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First-person thought and the use of ‘I’

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Abstract

The traditional account (TA) of first-person thought draws conclusions about this type of thinking from claims made about the first-person pronoun. In this paper I raise a worry for the traditional account. Certain uses of ‘I’ conflict with its conception of the linguistic data. I argue that once the data is analysed correctly, the traditional approach to first-person thought cannot be maintained.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Nottingham, University Park, Nottingham, NG7 2RD, UK

    Komarine Romdenh-Romluc

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  1. Komarine Romdenh-Romluc
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Correspondence to Komarine Romdenh-Romluc.

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Romdenh-Romluc, K. First-person thought and the use of ‘I’. Synthese 163, 145–156 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-007-9194-5

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-007-9194-5

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