Leibniz and “The Liar”
Abstract
Since classical antiquity, theorists have struggled with the problem of self-reference originating in the Liar Paradox of Eubulides: “Does someone who says ‘I am lying’ lie?” Does he speak truly or falsely? The consensus resolution has been to dismiss the contention “This statement is false” as meaningless incoherent on grounds of self-contradiction. Leibniz also deemed the claim incoherent, but not on grounds of self-contradiction incoherence however on grounds of embarking on an infinite and incompletable series of meaningfulness-presuppositions. He thus introduced a novel and constructive mode of semantical analysis.
Keywords
consistency | Epimenides | liar paradox | meaning | self-contradiction | self-reference | semantics | truth | cohérence | Épiménide | paradoxe du menteur | sens | autocontradiction | autoréférence | sémantique | vérité | Konsistenz | Epimenides | Lügner-Paradox | Bedeutung | Selbstwiderspruch | Selbstreferenz | Semantik | Wahrheit