Skip to main content
Log in

Management Attempts to Avoid Accounting Disclosure Oversight: The Effects of Trust and Knowledge on Corporate Directors’ Governance Ability

  • Published:
Journal of Business Ethics Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

Management has the opportunity to promote self-serving accounting practices, such as earnings management, when management can effectively avoid oversight by the audit committee. This article investigates the effects of financial knowledge and dispositional trust on the ability of audit committee members to recognize management attempts to avoid full disclosure to the board and potentially deceive board members. The results of a controlled laboratory experiment with 40 experienced audit committee member participants indicate that: (1) Audit committee members with less financial knowledge are more likely to accept insufficient client explanations for accounting judgments than are more knowledgeable audit committee members; (2) Audit committee members with less financial knowledge are more likely to reject sufficient client explanations for accounting judgments than are more knowledgeable audit committee members; and (3) Audit committee members that place higher levels of trust in others are more likely to accept insufficient client explanations for accounting judgments than are less trusting committee members.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  • Abbott L., S. Parker, & G. Peters.: 2004, Audit Committee Characteristics and Restatements, Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory 23, 69–87

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Agrawal A., & S. Chadha.: 2005, Corporate Governance and Accounting Scandals, Journal of Law and Economics 48, 371–406

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Anderson U., L. Koonce, & G. Marchant.: 1994, The Effects of Source-Competence Information and its Timing on Auditors’ Performance of Analytical Procedures, Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory 13(1), 137–148

    Google Scholar 

  • Bamber E.: 1983, Expert Judgment in the Audit Team: A Source Reliability Approach Journal of Accounting Research 21, 396–412

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Beccaria C.: 1963, On Crime and Punishment, Bobbs Merril: Indianapolis, IN

    Google Scholar 

  • Becker G.: 1968, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, Journal of Political Economy 76, 169–217

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Birnbaum M., & S. Stegner.: 1979, Source Credibility in Social Judgment: Bias, Expertise, and the Judge’s Point of View, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 37, 48–74

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Buckley A., & M. Van Der Nat.: 2003, Derivatives and the Non-Executive Director, European Management Journal 21, 389–297

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Chaiken S., & D. Maheswaran.: 1994, Heuristic Processing can Bias Systematic Processing: Effects of Source Credibility, Argument Ambiguity, and Task Importance on Attitude Judgment, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 66, 460–473

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cressey D. R.: 1973, Other People’s Money, Montclair, NJ: Patterson Smith

    Google Scholar 

  • Davidson W., B. Xie, & W. Xu.: 2004, Market Reaction to Voluntary Announcements of Audit Committee Appointments: The Effect of Financial Expertise, Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 23, 279–293

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dechow P., R. Sloan, & A. Sweeney.: 1996, Causes and Consequences of Earnings Manipulation, an Analysis of Firm Subject to Enforcement Actions by the SEC Contemporary Accounting Research 13, 1–36

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • DeFond M., R. Hann, & X. Hu.: 2005, Does the Market Value Financial Expertise on Audit Committees of Boards of Directors?, Journal of Accounting Research 43, 153–193

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Deutsch M.: 1973, The Resolution Of Conflict: Constructive and Destructive Processes, New Haven, CN: Yale University Press

    Google Scholar 

  • Elias R.: 2002, Determinants of Earnings Management Ethics Among Accountants Journal of Business Ethics 40, 33–45

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Farber D. B.: 2005, Restoring Trust after Fraud: Does Corporate Governance Matter?, The Accounting Review 80(2), 539–561

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Flynn J., P. Slovic, & H. Kunreuther.: 2001, Risk, Media, and Stigma: Understanding Public Challenges to Modern Science and Technology, London: Earthscan Publications, Ltd

    Google Scholar 

  • Goffman, E.: 1959, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (Penguin Books)

  • Harnett L., & L. Cummings.: 1980, Bargaining Behavior: An International Study, Houston: Dame Publications

    Google Scholar 

  • Healy P.: 1985, The Effect of Bonus Schemes on Accounting Decisions, Journal of Accounting and Economics 33, 85–107

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hirst D.: 1994, Auditor’s Sensitivity to Source Reliability, Journal of Accounting Research 32, 113–126

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kaplan S.: 2001, Ethically Related Judgments by Observers of Earnings Management, Journal of Business Ethics 32, 285–298

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kasperson R., R. Ortwin, P. Slovic, H. Brown, J. Emel, R. Goble, J. Kasperson, & S. Ratick.: 1988, The Social Amplification of Risk: A Conceptual Framework, Risk Analysis 8, 177–187

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Merchant K. A., & J. Rockness.: 1994, The Ethics of Managing Earnings: An Empirical Investigation, Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 13, 79–94

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Morse, G.: 2004, ‹Audit Committees can’t Add’, Harvard Business Review 82(5)

  • New York Stock Exchange.: 1999, Report of the Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees

  • New York Stock Exchange.: 2003, Standard 303A.06 Audit Committee

  • Perino M.: 2002, Enron’s Legislative Aftermath: Some Reflections on the Deterrence Aspects of the Sarbanes-Oxley act of 2002, St. John’s Law Review 76(4), 671–698

    Google Scholar 

  • Petty R., & J. Caccioppo.: 1977, Forewarning, Cognitive Responding, and Resistance to Persuasion, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 35, 645–655

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Pidgeon N., R. Kasperson, & P. Slovic (Eds.).: 2002, The Social Amplification of Risk, London: Cambridge University Press

    Google Scholar 

  • Powers, W., R. Troubh and H. Winokur: 2002, Report of the Investigation by the Special Investigative Committee of the Board of Directors of Enron Corp., Austin, TX

  • Rempel J., J. Holmes, & M. Zanna.: 1985, Trust in Close Relationships, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 49, 95–112

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rose J.: 2007, Attention to Aggressive and Potentially Fraudulent Reporting: Effects of Experience and Trust, Behavioral Research in Accounting 19, 215–229

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rose A., & J. Rose.: 2003, The Effects of Fraud Risk Assessments and a Risk Analysis Decision Aid on Auditors’ Evaluation of Evidence and Judgment, Accounting Forum 27(3), 312–338

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rose, J, A. Rose and M. Dibben: 2007, ‹Trust and Assurance: Are Business Leaders Overly Trusting?’, Working Paper, Southern Illinois University

  • Rosen R.: 2003, Risk Management and Corporate Governance: the Case of Enron, Connecticut Law Review 35, 1157–1184

    Google Scholar 

  • Rotter J.: 1980, Interpersonal Trust, Trustworthiness, and Gullibility, American Psychologist 35, 1–7

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sarbanes-Oxley Act.: 2002, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Congress

  • Schul Y.: 1993, When Warning Succeeds: The Effect of Warning on Success of Ignoring Invalid Information, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 29, 42–62

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Schul Y., E. Burnstein, & A. Bardi.: 1996, Dealing with Deceptions that are Difficult to Detect: Encoding and Judgment as a Function of Preparing to Receive Invalid Information, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 32, 228–253

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Shaub M.: 1996, Trust and Suspicion: The Effects of Situational and Dispositional Factors on Auditors’ Trust of Clients, Behavioral Research in Accounting 8, 154–174

    Google Scholar 

  • Staubus G.: 2005, Ethics Failures in Corporate Financial Reporting Journal of Business Ethics 57, 5–15

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • United States Security and Exchange Commission.: 2003, 17 CFR 240.10A-3. Washington, DC

  • Walster E., E. Aronson, & D. Abrahams.: 1966, On Increasing the Persuasiveness of a Low Prestige Communicator, Journal of Experimental Psychology 2, 325–342

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Williams K. R., & R. Hawkins: 1986, Perceptual Research on General Deterrence: A Critical Review, Law and Society Review 20(4), 545–572

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Wrightsman L.: 1974, Assumptions About Human Nature: A Social-Psychological Approach, Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole Publishing Company

    Google Scholar 

  • Wrightsman L. S.: 1991, Interpersonal Trust and Attitudes toward Human Nature, In J. P. Robinson, P. R. Shaver, & L. S. Wrightsman (Eds.), Measures of Personality and Social Psychological Attitudes: Vol. 1: Measures of Social Psychological Attitudes, 373–412. San Diego, CA: Academic Press

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Jacob M. Rose.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Rose, A.M., Rose, J.M. Management Attempts to Avoid Accounting Disclosure Oversight: The Effects of Trust and Knowledge on Corporate Directors’ Governance Ability. J Bus Ethics 83, 193–205 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-007-9611-1

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-007-9611-1

Keywords

Navigation