Abstract
By considering another version of the Inverted Earth thought experiment in which the protagonist is informed that she is implanted with inverting lenses behind her eyes, I argue that the thought experiment doesn’t successfully pose a challenge to representationalism because after many years, the protagonist’s visual experience of the sky of Inverted Earth would simply represent it as blue.
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Notes
For Dretske, the causal covariance theory of representational content applies to sensory states only when sensory states do the tracking in the same environment as the one in which the sensory system that produces the sensory states has evolved. For Tye, the causal covariance theory of representational content applies to sensory states only when the sensory system that produces the sensory states works under its optimal conditions. Clearly, both believe that the simpler version of the causal covariance theory of representational content doesn’t apply to sensory states.
Tye (2002) dismisses the gap by comparing it with other “normal misperceptions” like “Muller-Lyer illusion, two parallel lines of the same length look different lengths to normal perceivers in normal viewing conditions (p. 452).” Tye thinks that in the case of Muller-Lyer illusion, normal perceivers would misperceive at the non-conceptual level while they would perceive correctly at the conceptual level, that is, they would make the correct perceptual judgment that the two lines have the same length. But, it seems to me, normal perceivers would make the (non-inferential) perceptual judgment that the two lines have different lengths (they would say that one is longer than the other) unless they have known that the two lines have the same length by other means, for instance, measuring the lengths, or they have already known that it is an illusion that the two lines look different lengths.
It might seem that both Dretske and Tye could maintain that we attribute representational content to perceptual experience because of what the sensory systems that produce the experience have adapted to track (for Dretske) or what the sensory systems causally co-vary with in optimal conditions in their natural environment (for Tye). But first, according to functionalism, the identity of a perceptual experience is not solely determined by the causal relation it bears with the stimuli, but also by the causal relations it bears with other mental states and behavior. Second and more important, if there is a gap between the representational content of a perceptual experience and that of a perceptual judgment directly based on the perceptual experience, it seems that our perceptual judgments would lose contact with the external world even though our perceptual experiences may not, which seems unacceptable. One might argue that the fact that there is a gap between the representational content of a perceptual experience and that of a perceptual judgment directly based on the perceptual experience in a wild environment like Inverted Earth doesn’t threat the accordance between the representational content of a perceptual experience and that of a perceptual judgment directly based on the perceptual experience in a normal environment like Earth. However, it seems that we don’t have any non-arbitrary or non-question-begging way of determining which environment is normal or wild. That is to say, if it is possible that there is a gap in one environment, it is possible that there is gap in any environment. It is this very possibility that is the real threat.
In both situations, it is supposed that Rose knows that she lives on another planet. This supposition makes no essential difference, even in the NK-situation. In the NK-situation, Rose would still think that Inverted Earth is exactly like Earth, and Inverted Earthlings speak English.
Here it is supposed that after many years, the sky of Inverted Earth still looks blue to Rose. If it doesn’t, then obviously, it is out of the question that the Inverted Earth thought experiment poses a challenge to representationalism.
Of course, this doesn’t mean that in the K-situation, no social adaptation has occurred to Rose, for many years later, when Rose talks to Inverted Earthlings about the sky of Inverted Earth by saying, “The sky is blue,” presumably she expresses a true belief.
One may object here that I beg the question against anti-representationalism, for in arguing for the above point, I assume that Rose infer both (1) and (2) from:
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(a)
My visual experience represents the sky (of Inverted Earth) as blue;
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(b)
Since I have inverting lenses, if my visual experience represents the sky (of Inverted Earth) as blue, the sky is yellow.
But, one might say, people like Block may believe that Rose infers both (1) and (2) from:
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(a′)
My visual experience of the sky of Inverted Earth has the phenomenal character distinctive of experiences of blue things on Earth;
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(b′)
Since I have inverting lenses, if my visual experience of the sky of Inverted Earth has the phenomenal character distinctive of experiences of blue things on Earth, the sky of Inverted Earth is yellow.
If this is the case, Rose’s correct reports might not indicate that her visual experience of the sky of Inverted Earth represents it as blue.
I do assume that Rose infers both (1) and (2) from (a) and (b), but I am not begging the question. In fact, if one believes that Rose infers both (1) and (2) from (a′) and (b′), one would have to accept representationalism. First, we make perceptual judgments about the world based on the representational content of our experiences. If we could make perceptual judgments based on the phenomenal character of our experiences, the phenomenal character must represent; otherwise how the perceptual judgments could ever become knowledge of the world would be a mystery. Indeed, why do we then even think that experiences have representational content? Second, had Rose’s visual experience of the sky of Inverted Earth represented it as yellow many years later, would she still infer (2) from (a′) and (b′)? That could happen only if Rose cannot access the representational content of her visual experiences when making perceptual judgments or inferences based on her perceptual experiences, or she just fails to notice that her visual experience of the sky of Inverted Earth represents it as yellow, or even worse, she fails to be rational. None of the results seem acceptable. If representationalism is true, then it cannot be the case that Rose’s visual experience of the sky of Inverted Earth represents it as yellow while she still infers (2) from (a′) and (b′), for (a′) and (b′) would not hold. Third, if Rose infers (2) from (a′) and (b′) while representationalism is false, argument B could not even get off the ground, for then in the NK-situation, Rose’s utterance of “The sky is blue” would only indicate that the phenomenal character of her experience is so-and-such, not that her visual experience represents the sky as so-and-such.
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(a)
It should be noticed that when claiming that the representational content of Rose’s visual experience of the sky of Inverted Earth would not be directly determined by the causal covariance between the color of the sky of Inverted Earth and Rose’s visual experience of it as in normal circumstances, I am not modifying the simpler version of the causal covariance theory of representational content, for the term “in normal circumstances” is already contained in the formulation of the simpler version. I am only saying that having inverting lenses implanted behind one’s eyes would count as one of the abnormal circumstances.
This is because it would then be a state of VS2, which directly causally co-varies with the color of the sky of Inverted Earth, that realizes Rose’s visual experience of the sky.
Notice that I do not think that the inverting lenses could really be integrated into Rose’s visual system eventually, but to make a stronger case, I am here arguing that even if one insists that such result is possible, we still don’t have a good reason for thinking that representationalism is under threat.
It could be that the PC-parts of Rose’s previous visual system are just the parts of the whole system. Then, the PC-parts of her new visual system would just be the parts of her previous visual system.
Thanks to an anonymous referee of this journal for raising this issue.
That the sky of Inverted Earth would look yellow to Rose with her new visual system surely is counterintuitive, but it is counterintuitive only because we intuitively believe that the inverting lenses are not integrative parts of Rose’s visual system, that is, Rose doesn’t have a new visual system after spending many years on Inverted Earth.
But I don’t want to say that since in the NK-situation, Rose mistakenly thinks that she still speaks English, in any circumstance where thoughts of colors are concerned, what she intends to express would be different from what she really expresses. Suppose that in the NK-situation, after many years, Rose hears an Inverted Earthling saying:
During the spring, the green grass over the valley looks really beautiful, and she tries to tell this to another Inverted Earthling. She would do that by uttering the same sentence. It seems obvious that in such a situation, she intends to express one of her beliefs, which is that during the spring, the red grass over the valley looks really beautiful, and the thought expressed is the same. What I hold is a weaker claim, namely, given that in the NK-situation, after many years, Rose mistakenly thinks that she still speaks English, in some circumstances where thoughts of colors are concerned, what she intends to express would be different from what is really expressed. Such circumstances would include the ones in which perceptual judgments about colors are involved. This is because, roughly speaking, one makes perceptual judgments by taking into the information contained in perceptual experiences instead of taking into the information that has already been encoded in language.
References
Block, N. (1990). Inverted earth. Philosophical Perspectives, 4, 53–79.
Block, N. (1996). Mental paint and mental latex. Philosophical Issues, 7, 19–49.
Dretske, F. (1995). Naturalizing the mind. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Tye, M. (2000). Consciousness, color, and content. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Tye, M. (2002). Visual qualia and visual content revisited. In David Chalmers (Ed.), Philosophy of mind: Classical and contemporary readings. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Acknowledgments
This project is supported by National Social Science Fund (Project 11&ZD187); Program for New Century Excellent Talents in University (NCET 13-0348); Shandong University (Project 13RWZD03); and Ministry of Education in China (Project 11YJC720036).
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Ren, H. Inverted Earth Revisited. Erkenn 81, 1093–1107 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-015-9786-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-015-9786-2