Abstract
Tensions in ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’ are not resolved in Quine's later writings. The role of simplicity remains mysterious. Naturalized epistemology is wrongly presented as the only alternative to phenomenalism, and no attempt is made to answer the objection that judgements of the rationality of human activities have no place within a naturalistic philosophy. The attempt to develop an empiricism without experience leads to an implausible behaviorism and to an unsuccessful naturalistic account of observation sentences.
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A part of an earlier version of this paper was read at the Annual Conference of the Australasian Association of Philosophy, (August, 1973), and a part at the Annual Conference of the New Zealand Division, (May, 1975). I have been helped by the encouragements and criticisms offered by M. C. Bradley, G. C. Nerlich, J. J. C. Smart, and the Editor.
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Reeves, A. The foundations of Quine's philosophy. Philos Stud 30, 75–93 (1976). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01305759
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01305759