Abstract
Too much philosophical ink has been spilled on causality since Aristotle. But the problems remain with us as they were before him. The elimination of the notion of causality and all of its derivatives from the human language is probably the only satisfactory solution to these problems. I personally would prefer this elimination to all philosophizing on causality. The reason for my preference is this. Knowledge about causes is commonly viewed as a necessary condition of efficient action, and philosophizing on causality is justified by saying that knowledge about causes presupposes a concept of causality. In my opinion, the first part of this view, that is, the supposition of an action-theoretic demand for causal knowledge, is a dogma; hence there is no action-theoretic justification of philosophizing on causality. That does not mean that philosophizing on causality is practically irrelevant. On the contrary, even to show that philosophical inquiry into the problems — and pseudoproblems — of causality is a luxury that does not pay would be practically relevant at least in that it would perhaps contribute to a meaningful redistribution of research grants. Another practical consequence of such an inquiry would be the reduction of the plentiful ‘causal’ nonsense produced in the empirical sciences, especially in medicine. One of my aims in presenting the following thoughts on causal explanation is to demonstrate how many of the “causal explanations” offered in medicine belong to this category.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Bibliography
Eberle, R., Kaplan, D., and Montague, R.: 1961, ‘Hempel and Oppenheim on Explanation’, Philosophy of Science 28, 418–428.
Hempel, C. G.: 1965, ‘Aspects of Scientific Explanation’, in Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science, Free Press, New York, pp. 331–496.
Hempel, C. G. and Oppenheim, P.: 1948, ‘Studies in the Logic of Explanation’, Philosophy of Science 15, 135–175.
Sadegh-zadeh, K.: 1978, ‘On the Limits of the Statistical-Causal Analysis as a Diagnostic Procedure’, Theory and Decision 9, 93–107.
Sadegh-zadeh, K.: 1979, Problems of Causality in Clinical Practice, unpublished manuscript, in German. Forthcoming as Volume 2 of Medizin, Ethik & Philosophic, Burgverlag, Tecklenburg, Germany.
Sadegh-zadeh, K.: 1982, ‘Perception, Illusion, and Hallucination’ Metamedicine 3, 159–191.
Salmon, W. C.: 1970, ‘Statistical Explanation’, in R. G. Colodny (ed.), The Nature and Function of Scientific Theories, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, pp. 173–231.
Salmon, W. C.: 1971, ‘Explanation and Relevance: Comments on Greeno’s Theoretical Entities in Statistical Explanation’, in C. G. Buck and R. S. Cohen (eds.), Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 8, D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, pp. 27–39.
Stegmüller, W.: 1969, Wissenschaftliche Erklärung and Begründung, Springer Verlag, Berlin.
Stegmüller, W.: 1973, Personelle und statistische Wahrscheinlichkeit, Zweiter Halbband, Statistisches Schliessen, Statistische Begründung, Statistische Analyse, Springer Verlag, Berlin.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1984 D. Reidel Publishing Company
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Sadegh-Zadeh, K. (1984). A Pragmatic Concept of Causal Explanation. In: Nordenfelt, L., Lindahl, B.I.B. (eds) Health, Disease, and Causal Explanations in Medicine. Philosophy and Medicine, vol 16. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-6283-5_23
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-6283-5_23
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-94-009-6285-9
Online ISBN: 978-94-009-6283-5
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive