Abstract
This article focuses on the interpretation of the metaphysical deductions of the higher cognitive faculties in Gabriele Gava’s Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason and the Method of Metaphysics. The aim is to assess the role that Kant’s general logic plays in these metaphysical deductions, the consequences for the analysis of the faculties, and the place of general logic in Gava’s overall theoretical analysis of Kant’s first Critique.
Funding source: DAAD PRIME
Acknowledgments
I would like to thank Luigi Filieri and Lucia Oliveri for their helpful comments on a previous version of this paper. The work leading to this publication was supported by the PRIME programme of the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) with funds from the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF).
-
Research funding: This work was supported by DAAD PRIME.
References
Gava, G. 2023. Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason and the Method of Metaphysics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.10.1017/9781009172127Search in Google Scholar
Kant, I. 1998. Critique of Pure Reason, edited by P. Guyer, and A. W. Wood. New York, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.10.1017/CBO9780511804649Search in Google Scholar
Land, T. 2021. “Epistemic Agency and the Self-Knowledge of Reason: On the Contemporary Relevance of Kant’s Method of Faculty Analysis.” Synthese 198: 3137–54, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-02027-2.Search in Google Scholar
© 2023 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston
