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Good intentions and a great divide: Having babies by intending them

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Conclusion

Thus, there is a compelling policy argument as well as a suggestive constitutional argument that the practice of selling parental rights in general, and in particular the practice of commercial surrogacy, should not be permitted. These arguments favor the approach adopted in New York State as opposed to any more latitudinarian approach that would permit commercial surrogacy. Clearly, if the payment of money in exchange for parental rights should be prohibited, then we have a strong basis on which to reject the intentionalist theory, along with any other theory tht would link the parentage of a child with the payment of money. This conclusion is in no way undermined by the various arguments recited in part V above that favor the intentionalist theory since, as we have seen, these arguments are flawed.

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The author wishes to thank Gareth Matthews, Alan F. McMichael and John A. Robertson for their extremely valuable comments on earlier drafts of this article and to thank Sharon Rogers for her exceptional and unstinting editorial assistance.

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Roberts, M.A. Good intentions and a great divide: Having babies by intending them. Law Philos 12, 287–317 (1993). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01000988

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