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Bargaining with Incomplete information an axiomatic approach

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Abstract

Within this paper we consider a model of Nash bargaining with incomplete information. In particular, we focus on fee games, which are a natural generalization of side payment games in the context of incomplete information. For a specific class of fee games we provide two axiomatic approaches in order to establish the Expected Contract Value, which is a version of the Nash bargaining solution.

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  1. Institute of Mathematical Economics University of Bielefeld, Postfach 10 01 31, 33501, Bielefeld, Germany

    Joachim Rosenmüller

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  1. Joachim Rosenmüller
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Rosenmüller, J. Bargaining with Incomplete information an axiomatic approach. Theory and Decision 42, 105–146 (1997). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1004907606204

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