Abstract
Two common medical-ethical axions, the health-maximizing axiom and the personhood-respecting axiom, are discussed. On the basis of a philosophical analysis of personhood and freedom of the will it is shown that these two axioms are incompatible. The rejection of the first axiom is suggested.
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Corrigendum: in Part 1 of this paper [5], delete the word ‘symmetric’ on page 118, line 11 from the top.
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Sadegh-Zadeh, K. Normative systems and medical metaethics Part II: Health-maximizing and persons. Metamedicine 2, 343–359 (1981). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00882080
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00882080