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Sleeper Agents: The Sense of Agency Over the Dream Body

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Abstract

Although the sense of agency is often reduced if not absent in dreams, our agentive dream experiences can at times be similar to or enhanced compared to waking. The sense of agency displayed in dreams is perplexing as we are mostly shut off from real stimulus whilst asleep. Theories of waking sense of agency, in particular, comparator and holistic models, are analysed in order to argue that despite the isolation from the real environment, these models can help account for dream experience. The dreamer might feel an increased sense of control of their dream bodies and a sense that they can directly control elements of the dream world. Such experiences may at times be caused by superstitious or delusional thinking due to altered cognition and changes to the sleeping brain. Here it is argued that some such experiences are akin to specific waking delusions, such as delusions of grandeur, with similar cognitive features. However, other instances of increased sense of agency in dreaming appear to be sui generis and nothing like what we experience when awake. Lucid control dreams, in which the dreamer realises that they are dreaming and that they can control the dream environment, are examples of such an experience although further nuance is required to account for their specific cognitive attributes. Future empirical research should focus on controlled dream reporting conditions in order to clarify the types of experience that occur and determine the relevant cognitive mechanisms that relate to each type.

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Notes

  1. “Dream Text: Last Night's Dream—last_nights_dream), 66 words, ad2007_paul[2006–07-08].

  2. Sleepanddreamsdatabase.org.

  3. Dream Text: Last Night's Dream—last_nights_dream), 86 words, kb_dj_2018:kb_dj_2018:kb [2018–09-05].

  4. Dream Text: Last Night's Dream—last_nights_dream), 728 words, kb_dj_2016a:kb_dj_2016a:kb [2016–11-26].

  5. Examples of extracts from dream report containing references to common superstitious elements: 1. […]travelling by airplane. A croquet ball suddenly smashes the mirror, an indispensable instrument of navigation, and the airplane crashes to the ground. […] Dream Text: Last Night's Dream—last_nights_dream), 47 words, paulidreams:pauli[Answer Date Unknown].

    2. A black cat which would not get out of my house and every time i thought it was gone it would appear on a chair in my spare bedroom and just stare at me. i keep that door shut all the time now because it was really terrifying. Dream Text: Most Memorable—harris_2011:Q1005), 56 words, harris_2011:011,619 [Answer Date Unknown]. Neither of these reports relate to a specific SoA but do indicate that such elements may occur in dreams.

  6. (Dream Text: Last Night's Dream—last_nights_dream), 85 words, recent_dreams_2015:27,780 [Answer Date Unknown]).

  7. (Dream Text: Last Night's Dream 2—last_nights_dream2), 225). sleepanddreamdatabase.org.

  8. Dream Text: Awareness—harris_2012:Q1035), 17 words, harris_2012:003075[2012–01–01].

  9. Dream Text: Most Recent Dream—Q15), 158 words, krippner_survey1:krusf111[Answer Date Unknown].

  10. Dream Text: Last Night's Dream—last_nights_dream), 622 words, km2015:km[2003–04–27].

  11. Dream Text: Last Night's Dream—last_nights_dream), 89 words,recent_dreams_2015:17,753 [Answer Date Unknown].

  12. All reports are extracts from reports in sleepanddreamsdatabase.org.

  13. Dream Text: Last Night's Dream—last_nights_dream), 150 words, td2017:td116[2016–11-20].

  14. Dream Text: Most Memorable—harris_2011:Q1005), 97 words, harris_2011:047,002 [Answer Date Unknown].

  15. Dream Text: Last Night's Dream—last_nights_dream), 667 words, rb_dreams:rb[Answer Date Unknown].

  16. Telekinetic dreams: Dream Text: Awareness—harris_2012:Q1035), 40 words, harris_2012:001976[2012–01-01].

  17. Dream Text: Last Night's Dream—last_nights_dream), 134 words, sersa:s112[Answer Date Unknown].

  18. Beverly Journal 1986 beverly_1986:beverly 03–10-2017 sleepanddreamsdatabase.org.

  19. Nepal Dreams 2014 nepaldreams:nishan_s 11–23–2014 sleepanddreamsdatabase.org.

  20. Trump Dreams 2016–2017 td2017:td163 04–07–2017 sleepanddreamsdatabase.org.

  21. We many not have the cognitive capacity for such reflection during some dreams since cognition, especially higher-order cognition, is often limited, but my view is that it is possible to have JoAs in some dreams, especially the lucid variety.

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  1. Department of Philosophy, Lady Eaton College, Trent University, Suite S118.1, 1600 West Bank Drive, Peterborough, ON, K9L 0G2, Canada

    Melanie G. Rosen

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Rosen, M.G. Sleeper Agents: The Sense of Agency Over the Dream Body. Hum Stud 44, 693–719 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10746-021-09598-z

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