Abstract
Dignity is often invoked as the basis of human rights. The precise relation between dignity and human rights remains objectionably obscure, however, and many appeals to dignity seem little more than hand-waving, as critics have pointed out. This vagueness is potentially damning for contemporary human rights accounts, as it calls into question whether dignity can truly serve as the foundation of human rights. In order to defend the view that human rights are grounded in human dignity, this paper presents a novel analysis of dignity that elucidates how human rights can be derived from dignity. Arguing that neither contingent nor inherent conceptions of dignity can, on their own, account for human rights, it develops a conceptualisation of dignity that combines inherent and contingent features in a coherent fashion. This, in turn, is shown to provide us with the means to explain how human rights are both grounded in and protective of dignity. Showing that the inherent features of dignity always generate a claim to the contingent features of dignity, the paper demonstrates that human rights derive directly from the inherent features of dignity, whilst what they protect are the contingent features of dignity. The paper closes with a discussion of the advantages of conceptualising dignity in the manner proposed, explicating the connection between dignity and nobility.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
For an example of a view that advocates looking for other ways to justify human rights than dignity, see Schroeder (2012).
I should mention that, though common, this view that rights serve to protect our dignity is not the only position on offer with regard to the precise relation between dignity and rights. Alternative perspectives include the position that dignity is something to be honoured or revered rather than protected, where this reverence is thought to be expressed through respecting persons’ rights; the view that our dignity is constituted by having rights; or the view that dignity is itself a right (though perhaps a very special one). Each of these positions has its own drawbacks, which cannot, however, be discussed here.
Not all authors use exactly the same terms, but the distinction between contingent and inherent conceptions of dignity can without difficulty be mapped onto most existing classifications of dignity conceptions.
Disturbing examples of this way of reasoning can be constructed from the legal history of rape. In older times it was not uncommon to define the crime of rape in terms of spoliation of a person’s honour or dignity. Such a view has the perverse implication that in cases of gang rape the second rapist could argue that he is not guilty of such a crime (or at least only of a lesser one), since the victim’s dignity would already have been destroyed by the first rapist, and one cannot spoil what is no longer there.
Except for, perhaps, a protection against the destruction of the human person—destruction is, however, only one of the things that human rights are commonly thought to protect us against; many of our most prominent human rights are not specifically aimed at mere preservation.
Strictly speaking, relationality can also mean that dignity comes in degrees: some things having more dignity, others less—cf. Sensen’s ‘aristocratic’ understanding of dignity. According to Sensen, Kant uses this notion of dignity 39 times in his writings and these are generally not the most important passages for contemporary purposes; in most cases (72), however, Kant uses what Sensen calls ‘the traditional paradigm’ (2011, p. 178), where, so Sensen’s analysis suggests, dignity denotes the top position in a hierarchy.
See e.g. a collection of critical responses in Kant-Studien 106 (2015, issue 1).
The translation ‘Kingdom of Ends’ is more common than ‘Commonwealth of Ends’, but because the translation of ‘Reich’ as ‘Kingdom’ can be misleading in important respects, I prefer the term ‘Commonwealth of Ends’ (cf. Kant 1996, p. 83 translator’s note j.).
Cf. also Hill’s rejection of the inner transcendental kernel reading of Kant (Hill 2013, p. 316).
Habermas goes so far as to claim that ‘in order to understand what we mean by “human dignity”, the “kingdom of ends” must first be explained’ (2010, p. 474).
Note that this does not commit us to any particular view on the metaphysics of freedom. I have deliberately relied only on the idea of ‘seeing oneself as a lawgiver’, which can, but certainly need not be further interpreted in traditional Kantian terms (cf. Van der Rijt 2012, p. 77).
This also explains the common association of dignity with sovereignty.
Within Kantianism it is a matter of controversy whether this straightforward way of individuating the dignity of humanity (rational nature) into the dignity of individual persons is possible. As my purpose here is not one of Kant interpretation, I will abstain from that problem, however.
Note also that there is no contradiction in thinking of dignity as a status and as a value at the same time (cf. Hill 2013, p. 316; Tasioulas 2013, p. 304) as long as we realize that it is the type of value that is to be respected—and possibly protected—rather than promoted. Ranges of statuses are expressed in terms of higher and lower, not in terms of more or less.
Regarding oneself as a moral lawgiver thus does not just require that one give others their due, but also that one ensures one receives one’s due from others. As Kant put it: ‘Do not let others tread with impunity on your rights’ (Kant 1996, p. 558; 6:436).
Of course, in practice supreme courts often do have some legislative powers, being tasked with judicial review. For present purposes we can imagine a supreme court that lacks such powers, however—as indeed some existing supreme courts do.
These different kinds of freedom do not map easily onto existing taxonomies of freedom. The freedom to form moral beliefs is an essential element of the Kantian notion of ‘inner freedom’, but it does not fully cover that notion. Similarly, the freedom from alien powers is akin to the republican notion of freedom as non-domination, but the freedom from ‘other impediments’ can encompass negative freedom as well as certain aspects that are commonly taken to be distinctive of more positive conceptions of freedom (such as the ability to master one’s inclinations).
Exactly what form these rights should take as a matter of positive law, whether it makes sense to evaluate them individually or whether they should rather be judged as packages embedded in specific legal systems, and how to make the political power differentials that are integral to any political system acceptable, are perennial questions in political philosophy. Obviously, they cannot be answered conclusively here.
Though a liberal democracy may not be the only way dignity may be secured, it is worth noting that the fundamental premise of much of democratic theory is that these political rights must be such that positive laws can be seen in some way as self-given (how admittedly obscurely that idea may often be further specified). The reason it is so important that they must be viewable as self-given is, I suggest, that if they are not, they would violate the dignity of the human person: without at at least some minimal sort of participatory rights it is hard to see how we would be able to consider ourselves ‘sui iuris’. Our dignity demands that there be some way in which the social world we live in is influenceable by our sincere moral beliefs. Guarantees of freedom of conscience, the right to vote and stand for office, freedom of expression and protest are therefore all strong candidates for human rights that protect dignity.
As I use the term ‘education’, it does not refer merely to the training of professionally useful skills, but is more akin to the Humboldtian idea of ‘Bildung’. Note also that linking dignity exclusively to our morality thus does not mean that our animality is neglected altogether or denied moral relevance.
Things may be slightly different for what could be called developmental rights, such as the right to education. Informational rights are also a bit more tricky to locate, as they are clearly necessary to make adequate moral judgments. It seems plausible, though, to class judgment as a faculty under the inherent features of humanity, even though the exercise of that faculty may require further contingent requirements to be met.
They can, however, be temporarily impaired. Though this poses interesting philosophical puzzles, I take it for granted here that we do not cease to be persons when we are asleep, or are knocked unconscious, etc. In order to address such puzzles one would have to go into deep questions concerning the preservation of personhood and agential identity through time, which cannot be pursued here.
Such self-expression is of vital importance because it is part and parcel of the notion of agency that one can influence the world in a directed fashion; and it is part and parcel of moral agency that one can direct this influence in accordance with one’s moral beliefs.
Obviously I am not saying we can lay claim to any form of contingent dignity simply by virtue of our humanity—being a person does not entitle you to a crown, a seat amongst the judiciary, nor a bishopric. Only those contingent things that are essential to our expressing and asserting ourselves as beings of the highest moral standing, as moral agents, are candidates for being the object of human rights based on dignity.
Note that the qualification ‘blindly’ is essential here. Obviously I am not claiming one can never have sound reasons to defer to authority in specific situations.
Note that this only applies to severe cases. As the capacity for morality is a range property, persons with smaller mental handicaps will normally count as full moral agents with dignity.
As my analysis is monist with respect to the question which feature of moral agency bestows dignity (though it is agnostic with respect to whether there is only one or a plurality of bases of human rights) I only contrast my view with other monist positions here. Pluralist positions with respect to dignity will face the same problem though: they too will have to explain why the particular set(s) of human features they favour elevate(s) and ennoble(s) us. For an example of a pluralist view, see Gilabert (2015).
Griffin uses the term ‘normative agency’ to refer to this ability.
Griffin’s account has attracted several criticisms (see Crisp (2014) for a collection of such critiques). Griffin is charged, for example, with excluding human beings who lack the capacity for agency, focusing too exclusively on interests and thereby failing to take the importance of moral status sufficiently into account, and (connected to that) with being implausibly individualistic in his outlook, disregarding that there is a crucially comparative, social aspect to dignity. On these points connecting dignity to our capacity for morality has distinct advantages. I already outlined a response to the first of these criticisms above. As my account explicitly conceives of dignity as a status concept, it is immune to the second of these charges, and as our morality is by its nature concerned with the interaction between moral agents, it clearly cannot be accused of overlooking the social dimension either.
Unless, perhaps, one is willing to accept some divinely imposed purpose or the like.
For Kant’s explicit rejection of the view that our agency elevates us, see Kant (1996, p. 557; 6:434).
Of course acting in one’s own interests and acting in accordance with one’s moral beliefs do not always have to be at odds. Many of our moral beliefs concern the just weighing of rival interests, and any plausible moral view will make room for the pursuit of one’s own interests. Moreover, someone who systematically disregards his own interests for the benefit of others can be charged with the vice of servility (cf. Hill 1973). Such flaws of self-respect can rightly be considered as violations of dignity too, but these would be cases where the cause of the violation of dignity lies first and foremost with the person herself, not in what others do to her or her rights. For an extended analysis of why even seriously flawed moral beliefs are to be considered morally relevant see Van der Rijt (2012).
Important elements of this idea of inner nobility can be traced to the works of Friedrich Schiller, especially his Don Carlos (cf. Stoecker 2011).
References
Beitz, C. (2013). Human dignity in the theory of human rights: Nothing but a phrase? Philosophy & Public Affairs, 41, 259–290.
Birnbacher, D. (2013). Menschenwürde-Skepsis. In J. Joerden, E. Hilgendorf, & F. Thiele (Eds.), Menschenwürde und Medizin: Ein interdisziplinäres Handbuch (pp. 159–175). Berlin: Duncker & Humblot.
Brownsword, R. (2013). Human dignity, human rights, and simply trying to do the right thing. In C. McCrudden (Ed.), Understanding human dignity (pp. 345–358). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Carter, I. (2011). Respect and the basis of equality. Ethics, 121(3), 538–571.
Crisp, R. (Ed.). (2014). Griffin on human rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Cruft, R., Liao, S., & Renzo, M. (Eds.). (2015). Philosophical foundations of human rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Darwall, S. (2006). The second person standpoint. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Düwell, M., Braarvig, J., Brownsword, R., & Mieth, D. (Eds.). (2014). The Cambridge handbook of human dignity: Interdisciplinary perspectives. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Feinberg, J. (1984). Harm to others. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Fuller, R. (2006). Somebodies, nobodies and the politics of dignity. San Francisco: Berret-Koehler Publishers.
Gewirth, A. (1992). Human dignity as the basis of rights. In M. Meyer & W. Parent (Eds.), The constitution of rights: Human dignity and American values (pp. 10–28). Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Gilabert, P. (2015). Human rights, human dignity and power. In R. Cruft., S. Liao & M. Renzo (Eds.), Philosophical foundations of human rights (pp. 196–213). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Griffin, J. (2008). On human rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Griffin, J. (2014). Replies. In: R. Crisp (Ed.), Griffin on human rights (pp. 206–232). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Habermas, J. (2010). The concept of human dignity and the realistic Utopia of human rights. Metaphilosophy, 41, 464–480.
Hartogh, G. den (2014). Is human dignity the ground of human rights? In: M. Düwell., J. Braarvig., R. Brownsword & D. Mieth (Eds.) The cambridge handbook of human dignity: Interdisciplinary perspectives (pp. 200–207). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Herzog, D. (2012). Aristocratic dignity. In: J. Waldron, Dignity, rank, and rights (pp. 99–118). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hill, T. (1973). Servility and self-respect. Monist, 57, 87–104.
Hill, T. (2013). In defence of human dignity: Comments on Kant and Rosen. In C. McCrudden (Ed.), Understanding human dignity (pp. 313–326). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Honneth, A. (1992). Kampf um Anerkennung: Zur moralischen Grammatik sozialer Konflikte. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag.
Kant, I. (1996). The Cambridge edition of the works of Immanuel Kant: Practical philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Macklin, R. (2003). Dignity is a useless concept: It means no more than respect for persons or their autonomy. British Medical Journal, 327, 1419–1420.
McCrudden, C. (Ed.). (2013). Understanding human dignity. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Neuhäuser, C., & Stoecker, R. (2014). Human dignity as universal nobility. In: M. Düwell, J. Braarvig, R. Brownsword & D. Mieth (Eds.), The cambridge handbook of human dignity: interdisciplinary perspectives (pp. 298–309). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Pettit, P. (1997). Republicanism: A theory of freedom and government. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Pettit, P. (2013). On the people’s terms: A republican theory and model of democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Pettit, P. (2014). Just freedom: A moral compass for a complex world. New York: W.W. Norton & Company.
Pinker, S. (2008). The stupidity of dignity. The New Republic.
Rawls, J. (1963/1999). The sense of justice. In Collected papers (pp. 96–116). Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Rawls, J. (1971/1999). A theory of justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Ripstein, A. (2009). Force and freedom: Kant’s legal and political philosophy. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Rosen, M. (2012). Dignity: Its history and meaning. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Rosen, M. (2013). Dignity: The case against. In C. McCrudden (Ed.), Understanding human dignity (pp. 143–154). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Schaber, P. (2010). Instrumentalisierung und Würde. Paderborn: Mentis.
Schaber, P. (2012). Menschenwürde. Stuttgart: Reclam.
Schroeder, D. (2008). Dignity: Two riddles and four concepts. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics, 17, 230–238.
Schroeder, D. (2012). Human rights and human dignity—An appeal to separate the conjoined twins. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 15, 323–335.
Seifert, J. (1997). The value of life. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
Sensen, O. (2009). Kant’s conception of human dignity. Kant-Studien, 100, 309–331.
Sensen, O. (2011). Kant on human dignity. Berlin: De Gruyter.
Shapiro, T. (1999). What is a child? Ethics, 109, 715–738.
Skinner, Q. (1998). Liberty before liberalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Skinner, Q. (2006). A third concept of liberty. In R. Goodin & P. Pettit (Eds.), Contemporary political philosophy: An anthology (pp. 398–415). Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
Skinner, Q. (2008). Freedom as the absence of arbitrary power. In C. Laborde & J. Maynor (Eds.), Republicanism and political theory (pp. 83–101). Malden: Blackwell Publishing.
Stoecker, R. (2011). Three crucial turns on the road to an adequate understanding of human dignity. In P. Kaufmann, H. Kuch, C. Neuhäuscr, & E. Webster (Eds.), Humiliation, degradation, dehumanization (pp. 7–17). Dordrecht: Springer.
Tasioulas, J. (2013). Human dignity and the foundations of human rights. In C. McCrudden (Ed.), Understanding human dignity (pp. 291–313). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Van der Rijt, J. (2012). The importance of assent. A theory of coercion and dignity. Dordrecht: Springer.
Waldron, J. (1999). The dignity of legislation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Waldron, J. (2007). Dignity and rank. European Journal of Sociology, 48, 201–237.
Waldron, J. (2012). Dignity, rank, and rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Wood, A. (2014). Coercion, manipulation, exploitation. In C. Coons & M. Weber (Eds.), Manipulation (pp. 17–50). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Acknowledgements
I benefitted significantly from helpful comments from audiences in Bad Boll, Bayreuth, Bologna, Boulder, Bucharest, Groningen, New Orleans and Pavia. Special thanks must go to John Lawless, Oliver Sensen and the referees of Erkenntnis.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
van der Rijt, JW. Inherent Dignity, Contingent Dignity and Human Rights: Solving the Puzzle of the Protection of Dignity. Erkenn 82, 1321–1338 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-017-9877-3
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-017-9877-3