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Criminal Justice in a Democracy: Towards a Relational Conception of Criminal Law and Punishment

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Abstract

This article starts from the observation that in classical Athens the discovery of democracy as a normative model of politics has been from the beginning not only a political and a legal but at the same time a philosophical enterprise. Reflections on the concept of criminal law and on the meaning of punishment can greatly benefit from reflections on Athenian democracy as a germ for our contemporary debate on criminal justice in a democracy. Three main characteristics of the Athenian model will be analysed: the self-instituting capacity of a democracy based on participatory and reflective citizenship, political power as the capacity of citizens for co-operating and co-acting with others, and the crime of hubris as one of the key issues in Athenian criminal law. These analyses will lead to the conclusion that one of the key issues of a democratic legal order lies in its capacity of recognizing the fragility of the human condition and of developing workable and effective standards of justice in that context. A relational conception of criminal law and punishment, based on proportionality, reflexivity, mutual respect and responsibility fits best with a democracy under the rule of law.

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Notes

  1. Castoriadis (1983, p. 95 and 81).

  2. Meier (1990, p. 29).

  3. For a methodology to the dialogic reading of history, see Todorov’s study of the work of 1981. With reference to the history of Athenian democracy in dialogic perspective, see Finley (1973).

  4. Aeschylus (1999). We find the same theme in Euripides (1988). See further Vernant and Vidal-Naquet (1982, p. 25ff).

  5. Isonomia can be considered as a necessary condition of and also as the precursor of demokratia. Isonomia means here equality in, by and before the law. In this sense, it can be conceived of as the principle of legality, one which forms the basis for the ideal of democracy in Solon and Kleisthenes. This is developed in greater detail in Foqué (1992, p. 8ff).

  6. Vernant and Vidal-Naquet op. cit., p. 25ff. Buxton (1982), emphasises the persuasive power of Peitho (goddess of persuasion) to mislead, who convinced Clytemnestra to kill her husband Agamemnon and ultimately made her death inevitable.

  7. Ehrenberg (2004 (1967), pp. 212–213).

  8. See, in particular, Castoriadis (2002, p. 22ff and 55ff).

  9. Keegan (2003, p. 30).

  10. From a philosophical point-of view, I consider the debate between a liberal and a communitarian position not a very fruitful one, because there is “just plain confusion in this debate, because two quite different issues tend to get run together: the ontological issues and the advocacy issues”, as Charles Taylor once observed. See: Taylor (1995, p. 181). One of the main consequences of this confusion may be that not enough conceptual distinction is made between values and value-orientations, and between different forms of abstract subjectivity, different forms of individualism and of practical reflexive autonomy. All this confusion risks to produce more ideological certainty than critical philosophical reflection.

  11. Castoriadis op. cit., p. 81.

  12. Heinemann (1987).

  13. Verhoeven (1984, p. 20). “Macht komt dan aan de kant van het reflecterende subject, dat hiermee ook het subject van de geschiedenis wordt.”

  14. Thonissen (1875).

  15. Gernet (2001 (1917)).

  16. Gernet (1976).

  17. Herodotos (1996, I/131, p. 55).

  18. Arendt (1958, p. 18).

  19. Euripides (1979, p. 535).

  20. Gernet (1955, p. 2).

  21. Ostwald (1969, p. 12ff); de Romilly (2001 (1971), p. 13ff).

  22. Jaeger (1989, p. 141ff).

  23. Taylor (1989, p. 34).

  24. Taylor (1985, p. 67).

  25. Taylor Ibidem.

  26. Habermas (1999, p. 17ff).

  27. Herodotos op. cit., p. 12.

  28. Citizens with a weak or diminished relation as to the common and open-textured value-orientations of their society should be considered as among the most vulnerable members of that society: Their capacity for personal identity-building is almost minimal and the risk that they will turn into violence could be considered as quite realistic. The deeper anthropological explanation to these forms of violence can be found in their very often initially unequal socio-political position as to their changes for reflexive and intersubjective action and speech, and thus for individual responsibility. See on this argument recently: Sen (2007).

  29. On the continuity between Athenian democracy and Kant’s theory of law, see Korsgaard (2000).

  30. Kant (1964, p. 95).

  31. Kant (1983).

  32. Jaeger op. cit., p. 140.

  33. Castoriadis op. cit., p. 96.

  34. Fisher (1990) and Murray (1990).

  35. Aristotle (1991, II/1378b/28–29).

  36. Gernet observes that this more general perspective made hubris also relevant for the relationship of citizens with slaves, women and barbarians. On the current relevance hereof, see Honneth (2005).

  37. Gernet op. cit, p. 433ff.

  38. van der Wal (2003).

  39. Arendt op. cit., p. 248ff.

  40. van der Wal Ibidem.

  41. Jonas (1984, p. 57ff).

  42. With specific reference to criminal attributes, see Garland (2001) and Hudson (2003).

  43. See for an elaborated critique on legal instrumentalism in the context of criminal law and policy: Foqué and Hart (1990).

  44. Foucault (1975).

  45. Ricoeur (1999, pp. 48–49). “Il est important d'enchaîner les trois concepts: pouvoir, davantage de pouvoir, donc davantage de fragilité. Là où il y avait la fragilité simplement d'un homme, vulnérable, comme tous les vivants, à la maladie et à la mort, il y a les fragilités issues de son propre pouvoir, par le fait que l'homme est menaçant à l'égard de l'homme. … La modernité est précisément caractérisée par cette multiplication des pouvoirs et donc, par l'augmentation de la fragilité. Alors, là où il y a du pouvoir, il y a de la fragilité. Et là où il y a de la fragilité, il y a de la responsabilité. Moi, j'aurais même tendance à dire que l'objet de la responsabilité, c'est le fragile, le périssable qui nous requiert, parce que le fragile est, en quelque sorte, confié à notre garde, il est remis à notre soin.”

  46. Arendt op. cit., pp. 179–180.

  47. See Foqué and Zijderveld (1994, p. 298).

  48. Foqué and Hart op. cit.; Foqué (1996).

  49. Foqué and Hart op. cit., p. 129ff.

  50. See for an extensive analysis of the counterfactual character of legal concepts and principles: Foqué and Hart op. cit., p. 113ff and 405ff. On the relevance of this conception of law in a rather Kantian perspective see: Höffe (1995).

  51. Habermas (2001, p. 778).

  52. Habermas op. cit., pp. 88–89.

  53. Ricoeur (1997, p. 182ff).

  54. van Haute (1989, pp. 52–53).

  55. On this, see Foqué (2005b, p. 187ff).

  56. Hildebrandt (2002).

  57. See for the social and political consequences of the cultural dominance of the imaginary order conception of society: Lasch (1979).

  58. Hildebrandt op. cit.

  59. Castoriadis-Aulagnier (1975, p. 204ff).

  60. Claes (2005)

  61. Honneth (1995).

  62. Claes op. cit.

  63. Duff (2001).

  64. Foqué and op. cit.; Habermas op. cit.; see also the interesting study of Hudson op. cit., p. 204ff.

  65. Hudson op. cit.; Ricoeur op. cit.

  66. Castoriadis op. cit., p. 80.

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  1. Faculty of Law, Centre for the Study of the Foundations of the Law, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Tiensestraat 41, Leuven, 3000, Belgium

    René Foqué

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René Foqué is Professor of legal philosophy and legal theory at the Catholic University of Leuven (Belgium) and at the Erasmus University of Rotterdam (The Netherlands). He is a correspondent member of the Royal Dutch Academy of Sciences.

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Foqué, R. Criminal Justice in a Democracy: Towards a Relational Conception of Criminal Law and Punishment. Criminal Law, Philosophy 2, 207–227 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11572-008-9063-4

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