Abstract
Panqualityism, recently defended by Sam Coleman, is a variety of Russellian monism on which the categorical properties of fundamental physical entities are qualities, or, in Coleman’s exposition, unconscious qualia. Coleman defends a quotationalist, higher-order thought version of panqualityism. The aim of this paper is, first, to demonstrate that a first-order representationalist panqualityism is also available, and to argue positively in its favor. For it shall become apparent that quotationalist and first-order representationalist panqualityism are, in spite of their close similarities, radically different theories: quotationalist panqualityism locates qualities in the subject of an experience, while first-order panqualityism locates qualities in the world. I argue that this makes quotationalist panqualityism implausible and first-order, representationalist panqualityism a highly natural, elegant, and intuitive theory.
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Notes
Coleman (2017), pp. 518–596.
Chalmers calls Russellian theories of consciousness a ‘Hegelian synthesis’ of physicalism and dualism. See Chalmers (2015).
Of course, what I have laid out here is a panpsychism quite literal, on which any physical entity has experience. Panpsychists need not endorse this version of panpsychism – they may hold that it is only all fundamental physical entities that have experience, as well as some larger, suitably-structured creatures such as ourselves. Many other variations of panpsychism and panprotopsychism are also available. But I shall ignore these niceties in what follows.
Coleman (2017), p. 518.
Chalmers (2015), p. 27.
We are entitled to endorse this thesis after endorsing some intermediary theses that are in this context banal, such as the theses that in experience we are made immediately aware of qualia, or of Edenic color properties, etc. These theses are not unobjectionable, but anyone who objects to them is unlikely to be interested in the question whether panqualityism is preferable to panpsychism, or which version of panqualityism is to be preferred over the others.
The exposition here is adapted from Mihalik’s excellent summary in Mihalik (2022).
In a recent paper, Brian Cutter puts forth a view that, so far as I can tell, is substantially similar to this sort of panqualityism. But Cutter does not present his view as a variety of panqualityism, and declines to say whether he thinks the sensible qualities are qualitative in Coleman’s sense. See Cutter (2018).
Nevertheless, the basic picture of first-order representationalism that I shall assume in what follows is taken from Tye (2000). But the particular details of Tye’s view as articulated in that work are not material to the general outline of a first-order representationalist panqualityism.
Mihalik (2022).
Ibid.
This motivation for the quotational theory of awareness is quite independent of Coleman’s panqualityism. See the exposition in Coleman (2015).
The locus classicus for the intuition is in Moore (1903), p. 25; although, as Strawson reminds me, Moore goes on to deny the intuition as it is stated there.
Note that this argument is dialectically stronger than Mihalik’s argument against Coleman’s quotationalism, to be discussed presently. For Mihalik argues that the quotationalist account fails as an account of conscious awareness. But the objection just given grants the quotationalist account’s adequacy as an account of awareness – the objection is that it requires us to be aware of the wrong things.
Vide Balog (2012).
Levine (2007).
One might think that the Mihalik-Levine gap can be bridged by transforming Coleman’s quotationalism into a genuinely representational theory. Indeed, in some work Coleman seems to suggest that this is his view. But I cannot see how this would make a difference. What are represented by higher-order states are first-order states, not qualities. Qualities come into the story by being the categorical properties of parts of the neural realizers of the first-order states that get represented. They are not what is represented. So why should the hypothesis that the higher-order state represents the first-order state, rather than presenting it, narrow the gap at all? The qualities are still not being represented. The only way to narrow the gap is to have the higher-order state represent the qualities themselves. But then it is not a higher-order state, since what it represents is not a lower-order state. Then it is a first-order state, albeit one that represents brain tissue by quotation.
Byrne (2006), p. 243.
Ibid., p. 228 ff.
It may at this point be asked whether it is really clear that first-order representationalist panqualityism can account for our experience in all phenomenally conscious states. There should be no problem for panqualityist first-order representationalism if there is none for first-order representationalism generally, however. Dealing with each modality will require a suitable representational content to be found. Taste represents the qualities of the contents of the mouth, olfaction the qualities of the ambient environment, and so on. Pains will represent the qualities of those parts of the body that are in pain. I am inclined to say that moods are not genuinely phenomenal states, but one who thinks that they are will have to find a suitable representational content. A slight complication, however, will arise when the same object is experienced in multiple modalities at once: when I have pain in my thumb, and at the same time represent it as being a tan color, I am aware of two different sorts of qualities present in my finger. But why shouldn’t objects have many different sorts of categorical properties? Absent an argument that there is any special problem here, there seems to be no reason not to think that the different sorts of experience can each be dealt with.
Of course, this argument from theoretical simplicity and intuitiveness could also be given in favor of a representationalist dualism about colors and the like, but such a view would founder on questions about color causation. Since the representationalist component of the view is likely to employ a causal-teleological account of representation, I take such a view to be a non-starter.
Admirable work toward this end is accomplished in Cutter, op. cit.
Chalmers (2010), pp. 381–455. See in particular pp. 381-382 ff.
The defense here is deeply indebted to Tye’s treatment of hallucination in his op. cit., pp. 84–85. In later work, Tye abandons this treatment of hallucination, but I remain convinced of its adequacy. Vide Tye (2009), pp. 112–114, and elsewhere.
One alternative response to the problem of hallucination is simply to adopt a disjunctivism on which hallucinations do not, like veridical perceptions, have qualitative contents. On this view, hallcinations may seem to be phenomenal states, but they are not. Such a response is entirely consistent with first-order panqualityism.
The point is made forcefully in Goff, op. cit., although I do not wish to attribute to him the philosophy of science which I employ below.
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Acknowledgements
My thanks are due firstly to Michael Tye, in discussion with whom the ideas expressed above had their origin. Thanks are due no less to Galen Strawson, and to Michelle Montague, for their helpful comments. Samuel W. Cantor, Henry Curtis, and Matan Schapiro provided immeasurable help in numerous late-night discussions, and two anonymous referees provided helpful criticism and encouragement. I thank also Eric Saidel, my mentor and teacher.
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Rosenberg, H. First-Order Representationalist Panqualityism. Erkenn (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-023-00726-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-023-00726-y