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Autonomie

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Handbuch Angewandte Ethik

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Zusammenfassung

Individuelle Autonomie wird allgemein als die Fähigkeit von Personen verstanden, über ihr eigenes Leben bestimmen zu können, ihr eigenes Leben zu führen anhand von Gründen, Überlegungen, Motiven, Wünschen, die ihre eigenen sind und ihnen nicht von anderen – aus persönlichen oder politischen Gründen – aufgezwungen, die aber immer in Beziehung mit anderen entwickelt werden. Deshalb begründet Autonomie Verantwortlichkeit und fordert Respekt von anderen. Autonomie ist seit der Aufklärung einer der zentralen, leitenden Begriffe sowohl in der Ethik wie in der Politischen Philosophie.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Universiteit van Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Niederlande

    Beate Rössler

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  1. Beate Rössler
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Correspondence to Beate Rössler .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Institut für Philosophie und Politikwissenschaft, TU Dortmund, Dortmund, Deutschland

    Christian Neuhäuser

  2. Institut für LER/Institut für Philosophie, Universität Potsdam, Potsdam, Deutschland

    Marie-Luise Raters

  3. Abteilung Philosophie, Universität Bielefeld, Bielefeld, Deutschland

    Ralf Stoecker

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Rössler, B. (2023). Autonomie. In: Neuhäuser, C., Raters, ML., Stoecker, R. (eds) Handbuch Angewandte Ethik. J.B. Metzler, Stuttgart. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-476-05869-0_22

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-476-05869-0_22

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  • Print ISBN: 978-3-476-05868-3

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