Abstract
What does it mean that an object has instrumental value? While some writers seem to think it means that the object bears a value, and that instrumental value accordingly is a kind of value, other writers seem to think that the object is not a value bearer but is only what is conducive to something of value. Contrary to what is the general view among philosophers of value, I argue that if instrumental value is a kind of value, then it is a kind of extrinsic final value.
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Rønnow-Rasmussen, T. Instrumental Values – Strong and Weak. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 5, 23–43 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1014422001048
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1014422001048