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`Sex-Equal' Stable Matchings

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Abstract

The paper defines a measure on the set of stable matchings in the marriage problem. This measure is based on the minimization of the envy difference between the sets of men and women, while preserving stability and selects stable matchings with the least conflict of interest between both groups of agents. The solution concept proposed is called Sex-equal Matching (SEM) and the paper also provides an algorithm to compute the set of SEM.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Departamento de Economía, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, 28903, Getafe, Madrid, Spain

    Antonio Romero-Medina

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  1. Antonio Romero-Medina
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Correspondence to Antonio Romero-Medina.

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Romero-Medina, A. `Sex-Equal' Stable Matchings. Theory and Decision 50, 197–212 (2001). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1010311325241

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1010311325241

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