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Licensed Unlicensed Requires Authentication Published by De Gruyter July 3, 2021

Disorder and Discontinuity in Law and Morality

  • Leo Katz and Alvaro Sandroni

Abstract

For every legal concept X, there are clear instances exemplifying an X and clear instances exemplifying a non-X. The cases that come before courts are those that seem to lie in between, being neither clearly an X nor clearly a non-X. It is tempting to think that, being in-between, they should receive an in-between treatment, that is, to the extent that they are an X they should be treated as an X. If they are sixty percent toward being an X, they should get sixty percent of the treatment due an X. But this presupposes that in-between cases can be rank-ordered at least roughly according to the degree of their X-ness. This Article explains why that generally cannot be done and why courts therefore go for an either/or approach: something gets treated either as an X or as a non-X. The explanation is rooted in the kind of phenomena explored in the theory of social choice and multi-criterial decision-making.


* Leo Katz, University of Pennsylvania Law School.

** Alvaro Sandroni, Department of Managerial Economics and Decision Sciences, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University. Cite as: Leo Katz & Alvaro Sandroni, Disorder and Discontinuity in Law and Morality, 22 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 31 (2021).


Published Online: 2021-07-03
Published in Print: 2021-01-27

© 2021 by Theoretical Inquiries in Law

Downloaded on 30.5.2024 from https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/til-2021-0003/html
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