Abstract:
Kant characterizes war as the “barbaric way (the way of savages)” of deciding disputes. This opposition to war is paired with a discussion of right in war, with respect to each of going to war, the conduct of war, and the behaviour of the victorious party after a war. I explain how Kant can have a conception of right in war, against the background of his more general view that war is by its nature barbaric and to be repudiated entirely. Right cannot be decided by war, but can only be “found” in it if we suppose it can decide a dispute, and so in another sense resolve a question of right. Kant’s solution has two pillars: an account of the distinctively public nature of a state, and an account of peace as the only condition under which disputes can be resolved on their merits.
Article Note
Material included in this paper was presented at the 2012 Paton Colloquium at the University of St. Andrews, as the 2013 Natural Law Lecture at Fordham, and at Princeton, the University of Saskatchewan, and Stanford, as the opening lecture at a conference on Kant’s Doctrine of Right at the University of Vienna, and at the Toronto-Tsingua conference on International Law. I am grateful to my commentators on several occasions: Leonard Randall, (St. Andrews) Jonathan Quong, (Princeton) Tamar Schapiro, (Stanford), Thomas Lee (Fordham) and Reed Winegar (Fordham), to members of the audiences for their comments and questions, to Yitzhak Benbaji, Hamish Stewart, Jacob Weinrib and Ariel Zylberman for comments on an earlier draft, to Sorin Baiasu, Karen Knop, Joanna Langille, Peter Niesen, Kristi Olson, Herlinde Pauer-Studer, Scott Shapiro, and Allen Wood for discussion, and to Carolyn Shapiro for research assistance.
© De Gruyter
