When Judges Have a Hunch

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When Judges Have a Hunch

Intuition and Experience in Judicial Decision-Making

Richards, Diana

From the journal ARSP Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie, Volume 102, June 2016, issue 2

Published by Franz Steiner Verlag

article, 8602 Words
Original language: English
ARSP 2016, pp 245-260
https://doi.org/10.25162/arsp-2016-0012

Abstract Related content References

Abstract

This article aims to inform judges, legal scholars and philosophers of law on new developments in psychology and neuroscience that prove judicial “hunches” or intuitions are all-pervading in judicial decision-making. Unlike the “legal reasoning” paradigm taught in law schools and in judicial training, which overemphasises the rational, conscious, syllogistic nature of reasoning, new theories show that intuitions naturally take place in all minds that have amassed enough professional expertise. More particularly, this essay argues that intuitions appear in judges’ minds in all types of cases, easy or hard, at all levels of the judiciary; and that this is neither something to ignore not something to denigrate. Neurological and psychological research shows intuitions are not necessarily irrational and unwanted, but most likely the most effective way in which the judge’s brain adapts to the immense pressures of the job - be it increasing workloads, limited time to spend on a case, or the limited information available. This article aims to change the paradigm in judicial decision-making by making judicial intuitions reasonable, accepted, and even desirable.

Author information

Diana Richards

Keywords

judicial behaviour | judicial decision-making | intuition | hunch | legal reasoning | judge | court | dual process theory | bounded rationality

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