Abstract
Utility and subjective probability are assessed from a normative social darwinist viewpoint. It is shown that utility is essentially equal to monetary reward and that probability must satisfy a reasonable frequency criterion.
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Rosenlund, S.I. Social Darwinist aspects of utility and probability. Theor Decis 20, 123–132 (1986). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00135088
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00135088