Abstract
It is not clear whether we find anything much like the modern notion of ‘respect’ in Plato. But he certainly has plenty to say about things that might fall under this general heading. Thus he holds that we must not harm others, but always act justly towards them; he also attaches great value to love, and to friendship, devoting three whole dialogues to these subjects. But at the same time he also holds - in common with other Greek philosophers, at least until the advent of Christianity - that in all our actions each of us inevitably aims at his or her own good (that being the very nature of human desire). The difficulty is to understand how Plato thinks he can combine these two positions. The most important claim made in this chapter is that he effects the necessary combination by using the notion of what is ‘ours’, or ‘belongs to’ - is oikeion to - ourselves, so that it includes others and others’ interests as well as our own. A second claim is that the resemblance of this approach to the Stoic idea of oikeiôsis is not accidental.
