rational cognition just described.”
A principle is a law according to a representation of which she who is subject to it acts: she who acts according to the law does so understanding her action to accord with the law. Cf. GMS, p. 412: “Ein jedes Ding der Natur wirkt nach Gesetzen. Nur ein vernünftiges Wesen hat das Vermögen, nach der Vorstellung der Gesetze, d. i. nach Prinzipien, zu handeln, oder einen Willen. Da zur Ableitung der Handlungen von Gesetzen Vernunft erfordert wird, so ist der Wille nichts anderes, als praktische Vernunft.” [Everything in nature works in accordance with laws. Only a rational being has the capacity to act in accordance with the representation of laws, that is, in accordance with principles, or has a will. Since reason is required for the derivation of actions from laws, the will is nothing other than practical reason.”] While a law determines the necessary object of animal desire, a principle of reason determines the necessary object of rational desire.
A clear expression of this idea can be found in David Velleman’s “The Guise of the Good”. He represents the thought that acting is under the guise of the good as follows: “Desires are conceived as value judgments, with intrinsic justificatory force, so that the desire motivating an agent can be identified with the reason guiding him. The result is that all actions performed for reasons are conceived as arising from favorable value judgments, and hence as being aimed at the good.” (Velleman 2000, p. 104.)
Note that “x does wrong to y” is equivalent to “y suffers wrong from x”. Instantiating twice over, with the same names, in reverse order, we can derive contradictory statements. First instantiation: It is better that a suffers wrong from b than it is that a does wrong to b, equivalently, it is better that b does wrong to a than it is that b suffers wrong from a. Second instantiation: it is better that b suffers wrong from a than it is that b does wrong to a, equivalently, it is better that a does wrong to b than it is that a suffers wrong from b.
The question of an anonymous referee suggests to me that it may be worthwhile to point out that the grammatical subject of this sentence is “valid thought”, not “thought”.
This metaphor, taken from the field of sensory consciousness, is inept. It suggests something through which I think, something that is there, except that I do not apprehend it. The metaphor thus suggests a form of blindness, an incapacity. In truth, there is nothing there. What is ill-named “transparency” is no incapacity, but absolute power.
References
Kant I (1974a) Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten. In: Weischedel W (ed) Werkausgabe, vol 7. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main
Kant I (1974b) Kritik der praktischen Vernunft. In: Weischedel W (ed) Werkausgabe, vol 7. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main
Kant I (1977) Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft. In: Weischedel W (ed) Werkausgabe, vol 8. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main
Kant I (1996) Religion and rational theology. Translated and edited by di Giovanni G & Wood a. Cambridge University Press, New York
Kitcher P (2011) Kant’s thinker. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Müller A (1977) Radical subjectivity: morality versus utilitarianism. Ratio 19(2):115–132
Scanlon T (2014) Being realistic about reasons. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Velleman JD (2000) The guise of the good. In: Velleman JD (ed) The possibility of practical reason. OUP, Oxford
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Rödl, S. Good, Evil, and the Necessity of an Act. Ethic Theory Moral Prac 21, 91–102 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-017-9853-7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-017-9853-7