Inwardness and Infinity of Selfhood: From Plotinus to Augustine

Several scholars have drawn attention to the fact that to think of the self in terms of inner space or an inner realm is not universal. It is not an inevitable part of our self-description like perception or mortality, but can be traced back in history, especially to early modern philosophy. While ancient philosophers sometimes talked of an “inner man” or, rather, “human being within” (Plato, Republic IX, 589a),¹ this was not the primary means to describe the nature of subjects or agents, nor did they underline the inner nature and privacy of one’s own mental functioning. It has been further argued that Augustine and especially his discussions on memory present the first real steps towards the notion of an inner self.² A relatively recent study by Phillip Cary, entitled Augustine’s Invention of the Inner Self. The Legacy of the Christian Platonist,³ concentrates on this development in Augustine. As the title already indicates, Cary claims that the inner self is an Augustinian invention, but he takes also into account Augustine’s deep Platonism or, to be more precise, his Neoplatonism. The purpose of this article is to offer an alternative reading of the relation between Augustine and Plotinus on this issue. I will argue that the Neoplatonic influences are even deeper than Cary allows, and that most novelties attributed to Augustine are either explicit or implicit in Plotinus.⁴ However, it is not my intention to devalue Augustine’s originality.⁵ Towards the end of the paper I will propose some suggestions as to where, exactly, a new shift of emphasis happens when we move from Plotinus to the Augustine of the Confessions.